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ABSTRACT

BEYOND SYMPTOM ACCUMULATION: A LACANIAN CLINICAL APPROACH
TO OBSESSION
A CASE STUDY AND THEORETICAL EXPOSITION

By
Julie L. Futrell
August 2014
Dissertation Supervised by Bruce Fink, Ph.D.
Contemporary approaches to psychotherapeutic intervention increasingly utilize a
medical-based diagnostic system focused on identifying and eradicating discrete
symptoms. Mental “disorders” are determined by identifying “pathological” behaviors
and superficial symptoms which are then lumped together arbitrarily and labeled as
specific “mental illnesses.” Despite a gross lack of supporting evidence, these “mental
illnesses” are then attributed to various brain abnormalities and biological malfunctions,
most often with reference to “chemical imbalances” believed to be the origin of mental
distress. Evidence for such biological reductionism is presented conclusively, with little
regard for the implicit ontological assumptions made by such a positivist perspective.
When psychopathology is viewed in this way, the role of human experience is devalued,
resulting in an egregious medicalization of human distress that has devastating
consequences for those who suffer.
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The work of Jacques Lacan offers a radically different approach to diagnostic formulation
and treatment that has, until recently, largely been ignored in Western psychology. This
dissertation seeks to participate in correcting this imbalance by offering a Lacanian
clinical approach to working with obsession. I offer two case studies of former patients—
both of whom presented with classic symptoms of the medical syndrome known as
obsessive-compulsive disorder—to illustrate Lacan’s structural approach in
contradistinction to a descriptive, symptom-based approach. I endeavor to make Lacan’s
obsessive structure and his diagnostic schema accessible to mental health professionals
interested in employing Lacan’s work. To do so, I utilize a qualitative case study
methodology, with particular emphasis on the psychoanalytic interview. I draw specific
attention to the difference between obsessive-compulsive disorder and Lacan’s
obsessional structure. Finally, I highlight the ethical implications for clinicians of the
ideological construction of mental distress as solely biological and suggest that Lacan
offers a diametrically opposed discourse that is sorely lacking and needed at this time.
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INTRODUCTION
Locating Lack
Analysis [...] limits itself to a different discourse, one that is inscribed in
the very suffering of the being we have before us and is already articulated
in something—his symptoms and his structure—that escapes him, in so far
as obsessional neurosis, for instance, doesn’t simply consist of symptoms
but is also a structure.
(Lacan, 1981/1993, p. 134)1
Introduction to the Problem: The Medicalization of Distress and the Absence of
Lacan in American Psychology
Contemporary approaches to psychotherapeutic intervention increasingly utilize a
medical-based diagnostic system focused on identifying and eradicating discrete
symptoms. Mental disorders are determined by identifying “pathological” behaviors and
superficial symptoms which are often lumped together arbitrarily and labeled as specific
mental illnesses. Despite a gross lack of supporting evidence, these “mental illnesses” are
largely attributed to various brain abnormalities and biological malfunctions, most often
with reference to chemical imbalances posited as the origin of mental distress. Evidence
for such biological reductionism is presented conclusively, with little regard for the
implicit ontological assumptions made by such a natural science perspective.
The primary diagnostic tool for those working in the mental health profession
today is The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR, 2000),
published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA). The DSM-IV-TR utilizes a
descriptive approach to nosology aimed at categorically classifying disorders that are
believed to be neatly separated via discrete symptomatology. This type of classification
system relies heavily on superficial symptoms that are readily recognizable and attempts
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to standardize such symptoms across patient populations. Human pathology is
consequently viewed in light of similar behaviors and cognitions believed to be
abnormal, where the line between “normal” and “abnormal” is defined by an elite group
of mental health professionals—primarily psychiatrists—who form the DSM task force.
While the DSM has been praised for providing a standardized nomenclature for
mental disorders that allows mental health professionals to easily converse, it has not
been without its critics. Indeed, the history of the DSM is rife with conflict. First
published in 1952, the first edition detailed 106 diagnoses and was 130 pages in length,
while the current version lists over 300 diagnoses and is an incredible 952 pages long
(Mayes & Horwitz, 2005). The new edition—the DSM-V—is set to be released (amidst
tremendous controversy) in May of 2013 and has only further increased the number of
psychiatric diagnoses. What has contributed to such a dramatic increase in diagnoses in
such a short amount of time? Are people generally more mentally disabled now than in
years past or does the dramatic increase in diagnoses instead reflect political, financial,
and social motivations operating behind the scenes? Mayes and Horwitz (2005) argue
convincingly for the latter—suggesting that changes in the DSM, rather than reflecting
growing scientific knowledge, instead reflect the
[s]tandardization of psychiatric diagnoses [...] [that are] the product of
many factors, including (1) professional politics within the mental health
community, (2) increased government involvement in mental health
research and policymaking, (3) mounting pressure on psychiatrists from
health insurers to demonstrate the effectiveness of their practices, and (4)
the necessity of pharmaceutical companies to market their products to treat
specific diseases. (p. 249)
Concerns about the reliability and validity of DSM diagnostic criteria abound as the DSM
continues to move toward an almost exclusively biological model, despite its overseers’
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claim to its “atheoretical” nature. What appears to be occurring is a medicalization of
human distress.2
For example, Mayes and Horwitz, in detailing the history of the DSM, point out
that the first and second editions of the book, while including biological perspectives on
mental disorders, primarily reflected psychodynamic and psychosocial understandings of
human distress that focused on broad underlying concepts rather than surface symptoms.
Symptoms were not seen as revealing overt disease entities but were instead understood
as disguising underlying conflicts. The focus of clinical explanations and treatments was,
therefore, on “the total personality and life experiences of the person that provided the
context for the interpretation of the symptoms” (p. 250). However, in 1980, the
publication of the third edition of the DSM saw a shift of emphasis from underlying
dynamics to a more medically-based criterion with then-chairman Robert Spitzer—
responding in part to pressures from insurance companies for treatment outcome
accountability—arguing that mental disorders were simply a subset of medical disorders.
This shift to a more biologically-driven understanding of mental disturbance radically
changed the landscape of the mental health field, replacing contextual understandings of
human experience with diagnostic and quantitative research models imported from
medicine. Because insurance carriers would only pay for the treatment of discrete
diseases, visible and measurable symptoms became equated with specific “diseases” that
could then be treated pharmacologically. Under fire as a “quack” and illegitimate science,
psychiatry readily adopted this new paradigm “transforming how society perceive[d],
define[d], and treat[ed] mental disorders” (p. 258). Borne from this cataclysmic change

2
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were the era of so-called empirically-validated treatments and a biological vision of
mental health that stressed faulty brain chemistry and psychopharmacological
medications at the expense of contextual and dynamic psychotherapeutic interventions.
This biological perspective on mental disturbance has only increased with each
subsequent edition of the DSM and the influence of the pharmaceutical industry on the
creation of new “mental illnesses” cannot be overestimated. Recent research into
financial ties between DSM task force members and pharmaceutical companies that
benefit from increased specialization and numbers of diagnoses has been less than
flattering for psychiatric task force members claiming impartiality (see Cosgrove, et al.,
2006). While it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully articulate such egregious
misconduct and conflicts of interest by DSM task force members, it is necessary to
highlight the biased politics behind the current diagnostic system, particularly because the
DSM-IV-TR presents itself as holding the privileged and correct view of mental disorders.
The DSM-IV-TR makes implicit assumptions about human nature that it obscures by
presenting quantifiable “evidence” to support its claims. Rather than acknowledging that
its medical model perspective is but one way of viewing human suffering, it instead
presents itself as Truth; the result is that many now believe their mental distress is simply
biological in nature. What is missing from such ontological assumptions is any notion of
suffering as meaningful in a human context. Furthermore, recent investigations into the
efficacy of psychopharmacological medications indicates that much of the previous
research exalting the effectiveness of psychotherapeutic drugs has likewise been tainted
by political and financial motivations (see Harrow & Jobe, 2007; Whitaker, 2004, 2005,
2010).
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Concomitant with the proliferation of mental disorders defined by the DSM-IV-TR
has been an increase in manualized clinical techniques aimed at managing specific
“disorders.” In line with natural scientific assumptions and increased pathologizing of
human experience has come the demand for “empirically-validated treatments,” also
known as “evidence-based practices.” Such a call indicates “the power the positivist
research paradigm has gained over the practice of psychotherapy” (Miller, 2011, p. 27).
The dominant discourse that proclaims that quantification is legitimation (and
discoverable exclusively via the experimental method) still reigns supreme in mainstream
psychology, despite the seemingly commonsense notion that humans are complex,
malleable beings incapable of being isolated and manipulated as independent and
dependent variables. Calls for treatments that can be empirically-validated leave little free
reign to the experience and creativity of the therapist and little room for human behaviors
and experience that do not fit preformed diagnostic criteria. Manualized treatments
require the implementation of predetermined steps aimed at eradicating standardized
symptoms. When there is a reduction of symptoms (and there often initially is), we can
then say that such-and-such treatment intervention has been “empirically validated.”
However, as is increasingly being recognized (see Shedler, 2010), such symptom
alleviation is often short-lived, but because long-term follow-up on manualized treatment
approaches has yet to be conducted, such information is often obscured. Lost in such
manualized treatment approaches are the experience of the therapist and the singularity of
the patient. To assume that all human problems fall into easily defined categories that
merely need a manual to be overcome is not only astoundingly simplistic, it erases the
very qualities that make humans, well, human.
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Moreover, the idea that symptoms are all-telling is one that Freud, from his
earliest writings, warned against. As Dany Nobus in Jacques Lacan and the Freudian
Practice of Psychoanalysis (2000), notes,
Freud’s first, negative diagnostic rule read that one should not take
symptoms at face value. Mental organization had to be dislodged from
observable phenomena, and analysts were urged to suspend their judgment
and to look for more reliable criteria. (p. 8)
Indeed, Freud often went so far (contrary to those who followed in his footsteps) as to
maintain that seemingly neurotic symptoms did not always indicate an underlying
neurosis. Symptoms could be profoundly misleading. This, of course, flies in the face of
modern psychology and psychiatry where symptoms (such as hallucinations and
delusions) are the defining criteria for a diagnosis. Freud believed that symptoms often
served as guides for underlying disturbance; however, he did not believe they could be
taken on their own merit. Given this, what are we to make of the current emphasis on
diagnosis via discrete symptoms and of symptoms taken at face value?
In this dissertation, I will argue that we need an approach to diagnosis and
psychotherapeutic intervention that seeks something beyond the symptom and that
recognizes the psychic singularity of the patient. Rather than argue that there is no value
in neurobiological understandings of or cognitive behavioral approaches to mental
disturbance, I hope to perhaps poke a small hole in the ideology of biological
reductionism that has so thoroughly captured the mental health world by offering an
alternative to symptom-based, descriptive clinical approaches. I agree with McWilliams
(2011) that “We have become too reductive in neglecting the psychological side of
[disorders] simply because we now know more about their biology” (p. 290).
Furthermore, I hope to correct an imbalance that exists in American psychodynamic
6

theory today by explicating the work of French psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan, who has
largely been excluded from American discourse. As I will show, Lacan’s structural
approach to treatment and diagnosis recognizes the complexity of human experience and
addresses the question—largely left out of contemporary psychology—of human desire.
Whither Lacan?
The work of Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) has, until recently, been principally
ignored in the United States. Though prominent in much of Europe and South America,
Lacan’s clinical writings have gone relatively unnoticed by English-speaking
psychologists. The reasons for such exclusion are certainly overdetermined, but Lacan’s
notoriously difficult and opaque prose is certainly foremost among them. Also prominent
is the dominance of ego psychology in America (and, more recently, relational
approaches to psychotherapy)—an approach that Lacan critiqued heavily and
unabashedly throughout his career. Indeed, Lacan’s relentless attack on the strain of
psychoanalysis that has historically been mostly associated with America, combined with
his obscure style, has done little to ingratiate American audiences to his approach.
Despite his lack of popularity in the US, Lacan’s immense appeal in other countries
should at least prompt us to examine whether his teachings might have something to
offer. As Nobus (2000) notes, four years after his death, 19 out of 20 psychoanalytic
organizations in France were basing their work on Lacan’s teachings.
Recent publications by American psychotherapists devoted to elucidating
Lacan’s clinical approach (e.g., Swales, 2012; Miller, 2011) suggest there is mounting
interest within the therapeutic community in a Lacanian approach radically opposed to
the current dominant discourse. While these recent publications indicate positive
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movement toward something more than a descriptive approach to diagnosis and
intervention, Lacan remains conspicuously absent from therapeutic discourse, as well as
Clinical Psychology programs. Where he has been taken up, it has usually been in a
highly theoretical manner with little clinical application. For example, many authors
apply Lacanian theory to cultural, ideological, and political topics rather than clinical
ones (e.g., Copjec, 1994; Stavrakakis, 1999; Zizek, 1991, 1992). While these authors
have certainly been important in spreading Lacan’s name, they have done little to
disseminate his clinical approach (Goldman, 2004). This is particularly curious since
Lacan (1973/1981) is known to have said, “The aim of my teaching has been and still is
the training of analysts” (p. 230). In spite of this commitment, Lacan himself rarely
published his own case studies. To my knowledge, there are only two: A brief mention
of Lacan’s work with an obsessive patient in “The Direction of the Treatment and the
Principles of its Power” (1961/2002), as well as a transcribed interview with a psychotic
patient (Schneiderman, 1980). We not only lack case studies by Lacan himself, we also
lack texts explicitly applying a Lacanian approach to psychotherapy. As Lacanian
psychoanalyst and author Bruce Fink (1997) states, “Few if any books on Lacan available
today talk about how one goes about doing Lacanian psychoanalysis, what it really
involves, and what thus distinguishes it from other forms of therapy, whether
psychoanalytically oriented or not” (p. x). I agree with Goldman (2004) that “There is a
need for literature that illustrates the ‘how,’ that is, the practices involved in ‘doing
Lacanian psychoanalysis’” (p. 4).
There are, of course, notable authors who have striven to disseminate Lacan’s
clinical corpus; however, as Miller (2011) notes, many of these often do not escape the
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degree of abstraction in their writings for which Lacan himself was notorious. Indeed, it
may be the case that these writings only serve to frustrate English-speaking audiences
even more by inadequately explaining Lacan’s alien terminology and sometimes seeming
randomness of procedure (e.g., Dor, 1998; Schneiderman, 1980). Stuart Schneiderman’s
(1980) edited collection Returning to Freud: Clinical Psychoanalysis in the School of
Lacan presents both case studies and theoretical expositions by students of Lacan in the
areas of neurosis, perversion, and psychosis. Dany Nobus’s (2000) Jacques Lacan and
the Freudian Practice of Psychoanalysis addresses such Lacanian themes as diagnosis
via speech and transference, the analyst’s desire, and tactics of interpretation. Malone and
Friedlander (2000) have also contributed to the clinical literature with The Subject of
Lacan: A Lacanian Reader for Psychologists, which offers three case examples but
remains largely theoretical. Joel Dor’s (2001) Structure and Perversions, offers two case
studies; however, as Goldman (2004) notes, the cases serve more as a complement to the
theory than as an exposition of it. Particular concepts and verbatim quotes from his
patients are largely missing.
Perhaps most important to my growth as a clinician and a bit more accessible to
those unfamiliar with Lacan are the books of Bruce Fink. Fink’s (1997) A Clinical
Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis is a readily accessible introduction to many of
Lacan’s key analytic concepts such as desire, jouissance, and object a and offers several
case vignettes. Fink presents two of his own case studies—one illustrating the diagnostic
structure of hysteria and the other depicting a case of obsession. Fink’s (2007)
Fundamentals of Psychoanalytic Technique further explicates such Lacanian clinical
techniques as scanding (the variable-length session), punctuating and interpreting, and
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non-normalizing therapy, to name but a few. Elsewhere, Fink (2003) provides clinicians
with a case study of perversion. In these writings, Fink weaves together theory and
practice to present an excellent primer for Lacanian-oriented therapy.
While all of these writings have contributed to a greater explication of Lacanian
theory and practice to an English-speaking audience, they remain fairly broad in scope.
With a couple of notable exceptions, there is a dearth of clinical books exploring a
Lacanian approach to specific clinical issues. Swales (2012) recently published a work
addressing the issue of perversion from a Lacanian standpoint and offers two of her own
case studies to demonstrate Lacan’s clinical approach to working with perversion. Miller
(2011) has written an excellent primer on Lacan utilizing four of his own case studies to
specifically articulate how the therapist “listens to the letter” of the patient’s speech.
Miller demonstrates Lacan’s emphasis on the role of the signifier by attending to his
patients’ verbatim speech, as well as offering valuable case formulations. Cristina Laurita
(2008) addresses the issue of addiction from a Lacanian perspective, and Yael Goldman
(2004) offers case formulations of a hysterical and obsessive patient, as well as
articulating Lacan’s concept of the fundamental fantasy.3
Even shorter in supply are specific Lacanian case studies of obsession.
Schneiderman’s (1986) Rat Man, in which he offers a Lacanian analysis of Freud’s
infamous case study of obsessional neurosis, is well-known though dated. Serge
Leclaire’s “Jerome, or Death in the Life of the Obsessional” (1956/1980) and “Philo, or
the Obsessional and His Desire” (1959/1980) provide excellent case formulations and
highlight key components of Lacan’s obsessional structure but both require a

3
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sophisticated working knowledge of Lacanian theory. In my case presentations, I do not
assume a working knowledge of Lacan—I instead attempt to articulate Lacanian
theoretical concepts through concrete case examples. Rather than engage in long
theoretical discussions of Lacan’s work as has previously been done, I instead direct the
reader to specific texts that may aid the reader if s/he desires a more in-depth
understanding. My aim is to demonstrate how Lacan’s concepts guided my clinical
practice and informed my case conceptualizations. It is thus my hope to contribute to the
burgeoning area of clinical literature by utilizing Lacan’s structural diagnostic criteria to
elucidate a clinical approach to working with obsessive structure. By emphasizing
Lacan’s structural diagnostic criteria, I hope to illuminate why a symptom-based
approach to psychotherapeutic intervention and diagnosis is superficial at best and
unethical at worst.
I believe the need for such scholarship in this area is twofold: 1) to provide an
alternative diagnostic approach to the current dominant discourse as exemplified by the
DSM-IV-TR; and 2) to articulate how a Lacanian approach to psychotherapy and case
formulation can benefit current psychological practices. To achieve these aims, I will first
provide a comprehensive account of obsessional neurosis, as well as the various theories
and treatment modalities associated with the disorder. I will then explore the history of
the case study methodology I will be utilizing and argue for why this method is best
suited for illustrating the how of psychotherapeutic practice. In Chapter Two, I will offer
a brief primer on Lacan’s basic concepts. In Chapters Three and Four, I will present two
case studies of patients4 I worked with doing long-term, twice weekly therapy. Both
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patients experienced symptoms of what the DSM identifies as obsessive-compulsive
disorder (OCD), yet, over time, I came to recognize them as structurally different;
consequently, the way I worked with each patient was distinctly different. By
highlighting these differences, I hope to not only offer a Lacanian approach to working
with obsession—I also hope to show why the medical diagnosis known as OCD is based
on superficial symptoms and therefore limited from the start. By doing so, I believe I will
have achieved my goal of critiquing the dominant DSM-IV-TR biological model of
diagnosis while simultaneously contributing to the Lacanian clinical literature. In my
final chapter, I will discuss the limitations of my approach and draw attention to the
ethical implications my dissertation has highlighted. I will also discuss my methodology
and implications for future research, particularly with regard to the impending publication
of the DSM-V.
Preliminary Observations
There are various obstacles that present themselves at the outset of a dissertation
utilizing case studies, particularly Lacanian case studies. Like others, I find Lacan
difficult to understand at times. As is the case with any difficult thinker, my
understanding has grown as I have read more and as I have become more acclimated to
Lacan’s prose. Nevertheless, there is still much I do not comprehend and with which I
continue to struggle. I wonder (at times) what makes me feel capable of writing a clinical
dissertation on Lacan. I am not, after all, a Lacanian analyst. One of the answers that
therapist and client. Increasingly (and unfortunately), mental service providers use the term “consumers” to
identify those who “consume” mental health services. Lacan began using the term “analysand” after 1967
because it implies the person being analyzed is the one doing the work (see Fink, 1997). I have chosen to
use the term “patient” because I do not believe “client” accurately captures much of the distress and pain
my patients experienced, nor do I see the therapist/patient relationship as reciprocal. As I am not, at present,
a Lacanian analyst, I do not feel comfortable using the term “analysand,” but I do believe the bulk of
responsibility for the therapeutic works lies with the patient. I see the term “consumer” as a product of our
capitalist society and highly disrespectful to those who seek our help.
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returns to me when I pose this question is that I have witnessed the effect that Lacanian
praxis had upon my patients when I slowly began to incorporate his methods into my
already analytically-leaning practice. I may not be a Lacanian analyst, but I am a
Lacanian-oriented psychotherapist (in training). I believe the incorporation of Lacanian
techniques into therapeutic practice is possible by anyone who chooses to do so. There is
a strange rift in America between “Lacanians” and “everyone else.” I do not believe this
need be the case. Lacan has much to offer anyone working in the field of mental health
who deals with the tragedies, heartbreak, joy, and beauty entailed in the
psychotherapeutic process.
The other answer that returns to me in response to my question is that there are
limits to understanding such that I will, of course, never understand all of Lacan. I
certainly do not believe Lacan wrote his entire oeuvre with the intention that everyone
understand his every idea. I believe this is one of Lacan’s most powerful lessons: There is
a limit to understanding—a lack. As Lacan (1975/1998) noted, “[R]eading in no way
obliges you to understand. You have to read first” (p. 65). To believe I could somehow
understand it all and lay it out easily here on paper would be a denial of that lack. My
knowledge has limits. My formulations have limits. Despite these limits, I have done my
best here to present some of Lacan’s ideas in a way that may be accessible to a greater
number of people. Likely, I do him a bit of a disservice by simplifying his ideas so that
they are more readily “understandable.”
Then there are my patients. Their confidentiality is of the utmost importance.
They each signed a consent form; nevertheless, I have taken every possible measure to
ensure their anonymity. All names, places, and identifying information have been
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changed. The information I offer is based on their signifiers (i.e., words), desires,
fantasies, dreams, and the way their structural economies shifted and moved during the
course of therapy. I have had to pay particular attention to my own subjectivity as I have
formulated these cases. My formulations changed over the years I spent with these
patients as I listened to them speak—as more of the unconscious was revealed. In
formulating their cases here, I have reminded myself that I am not an impartial spectator.
The way I present the case can never be something completely objective, complete
objectivity being a myth of modern science. I have attempted here to stay as close to the
letter of the patients’ speech as possible, and I have attempted, first and foremost, to
respect the difference and singularity of each person.
There are circumstances surrounding my time with these patients that are unique.
Firstly, the work took place as part of my psychology doctoral training. Patients were
aware of this, and it thus entailed certain conditions that would not normally occur,
including patients being aware of certain aspects of my personal life that I would not
typically share. They were also aware that I would only be at the clinic for four years.
There was a time limit set on therapy from the beginning—something I would not
normally advocate. Secondly, the work took place in a university setting which likewise
affected therapeutic processes in various ways. Typically, fee is determined between
therapist and patient; however, fees were determined by clinic policy and payment was
not handled directly between myself and the patient. I also found confidentiality to be an
issue at times, as the clinic had an open waiting room where patients often encountered
people they knew. A further difference was that breaks in therapy frequently took place
when the university closed. This meant patients essentially followed a university schedule
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rather than breaks that were set by me as the therapist. Finally, Lacan was not part of my
curriculum throughout the time I worked with these patients. The latter were curious
when I began punctuating polyvalent phrases and signifiers during sessions. Initially, this
obvious change in approach put “me” a little more in the picture than I usually would
allow; however, this rather quickly changed as my patients began to question the layers
of meaning present in their own words, leading them away from me and on to questions
about the unconscious.
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CHAPTER ONE
A History of Obsession
I must confess that I have not yet succeeded in completely penetrating the
complicated texture of a severe case of obsessional neurosis [....] An
obsessional neurosis is in itself not an easy thing to understand.
(Freud, 1909/1955, p. 294)
Literature Review
The seemingly senseless and strange cluster of symptoms that we now identify as
OCD has been documented in the literature since at least the early 1600s (Davis, 2008),5
although it was not known by that name until recent times. As with many of the
psychiatric diagnoses in the DSM-IV-TR, the syndrome has acquired a medical
nomenclature that attempts to place it in the same register as other biological diseases
such as cancer or diabetes; however, the terms “obsessional” and “obsessive” have seen a
wide number of different usages over the years. The terms have been used to: 1) denote
the clinical syndrome, OCD, 2) as an often derogatory descriptive label for specific
behaviors and thoughts (e.g., “Stop obsessing over him!”), and 3) as an indication of a
type of character (e.g., “You’re such an obsessive!”). Despite the variety of usages these
words have acquired,
The implication of all these definitions is that an obsession is an unwanted
but repetitive thought which forces itself insistently into consciousness
and recurs against the conscious desires of the person concerned. Such
thoughts may include intrusive doubts, wishes, fears, impulses,
prohibitions, warnings, and commands. Neither reason nor logic can
influence these pointless, repugnant, insistent and absurd thoughts, and
they persist so tenaciously that they cannot be dispelled by conscious
effort. A compulsion, in addition to having many qualities in common
with obsessions, is generally thought of as expressed in action. (Sandler &
Hazari, 1960/1997, p. 163, original italics)

5

For a complete history of obsessional neurosis, refer to Davis (2008).
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Due, in part, to the coupling of obsessive and compulsive in the naming of the clinical
syndrome, many assume the two phenomena are intrinsically intertwined; however, as
McWilliams (2011) notes, this is not necessarily the case and the two are often
conceptually and clinically separate. McWilliams further comments that, while analytic
explorations of both obsessions and compulsions reveal similar dynamics, the coupling of
the two is somewhat artificial with respect to character:
As symptoms, obsessions (persistent, unwanted thoughts) and compulsions
(persistent, unwanted actions) can occur in anyone, not just in those who
are characterologically obsessive and compulsive. And not all obsessive
and compulsive individuals suffer recurrent intrusive thoughts or engage
in irresistible actions. (p. 290, original italics)
Thus, we see already that common parlance about OCD is not as straightforward as is
presented in the DSM, nor are superficial symptoms as trustworthy as one might be led to
assume. Freud (1907/1959) used the term obsessional neurosis to include compulsive
acts, articulating his view that compulsions were defensive behavioral reactions to
obsessional thoughts and impulses. “People who carry out obsessive actions or
ceremonials belong to the same class as those who suffer from obsessive thinking,
obsessive ideas, obsessive impulses and the like. Taken together, these form a particular
clinical entity, to which the name of ‘obsessional neurosis’ is customarily applied” (p.
117).
Operational definitions aside for the moment, recent epidemiological studies
indicate that OCD is on the rise—with some estimates suggesting that between four and
seven million Americans suffer from OCD (a fiftyfold increase since 1953, or
approximately one in 40 people)—while others suggest rates are even higher (Penzel,
2000). What was once thought to be a rare disorder has been found to be much more
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prevalent than previously thought. Reasons for such discrepancies are most certainly
overdetermined and include misdiagnosis, overdiagnosis, and patients’ failure to report
symptoms they view as embarrassing, irrational, and shameful. There is also a crossover
between what is termed “classic OCD” and the Cluster C personality disorder known as
“obsessive-compulsive personality disorder” (OCPD).6
OCD and OCPD are typically distinguished by whether the patient’s symptoms
are ego-dystonic or ego-syntonic. As Gabbard (2005) notes, “Obsessions are defined as
recurrent ego-dystonic thoughts, whereas compulsions are ritualized actions that must be
performed to relieve anxiety” (p. 264, original italics).7 In OCD, repetitive obsessions and
compulsions are intrusive, unwanted, and ego alien to the sufferer. In short, they disturb
the person who experiences them (McWilliams, 2011). OCPD, however, is seen as a
characterological “pervasive pattern of preoccupation with orderliness, perfectionism,
and mental and interpersonal control, at the expense of flexibility, openness, and
efficiency” (DSM-IV-TR, p. 725). Those suffering from OCPD do not feel disturbed by
their symptoms, and more importantly, are unaware of their “pathological” nature.
Indeed, sufferers may derive great pleasure from the order and rigidity that characterizes
their lives.8
To complicate matters, the personality characteristics associated with OCPD are
often found in those suffering from OCD as well. Despite the DSM’s attempt to neatly

6

The DSM-IV-TR (2000) defines a personality disorder as “an enduring pattern of inner experience and
behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual’s culture, is pervasive and
inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable over time, and leads to distress or
impairment” (p. 684).
7
For the full diagnostic criteria for OCD, see (DSM-IV-TR, p. 456).
8
I would add here that they perhaps derive more conscious pleasure from such character traits. All
symptoms provide a certain jouissance—a topic I will take up in greater depth later. The “ego-dystonic”
symptoms of OCD also provide pleasure; however, patients are usually unaware of how they indirectly
enjoy their symptoms.
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categorize disorders, there is often no easy delineation between the two. This has
prompted many clinicians and researchers to take a dimensional approach to obsessivecompulsive disorders, proposing that, rather than being distinct disorders, obsessivecompulsive traits instead lie on a spectrum (Gabbard, 2005; Penzel, 2000; Stein &
Hollander, 1993/1997). In this view, disorders that are separated and defined by certain
behaviors in the DSM including OCD, trichotillomania (compulsive hair-pulling), body
dysmorphic disorder (imagined ugliness disorder), anorexia nervosa, Tourette’s
syndrome, self-injurious behavior, onychophagia (nail biting), and dermatillomania
(compulsive skin picking), are not viewed as different disorders, but rather represent
different manifestations of underlying issues. Thus, the “ego-dystonic” obsessions and
compulsions associated with OCD—rather than being distinct from the personality
organization of OCPD—are instead viewed as one of a difference of degree As Gabbard
(2005) notes,
Symptoms of an obsessive-compulsive nature have also been reported as
transitory occurrences during the psychoanalytic treatment of patients with
OCPD. However, empirical studies indicate that a wide range of
personality disorders may occur in patients with OCD. (p. 572)9
What Gabbard is, of course, suggesting (as did McWilliams previously) is that clusters of
symptoms occur in a variety of character structures, and as such, cannot be taken at face
value as specific “disease entities”—a central point of this dissertation. Under the current
diagnostic system, OCD is labeled as an anxiety disorder, Tourette’s syndrome as a tic
disorder, anorexia nervosa as an eating disorder, body dysmorphic disorder as a
somatoform or delusional disorder, and trichotillomania as an impulse disorder. This
focus on overt symptoms and behaviors thus obscures underlying dynamics. The
9

For an in-depth analysis of obsessional symptoms and corresponding personality disorders, see Gabbard
(2005, p. 572).
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important point to be made here is that when a descriptive approach to diagnosis is taken
that focuses on symptom patterns, there are innumerable diagnoses that may be
concocted.10 Consequently, there are innumerable therapeutic techniques that may also be
concocted to “treat” such disorders. Treatments are, of course, aimed at symptom
reduction, and the success of each treatment is measured precisely by this symptom
reduction rather than any change in the patient’s psychic economy.
The precursor to the distinction between what are currently termed “Axis I
clinical syndromes” and “Axis II personality disorders” lies in the emergence of the ego
psychology tradition. Wilhelm Reich (1933) distinguished between what he termed
symptom neuroses and character neuroses, where symptom neuroses were identified as
discrete and connected to an identifiable precipitant in a person’s current life that had
activated an unconscious conflict (roughly equivalent to contemporary Axis I disorders).
A person with a symptom neurosis was believed to have the ability to engage her11
“observing ego” to gain perspective on her symptomatology. By contrast, character
neuroses were viewed as ego-syntonic (i.e., there was a problem with the development of
the observing ego) and indicated a problem at the level of the whole personality. Work
with patients with character neuroses was viewed as considerably more difficult than
those with symptom neuroses (a belief that is still widely held by many clinicians), with
the goal of therapy being the development of the observing ego so that what had formerly
been ego-syntonic could be made ego-alien and thus “managed” more effectively
(McWilliams, 2011).12

10

To this list, we could also add the newly-formed “hoarding disorder,” seen as a disorder that lies on the
same spectrum, but that is, likewise, presented as somewhat different from the others.
11
To be respectful, I utilize both the feminine and masculine pronouns throughout this dissertation.
12
The notion of an “observing ego” is one that Lacan critiques heavily, as will be outlined in Chapter Two.
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On the one hand, the distinction between symptom and character neuroses has
been a strength of the psychoanalytic tradition in that it draws attention to the deeper
problems adhering to personality structure; however, it also runs the risk of artificially
splitting the symptom off from the whole person by emphasizing the development of an
observing ego designed to act as master and manager. The point, of course, is that
symptoms and structure do not always coincide; however, symptoms are always a
response to unconscious conflicts that have not been adequately (if ever) symbolized.
Thus, while I agree with McWilliams (2011) that “The practitioner who expects from a
patient with an obsessive character the same rate of progress achievable with a person
who suddenly develop[s] an intrusive obsession is risking a painful fall” (p. 12), I do not
believe this is the case if we remember that underlying the “sudden intrusive obsession”
is an enduring character structure that may be just as refractory to change as that of
someone who is obsessively structured. In other words, the person who experiences a
sudden intrusive obsession may overcome that particular symptom (the obsessive
intrusion) more readily, but this does not indicate that treatment will be easier—only that
a particular symptom may remit more quickly. What is important is that we identify the
underlying structural dynamics. Freud, in his early formulations, often fell victim to the
conflation of symptoms with structure13—at times failing to distinguish between
structurally hysterical or obsessive individuals and those who were simply manifesting
hysterical or obsessive symptoms; however, by the end of his career, he had clearly
begun to discriminate between an “obsessional neurosis in an otherwise nonobsessive

13

See Chapter 17 of Freud’s (1917) Introductory Lectures where he formulates what he describes as female
“obsessives.” In my opinion, the women he presents are clearly hysterically structured with an
accompanying obsessional neurosis. Here we see the symptomatology taking precedence over the
underlying structure.
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person and an obsession that was part of an obsessive-compulsive character”
(McWilliams, 2011, p. 46).
Psychological Formulations of Obsession
Classical Psychoanalysis14
For these patients whom I analyzed had enjoyed good mental health up to
the moment at which an occurrence of incompatibility took place in their
ideational life—that is to say, until their ego was faced with an experience,
an idea or a feeling which aroused such distressing affect that the subject
decided to forget about it because he had no confidence in his power to
resolve the contradiction between that incompatible idea and his ego.15
(Freud, 1894/1962, p. 47)
Freud’s revolutionary accounts of hysteria on the one hand, and of obsessional
neurosis on the other, are well-known to comprise the keystones of psychoanalytic theory
(Stein, 1997). Indeed, Freud’s (1909/1955) seminal case study, Notes upon a Case of
Obsessional Neurosis, offers one of the most thorough accounts of the syndrome. The
mysterious symptoms that plagued the infamous “Rat Man” offered Freud the chance to
work through and explicate his early formulations of the unconscious and the specific
meanings that symptoms carried as compromise formations. Freud’s emphasis on the
importance of interpreting symptoms is a hallmark of psychoanalysis, and sadly, one that
has largely been forgotten in our modern era. Freud insisted throughout his career that
symptoms served as disguises for underlying sexual and aggressive tendencies that had

14

What follows is an abbreviated and simplified version of Freudian theory. My assumption here is that the
reader of this dissertation already has at least an elementary understanding of psychoanalytic theory.
Consequently, my aim is to highlight the major components of Freud’s theory of obsessional neurosis
rather than offer a detailed description. For detailed explanations, the reader is referred to Freud (1894,
1895, 1896, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1913).
15
It is important to note here that Freud had not yet developed his structural theory of mind. “Ego” or ich in
German refers to the whole person and is different from “das ich,” which Freud later used to refer to the
psychic agency commonly referred to as “the ego.” The distinction here is important, as ego psychologists
do not make this distinction, resulting in a misunderstanding of Freud’s early use of the term. See Soler
(1996, p. 256).
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been repressed, and as such, required careful examination and interpretation. Far from
being senseless, obsessive actions and compulsive rituals were laden with meaning. “[I]n
obsessive actions everything has its meaning and can be interpreted. [...] We express this
important fact by saying that the obsessive action serves to express unconscious motives
and ideas” (Freud, 1907/1959, p. 122, original italics). In Freud’s early work, he
explicitly identified obsessions as “surrogate[s] for unbearable sexual ideas” (p. 53) and
posited that the obsessive experienced guilt over early sexual pleasure. In fact, Freud
initially differentiated hysteria and obsessional neurosis by the response that each had to
early sexual experience: Hysterics responded passively and with disgust, while the
obsessive’s early sexual experiences were carried out “actively and with pleasure” (Stein,
1997, p. 3).16 17
Hysteria and obsessional neurosis were further differentiated by the way each
responded to the incompatible idea striving for consciousness. For the hysteric, “The
incompatible idea [was] rendered innocuous by its sum of excitation being transformed
into something somatic” (Freud, 1894/1962, p. 49, original italics); whereas, in
obsession,
In order to fend off an incompatible idea, he sets about separating it from
its affect, then that affect is obliged to remain in the psychical sphere. The
idea, now weakened, is still left in consciousness, separated from all
association. But its affect, which has become free, attaches itself to other
ideas which are not in themselves incompatible; and, thanks to this “false
connection,” those ideas turn into obsessional ideas. (Freud, 1894/1962,
pp. 51-52, original italics)

16

Freud later questioned his theory of the etiology of hysteria and obsessional neurosis; however,
throughout his career, he retained some belief in his original hypothesis. In 1924, he added a footnote to his
1896 paper to this effect.
17
Freud later suggests that an earlier passive experience lay in the remoter background of obsessional
neurosis. See Freud (1896/1962). Soler (1996) suggests that this is what Freud was referring to when he
spoke of the “hysterical nucleus of obsession” (p. 252).
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Stated otherwise, in hysteria, ideational representatives are repressed and the
corresponding affect is converted into a bodily symptom; whereas in obsession, the
ideational representative remains conscious but isolated from its accompanying affect. In
Freud’s early hydraulic terms, each defense—conversion and isolation of affect—served
to neutralize overwhelming “sums of excitation.” Once freed from the intolerable
ideational representatives, obsessional affects could then, through displacement, become
attached to more compatible ideas—resulting in seemingly trivial matters becoming
exceedingly important. Here we see one of the classic hallmarks of obsessional neurosis:
the import attached to apparently unimportant events (such as the need to walk through a
doorway using a certain number of steps or the imperative to turn left when standing if
previously one has turned right). It is this false connection between the emotional state
and the associated idea that seems so absurd in obsession; however, it is important to note
that the affect is not absurd, merely displaced.
In “Further Remarks on the Defense Neuro-Psychoses” (1896/1962), Freud
further distinguished between primary and secondary defenses in obsessional neurosis.
He hypothesized that obsessional ideas were a first line of defense—preoccupying the
person with ruminations to prevent the emergence of unacceptable sexual thoughts;
however, if repression was unsuccessful, then the return of the repressed yielded what
Freud termed secondary defenses, or in common parlance, compulsions and prohibitions.
Freud posited that these “protective measures” were “never primary” (p. 172) and could
include obsessional brooding, a compulsion to test things, doubting mania, a compulsion
to collect and store things (hoarding), burdensome ceremonials and rituals, precautionary
measures, superstition, increased conscientiousness, fear of betrayal, and phobias, to
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name but a few. As anyone who has ever worked with someone firmly ensnared in an
acute obsessional neurosis knows, symptoms readily take over the person’s entire life
quite quickly. I point out Freud’s delineation here between primary and secondary
defenses because it anticipates his increasing distinction between an acute obsessional
neurosis and an obsessional character structure.
In 1907, Freud began to move away from his hydraulic descriptions of
obsessional neurosis to focus more explicitly on character traits. In “Obsessive Actions
and Religious Practices,” Freud described the sense of guilt so prevalent in obsession and
suggested, “Its source [is] in certain mental events, but it is constantly being revived by
renewed temptations which arise when there is a contemporary provocation” (p. 123).
Furthermore, Freud noted the sense of expectant anxiety and expectation of misfortune,
“which is linked, through the idea of punishment, with the internal perception of the
temptation.” This temptation and the prohibition of it is a never-ending process:
In the course of the repression of this instinct a special conscientiousness
is created which is directed against the instinct’s aims; but this psychical
reaction-formation feels insecure and constantly threatened by the instinct
which is lurking in the unconscious. The influence of the repressed instinct
is felt as a temptation, and during the process of repression, anxiety itself
is generated, which gains control over the future. [...] The process of
repression which leads to obsessional neurosis must be considered as one
which is only partly successful and which increasingly threatens to fail. It
may thus be compared to an unending conflict. [...] Thus the ceremonial
and obsessive actions arise partly as a defense against the temptation and
partly as a protection against the ill which is expected. (p. 124, original
italics)
Thus, when protective measures fail (as they inevitably do) prohibitions and compulsions
come into play, and the obsessive is caught in an acute neurosis; however, Freud reminds
us here that all symptoms serve as compromise formations. “They thus always reproduce
something of the pleasure which they are designed to prevent” (p. 125, italics added).
25

In “Character and Anal Eroticism,” Freud (1908/1959) specifically identified the
triad of anal character traits he associated with obsessive character structure: orderliness,
parsimony, and obstinancy. Drawing upon his work in Three Essays on the Theory of
Sexuality, Freud (1905/1953) elaborated his notion of the sexual component instincts
(better known today as “partial drives”) and suggested that we can “infer that such people
[obsessives] are born with a sexual constitution in which the erotogenicity of the anal
zone is exceptionally strong,” (p. 170) and that “cleanliness, orderliness and
trustworthiness give exactly the impression of a reaction-formation against an interest in
what is unclean and disturbing and should not be part of the body” (p. 172). Freud posited
that character in its final shape was thus formed out of the constituent sexual instincts. It
was not, however, until “The Predisposition to Obsessional Neurosis” that Freud
(1913/1958) clearly distinguished between obsessional neurosis proper and the
development of obsessional character. Freud postulated that in obsessional neurosis
proper, there was a failure of repression and a subsequent return of the repressed;
whereas in the formation of obsessive character, repression had been more successful and
had thus been replaced with reaction formations and sublimations (Sandler & Hazari,
1960/1997, p. 164). A person could thus have an obsessional character without a
corresponding obsessional neurosis, as well as the converse.
Furthermore, in “The Predisposition to Obsessional Neurosis,” Freud first
proposed the idea of “pregenital instincts” and of distinct stages in sexual development
that were dominated by specific component instincts. Based largely on his work with the
Rat Man, Freud identified what he termed the “pregenital, sadistic, anal-erotic sexual
organization,” and suggested that a regression from the castration anxiety associated with
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the oedipal stage to the relative safety of the anal stage was what characterized the
obsessive. Freud noted that many of the issues that are readily identifiable in obsessive
personalities such as cleanliness, orderliness, obstinacy, and tendencies toward
withholding were prominent issues in toilet training. He reasoned that anal characters felt
rage toward parents for imposing social restrictions on their bowel movements
prematurely that led to power struggles the child was doomed to lose. Consequently, the
experience of feeling controlled and required to perform on schedule resulted in
aggressive fantasies and angry feelings the child came to feel as “a bad, sadistic, dirty,
shameful part of the self” (McWilliams, 2011, p. 292). Consequently, the need to feel in
control, rational, and contained predominated the world of the obsessive. Mastery of
objects was likewise of paramount importance.
The role of hate in obsessional neurosis was one Freud highlighted in his analysis
of the Rat Man, formulating the doubt and ambivalence characteristic of the obsessive as
a product of repressed hatred. Ernest Jones (1913/1997), in his seminal paper “Hate and
Anal Eroticism in the Obsessional Neurosis,” likewise held the view that the ambivalence
between love and hate was responsible for the alternation between compulsion and doubt
in obsessional neurosis. Jones suggested that “The conflict involved in the interference
with anal eroticism on the part of the mother [...] must be regarded as one of the most
important sources of chronic hatred” (p. 67). Indeed, the Oedipus complex, and the
intrusion of another person in the child’s pleasure, provided the necessary conditions for
hatred to arise. Citing Ferenczi, Jones correspondingly considered the obsessive’s
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omnipotence as a projection of the feeling that one must slavishly obey certain irresistible
instincts.18
Karl Abraham (1924) contributed to Freud’s theory of anal eroticism suggesting
that the anal stage was divided into two different stages. In the later stage, conserving
tendencies of retaining and controlling the object predominated, whereas in the earlier
stage, hostility toward the object and tendencies to destroy dominated. Abraham wrote,
If the conserving tendencies, those of retaining and controlling his object,
are the more powerful, this conflict around the love object will call forth
phenomena of compulsion. But if the opposing sadistic-anal tendencies are
victorious—those which aim at destroying and expelling the object—then
the patient will fall into a state of melancholic depression. (p. 80)
Abraham further noted that the obsessive was engaged in a world of power struggles and
mastery, attempting to force things into a rigid and pedantic system in order to control
them. The obsessive desired to rule and possess his object, and this largely resulted from
the forcing of a habit on the child prematurely before he was psychically ready. Abraham
(1921) suggested that “psychical preparedness” only occurred when the child began to
transfer onto objects his own narcissistic feelings, such that the child did not feel
dominated but rather wanted to perform for the sake of the other person. A transition
from the earlier sadistic-anal stage to the later conserving stage thus indicated the
individual had begun to spare his object from destruction and was moving toward the
genital period, where he would “overcome his ambivalence and his libido [would] attain
[...] its full capacity both from a sexual and social point of view” (p. 102). Finally,
Abraham identified productivity with the genital stage and pointed out that avoidance of
effort was a frequent trait of the obsessional character. Freud (1926/1959) concurred: “It

18

I would add here, not only must s/he slavishly obey irresistible instincts, s/he must also obey parents and
the law.
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may be that regression is rendered possible not because the genital organization of the
libido is too feeble but because the opposition of the ego begins too early, while the
sadistic stage is at its height” (p. 113).
Fenichel (1945), while agreeing with Freud that obsession represented regression
to the anal stage due to overwhelming fears of castration and defenses against oedipal
longings, later suggested that obsessive doubt reflected the ambivalence between the id
and the superego. (Should I be naughty or nice?) He further noted that symptoms
expressed distorted commands from the superego and that danger was a threat from
within; compulsions were thus felt as positive commands and threats. Consequently,
Fenichel noted obsessives were constantly caught up in protecting their loved ones from
their own hostile impulses. He identified obstinacy as a way of expressing difficult
feelings such as anger and aggression and noted the alternation between deed and
punishment. Indeed, Fenichel pointed out that the purpose of many typical compulsive
symptoms was to undo perceived aggressive acts and that compulsive rituals generally
“represent[ed] a caricature of masturbation” (p. 272). The restricted and rigid world of
the obsessive is perhaps best illustrated by Fenichel’s own words:
As long as the timetable functions as the regulator of their activities, they
are sure that they are not committing the sins they are unconsciously afraid
of; and as long as they know beforehand what they will do afterward, they
are able to overcome their fear that their own excitement may induce them
to do things they are afraid of. (p. 284)
The tug-of-war that colors the obsessive’s world is thus constant and demanding. In all of
his formulations, Freud maintained his emphasis on symptoms as meaningful but also as
providing a certain pleasure for the obsessive. The doubt, uncertainty, compulsions,
prohibitions, obsessions, and the like—although painful—yield a certain kind of
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enjoyment, a sexual satisfaction of sorts. Indeed, he posited that symptoms serve as a
substitute for sexual satisfaction. This emphasis on the symptom as a compromise
formation, as something valuable in itself, was (and is) revolutionary.
Interpersonal/Relational/Object Relations19
Contemporary dynamic understandings of the obsessive-compulsive personality20
focus on patients’ early relationships with parents rather than emphasizing regression
from the oedipal to the anal psychosexual stage characteristic of classical Freudian
theory. Intimate relationships, interpersonal elements, self-esteem, management of anger
and dependency, and cognitive style are specifically identified and focused upon in
treatment (Gabbard, 2005). Clinicians working in this tradition suggest that the
obsessive-compulsive person felt inadequately loved and undervalued as a child,
resulting in “strong, unfulfilled dependent yearnings and a reservoir of rage directed at
the parents for not being emotionally available” (p. 574). Because the early environment
was not conducive to the development of normal dependency needs or to the expression
of anger specifically and emotional displays generally, the obsessive-compulsive person
employs defenses such as reaction formation and isolation of affect to defend against
such feelings. In fact, remaining in control of one’s affects is of paramount concern to the
obsessive, and this may stem from a belief that anger and other forms of emotional
display could potentially drive others away. Consequently, intimate relationships pose a
problem for the obsessive as “Intimacy raises the possibility of being overwhelmed by
powerful wishes to be taken care of, with the concomitant potential for frustration of
I do not mean to suggest that all three of these orientations are exactly the same; however, for brevity’s
sake, I have put them together because they all emphasize the relationship between therapist and patient as
curative.
20
The obsessive-compulsive personality is a term that many psychodynamic therapists use; however, as
will be shown shortly, it is different than Lacan’s obsessive structure.
19
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those wishes, resulting in feelings of hatred and resentment and a desire for revenge” (p.
574).
A need to control others, as well as one’s affects, is therefore a central component
of the obsessive-compulsive personality according to interpersonal theorists.
Unconsciously, the obsessive believes s/he can prevent loss by maintaining supreme
control. Unconscious aggressive wishes are also likely to contribute to the fear of losing
others. Underlying this need to control is the fundamental belief that nurturance is
temporary and can disappear at any given time. The obsessive responds to his or her
unconscious rage by becoming overly deferential and pleasing to others. Indeed,
obsessives are typically dutiful, rule-oriented, and exceedingly compliant in their
attempts to ingratiate themselves to others; however, these behaviors can often be so
excessive that they ring false. In this way, the obsessive’s fear of being unloved and
underappreciated becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, as other people distance themselves
from such obsequious behaviors. The obsessive is then left with the feeling of being
chronically unloved—a feeling with which s/he is all-too-familiar. The repetition here is
evident.
Therapists of the interpersonal persuasion also suggest that the quest for
perfection which often characterizes the obsessive-compulsive personality is indicative of
the belief that if one is “more perfect,” one will finally garner the love and approval
missed out on as a child. Those with obsessive-compulsive personalities often had
parents who demanded high standards of behavior, expected strict conformity, and were
derisive of expressions of feelings. Similarly, object relations theorists emphasize that
early objects in the obsessive-compulsive’s life were likely overly authoritarian and
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controlling, prohibiting spontaneous behaviors and demanding strict adherence to
schedules. As is the case in psychoanalysis, other theorists have found the polar opposite
to be the case: Obsessive-compulsive personalities often have a background of
underparenting, as in the case of an unavailable mother and an absent or alcoholic father.
To make up for the lack of any family standard, the obsessive sets high standards for
himself in an effort to push himself to grow. Because there is no clear object on which to
model oneself, these standards tend to be overly harsh and unrealistic (McWilliams,
2011). Finally, there is evidence that obsessives often suffered early loss of an object—
whether real or imagined—leading to precocious ego development and the belief that the
early loss was caused by one’s own death wishes (A. Freud, 1966/1997).
Concomitant with either an overly authoritarian or lax parental presence in early
childhood is an overly punitive superego that relentlessly abuses the obsessive—always
expecting more and reminding the obsessive that he is never “good enough.” This harsh
superego is viewed as an internalization of the parent who could never be satisfied in the
former case, and a projection of the obsessive’s unconscious aggressive tendencies onto
an invented parental image in the latter (Kohut, 1971). The role of guilt and shame cannot
be overemphasized in the obsessive personality. In response to the overly punitive
superego, many obsessives are often prodigious workers who achieve great things;
however, they are rarely satisfied with such achievements, instead preferring to move on
to the next task to be mastered. It is also quite common for obsessive personalities to
become so consumed by minutiae that they are unable to make any decisions whatsoever.
In an effort to maintain control over all possible choices, obsessives become paralyzed in
the decision-making process—leaving them to procrastinate until “fate” ends up making
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the decision for them. Obsessives strive for certainty in all matters, and because this is
simply an impossibility, end up doubting any decision they could potentially make. They
often painstakingly (and to the annoyance of those around them) examine every possible
avenue, attempting to come up with the “rational” and “right” decision—one that no
person could possibly criticize. Any affective component to decision-making is
conspicuously absent.
Obsessional Styles
Shapiro (1965, 1981) suggests that the obsessive-compulsive personality has a
certain “neurotic style.” He writes, “By ‘style,’ I mean a form or mode of functioning—
the way or manner of a given area of behavior—that is identifiable [...] through a range of
his specific acts” (p. 1). Shapiro believes these modes of functioning are characteristic of
various neurotic conditions. Specifically, he identifies ways of thinking and perceiving
(cognitions), ways of experiencing emotion, modes of subjective experience in general,
and modes of activity associated with various pathologies. Interestingly, rather than
focusing on the superficial traits of such “neurotic styles,” Shapiro (1965) links them to
an underlying psychological structure (what he terms a “matrix”) that “might be of a
more general type than the specific traits or mechanisms that could be inferred from
them” (p. 2). Furthermore, Shapiro suggests that the disposition to one or another specific
form of symptom “may be regarded as essentially a problem of character” (p. 5) and sees
style as a product of drives and stimuli plus the “mental organizing capacities” of the
individual. In other words, the obsessive-compulsive person behaves in a certain manner
not only because of certain modes of response to a stimulus, but also because of the
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particular way he experiences or perceives a stimulus. Symptoms are thus viewed as
products of a style of functioning.
Shapiro sees the characteristic cognitive rigidity of the obsessive as resulting from
a distortion in the normal functioning and experience of volitional will. The tense
deliberateness and more or less constant pressure the obsessive exerts upon himself
represents an early defect in the development of autonomy and self-directed
intentionality. Shapiro writes,
In the normal case, intentionality becomes sufficiently well established to
function smoothly, without self-consciousness and, for the most part,
without any special tension, and the willfulness of childhood seems to
develop into an adult’s sense of competency and freedom to do with
himself what he chooses. In certain cases, however, the development of
will and volition is achieved only in a markedly distorted and rigid form.
(p. 37)
Stated otherwise, in the normal course of development the child, aided by his
environment, learns to trust his impulses and wishes and integrates them in such a way
that decision-making derives from his inherent interests; however, in the obsessive
character, impulses and desires are rejected as untrustworthy and self-direction thus
becomes a function of an always-conscious overseeing will rather than a natural
implementation of acknowledged wishes. At heart, the obsessive cannot and does not
trust his own impulses. Rather than following an internalized sense of direction, the
obsessive obeys the rules and commands of some higher authority he feels obliged to
serve. Without these strict imperatives, there is a loss of conviction; thus the very
pressure and tension that characterizes the obsessive also keeps him safe: The presence of
an external directive under which he can serve is ultimately reassuring. Satisfaction
comes not from freely making a decision for oneself, but from the sense of duty of time
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served—from a sense of slavishly paying off one’s debt. There is, therefore, confusion
between one’s will and one’s genuine wishes—a lack of self-control is assumed when
one’s wishes are contrary to the directives of the will.
Shapiro identifies obsessive doubt and dogma then as defenses against a more
spontaneous experience of conviction. “If the capacity for volition and the sense of
autonomy and will are well established, they can also be relaxed to make room for
playfulness, spontaneity [...] A person whose direction of himself is secure can, in other
words, afford abandonment of direction of himself in various forms and degrees with
neither the expectation nor the fact of disastrous consequences” (p. 37). When this is not
present, previously established authoritarian rules and principles make further judgment
unnecessary, thus serving a protective function. Consequently, obsessives live in a state
of “continuous tension between will and underlying inclination” (1981, p. 86).
Cognitive-Behavioral Approaches
At present, cognitive-behavioral and psychopharmacological approaches are
considered by many to be the preferred method of treatment for OCD (obsessional
neurosis). This is due principally to the current emphasis on empirically-validated
treatments, as well as the dominance of Health Management Organizations (HMOs) that
are only willing to pay for such evidence-based treatments (a category psychoanalytic
treatment rarely falls into, despite supporting evidence; this issue will be discussed in my
Method section below). Cognitive-behavioral formulations of obsessional neurosis do not
focus on the historical context of the symptom or the early relationships that may have
engendered its development but instead focus on the cognitive distortions or “negative
automatic thoughts” of the person suffering from acute OCD. (Note here that we are not
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talking about the obsessional character but about the “medical syndrome” as defined by a
certain definable set of symptoms set forth by the DSM.) CBT models consequently
center on helping patients identify maladaptive thinking patterns and management of
negative automatic thoughts. Cognitive techniques (e.g., thought-stopping, distraction
and dismissal procedures, identification of maladaptive thoughts) are typically combined
with classic behavioral techniques (typically, exposure and response prevention, or ERP)
in the treatment of OCD. Behavioral techniques such as ERP involve exposing the patient
to what s/he obsessively fears in the presence of someone who prevents the patient from
engaging in the compulsive activity designed to offset the anxiety caused by the stimulus.
The idea is that by “flooding” the patient with anxiety, s/he will learn that s/he can
tolerate it with no catastrophic events occurring. Over time, the patient will become
“habituated” to his anxiety, thus relieving it. I worked at UCLA for a time in the early
2000s as part of the behavioral unit for OCD. Part of my job was to implement such
exposure with patients. One woman I worked with suffered from contamination fears.
Part of her “treatment” was to sit on a public toilet seat for a set amount of time without
engaging in any undoing rituals. My job was to stand by her until time was up, essentially
forcing her to endure terrifying levels of panic and anxiety. Needless to say, I found the
treatment to be ethically questionable and, while it may have produced short-term results,
in my experience they were not lasting (see above: anxiety displaces onto other things or
activities).
In the cognitive model, obsessions themselves are not viewed as “negative
automatic thoughts,” but are instead seen as stimuli that provoke such automatic thoughts
(Salkovskis, 1985/1997). Intrusive thoughts are seen as typical occurrences in everyone;
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what makes the obsessive person different is the way s/he appraises such intrusive
thoughts (i.e., “It is bad that I am thinking this; something is wrong with me”). While
most people experience intrusive thoughts as relatively benign, letting them go rather
quickly, the obsessive person places catastrophic importance on them. Rachman (1971)
suggests that obsessional thoughts are “noxious conditioned stimuli which have failed to
habituate” (as cited in Salkovskis, 1985/1997, p. 221). Affective disturbance in OCD
stems from these automatic thoughts rather than from the intrusive thought itself.
Furthermore, the ideation from which the affective disturbance arises typically relates to
responsibility or the possibility of the individual being blamed for some harm done to
others as a failure to control the impulse. Correspondingly, compulsive behaviors are
viewed as an attempt to “put things right” and avoid being blamed by self or others. The
seeking of reassurance from others is likewise seen as an attempt to “spread
responsibility” (p. 223). Cognitive distortions in OCD are thus seen to relate to an
inflated belief in one’s ability to harm others or the self. Treatment is consequently aimed
at making the ego-syntonic negative automatic thoughts more ego-dystonic, such that the
patient may more effectively manage symptoms. The ability to identify maladaptive and
catastrophic thoughts concerning responsibility for harm to self and others is likewise
engendered. Combined with behavioral approaches, the assumption is that, “Cognitive
modification of obsessions should concentrate not on modification of intrusions [...] but
on the automatic thoughts consequent of the intrusions, and the beliefs which rise from
these” (Salkovskis, 1985/1997, p. 235).
There have been numerous studies documenting the efficacy of behavioral
therapies (see Rachman, Hodgson, & Marks, 1971/1997); however, not all patients
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respond. Interestingly, when patients do not respond well to treatment, it is the patient
who is blamed rather than the technique. Jenike (1992/1997) writes, “Outcome studies
and anecdotal evidence indicate that poor compliance with the behavioral treatment
program is the most common reason for treatment failure with behavioral therapy for
OCD” (p. 316, italics added). The harsh moralization of such a comment is inescapable
and is a primary critique I make of this method: The patient is already struggling with
uncontrollable obsessions and compulsions, but it is considered to be the patient’s fault if
she cannot make herself sit on a public toilet seat for 10 minutes. The implicit assumption
is that we are all able to consciously control and manage ourselves. Freud termed this
type of therapy a “psychology of consciousness,” meaning that any indication of the
unconscious or its motivations is lacking (Freud, 1912/1958, p. 118). Such a therapy
lends itself to further fragmentation in the patient by fostering a still deeper split between
what is “me” and “not me.” Sadistic, angry, punitive, jealous, sexual, less-than-pleasing
thoughts, rather than being accepted as part of one’s being, are instead distanced further
and made even more alien.
Given this critique, I would like to momentarily examine the well-known claim in
the literature that obsessional neurosis is notoriously refractory to psychoanalytic
treatment (Gabbard, 2005; McWilliams, 2011; Penzel, 2000). There are numerous
problems with this claim. To list but a few: What type of psychodynamic treatment? (As I
hope I have shown, what we mean by this term is radically different depending on which
theorist one is reading.) What is the definition of a “successful” treatment of obsessional
neurosis? Is obsessional neurosis actually what is being treated? And finally, is the
problem with the technique itself (psychoanalysis) or with what is being treated
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(symptoms)? McWilliams (2011) notes that medications such as the selective serotonin
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) and CBT are often more effective in those suffering acute
OCD than psychoanalytic therapy alone; however, she reports that those approaches are
less effective with what she calls the obsessive-compulsive personality (which is similar
but not quite the same as what Lacan refers to as obsessive structure). Similarly, Gabbard
(2005) notes, “[T]he symptoms of patients with OCD are notoriously refractory to
psychoanalysis and insight-oriented psychotherapy. Obsessive-compulsive personality
disorder appears to respond well to these treatments” (pp. 264-265, italics added).21 If the
definition of successful treatment is a quick remission of a symptom¸ then therapeutic
interventions designed specifically for this purpose will most certainly be “more
successful.” (Indeed, taking Valium quickly relieves one of the symptom of anxiety.)
However, if the definition of successful treatment is a shift in the patient’s psychic
economy, treatments aimed exclusively at symptom eradication will likely not be viewed
as “successful.” What I am proposing here is that obsessional neurosis has historically
been viewed as refractory to a psychoanalytic approach precisely because clinicians have
been treating symptoms rather than underlying structural dynamics. Dynamic therapy
aims at a restructuring of character formation and the economy of desire; symptom
remission occurs as a result of such restructuring but is not a primary aim. As previously
noted, acute obsessional neurosis has the peculiar ability to manifest everywhere—as
soon as one symptom disappears, strangely enough, it pops up elsewhere; it is displaced.
It is not surprising that when the goal is efficient symptom management, psychoanalytic
treatment is deemed a failure. It aims at far more—lasting and permanent
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See Gabbard (2005, p. 578) for a detailed analysis.
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characterological change—and this is not something quickly attained, despite
contemporary society’s demand for a quick fix.
Neurobiological Approaches
Biological models of OCD abound today. While it has been established that there
is likely a genetic component to the disorder, it is difficult to find two camps who agree
on just what role neurobiology plays. From a neurobiological perspective, OCD is taken
up as a medical syndrome that must have clearly identifiable neurobiological substrates;
however, many of the studies clearly contradict each other, leaving it difficult to identify
anything clearly. Two primary hypotheses emerge consistently in the literature: the basal
ganglia hypothesis that posits OCD as a dysfunction in the basal ganglia22 region of the
brain (Wise & Rapoport, 1989/1997) and the serotonin hypothesis (Zohar & Insel,
1987/1997; Jenike, 1992/1997).
Jeffrey M. Schwartz (1996), a UCLA psychiatrist regarded as an expert in OCD
writes in his book Brain Lock,
We now know that OCD is related to a biochemical problem in the brain.
We call this problem “brain lock” because four key structures of the brain
become locked together, and the brain starts sending false messages that
the person cannot readily recognize as false. (p. xv)
Using a gearshift of a car as a metaphor for the brain, Schwartz explains that two
structures—the caudate nucleus and the putamen—work together like the “automatic
transmission” for the prefrontal cortex. The caudate nucleus works with the thinking part
of the brain, while the putamen functions as the transmission for the part of the brain that
controls body movements. The caudate nucleus, when working correctly, “allows for the
extremely efficient coordination of thought and movement during everyday activities.” In
22

For a detailed review of basal ganglia dysfunction and its correlation with OCD, see Wise & Rapoport
(1989/1997).
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OCD, however, the caudate nucleus gets “stuck in gear” and messages from the
prefrontal cortex get stuck there, leaving the person effectively on repeat.
Baxter et al. (1992/1997) suggest that the “gating” function of the basal ganglia is
disordered in OCD. Essentially, the gating function “by which certain motor, sensory,
and perhaps cognitive impulses are either allowed to proceed through to perception and
behavior or are held back (‘filtered’)” malfunctions, leaving the OCD patient
overwhelmed with doubt about sensory, motor, and cognitive experiences. Interestingly,
Baxter et al. note that the concept of gating is very similar to the concept of repression in
analytic thought—whether something is allowed to reach consciousness or whether it is
held back.
The role of serotonin in OCD is a controversial one with plenty of studies
supporting both sides. The hypothesis rests on evidence that SSRIs effectively treat the
symptoms of OCD, while other drugs targeting different neurotransmitters prove
ineffective (Baxter et al., 1992/1997). However, as Gabbard (2005) notes,
neurotransmitter changes associated with medications may relate either directly or
indirectly to the condition—in other words, just because SSRIs improve symptoms does
not necessarily mean there is a causal connection. Pharmaceutical response does not
provide answers about the etiology of symptoms. For example, the fact that Clonazepam
reduces anxiety tells us nothing about underlying reasons for the anxiety. Jenike
(1992/1997) notes, moreover, that only 30% to 60% of patients with OCD respond to
medication. Penzel (2000) suggests that “A problem in the brain’s use of serotonin is
believed to be the main cause of classic OCD” (p. 116), but then continues, “There are a
number of studies of serotonin blood levels, but they have not been particularly helpful in
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contributing to our knowledge, since the findings do not seem to agree” (p. 116, italics
added). My point here is that, while there are many studies suggesting a biological
component to OCD, they are contradictory and complex and cannot be taken as
confirmatory evidence of any specific causal theory. Furthermore, given the polyvalent
findings of medication studies, as well as the widely divergent response among patients
to psychopharmocological drugs, we would be remiss to firmly assert a biological
foundation for OCD.23
A Brief Interlude
Clearly, the cognitive-behavioral and neurobiological models differ significantly
from psychoanalytic theory. It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage in a thorough
critique of such models; however, I want to briefly mention that what is left out of these
two approaches is any idea of the symptom as meaningful and historical. I find it curious
that the content of obsessions seems to be of little interest to those ascribing to a
cognitive-behavioral or neurobiological theoretical perspective. If we pause for a moment
to actually look at the content of obsessions, we notice a curious pattern. Obsessions are
often broken down into the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Morbid obsessions about sex or harm,
Contamination obsessions,
Religious obsessions,
Obsessions of harm, danger, loss, or embarrassment,
Magical obsessions,
Body-focused obsessions, and
Perfectionistic obsessions.

If we take seriously Freud’s contention that symptoms convey a hidden meaning, we
notice that the content of obsessions most often revolve around socially unacceptable
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Because the focus of this dissertation is not on the neurobiological substrates of OCD, I will direct the
reader to Gabbard (2005, pp. 264-266) and Jenike (1992/1997, 2004) for more detailed information.
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impulses (e.g., those of an aggressive or sexual nature). What would the biologicallyminded make of this? Penzel (2000) seems to recognize the general nature of obsessions,
remarking,
Obsessive thoughts and questions can often be about nasty and morbid
subjects [...] For reasons we don’t yet understand, some people’s obsessive
thoughts seem to latch onto whatever they may find the most repulsive or
disgusting [...] Morbid obsessive thoughts are especially hard to cope with
because they are so foreign to the person. They mostly involve sinful,
destructive, and/or disgusting acts, wishes, impulses, or mind pictures. (p.
212)
Of course, would Penzel but broaden his perspective, he might take seriously Freud’s
conjectures in Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis (1909/1955) that the
repression of sexual and aggressive impulses results in a morbid preoccupation with
them. “According to psychoanalytic theory [...] every fear correspond[s] to a former wish
which was now repressed” (p. 39). Thus, if we pay attention to the content of obsessions,
we find hostile and aggressive impulses seeking expression. Again, my intent here is not
to invalidate the work that has been done in the biological explorations of mental states,
nor is it to suggest there is no place for cognitive-behavioral approaches. My intention is
instead to draw attention to the human facets of character that are left out of such
approaches. It is not a coincidence that every person experiencing acute obsessional
neurosis struggles with ethical issues surrounding sex, anger, aggression, scrupulosity,
and the like. What gene or neurotransmitter is responsible for such a coincidence? I point
this out lest we lose sight of the immense complexity, not only of obsessional character
and neurosis, but of humanity in general.24

24
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Cultural Considerations
It is hard to miss the fact that many of the “characterological disturbances”
associated with obsessive character are, in fact, traits endemic in contemporary Western
society, including excessive work productivity, frugality, perfectionism, and extreme
attention to detail. Indeed, the very symptoms of obsessional character that the DSM
pathologizes are otherwise thought to show “strong moral character” in “normal” people.
I would argue that we are living in an obsessive culture today.
If we look at the emphasis placed in schools currently on science over the arts and
math over play, we clearly see aim-oriented activities taking precedence over creativity
and spontaneity. The very way students today are taught is representative of obsession:
Learning is a means to an end—not a process in itself—and the bottom line is measured
by scores on standardized tests. What is taught in the majority of schools today is not
critical and creative thinking, but conformity to external rules and authority. Indeed,
many children are being diagnosed with “disorders” such as Oppositional Defiant
Disorder precisely because they do challenge rules they view as confusing or illegitimate.
Essentially, they are being taught to place their ultimate trust in the authorities around
them at the expense of developing their own sense of direction. Furthermore, the
emphasis on perfection is one that readily haunts the youth of today. Many students take
medication today for test anxiety! The risk of making a mistake is that high. The worry of
being seen as lacking is that great.25
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Lacan (1948/2002) writes, “It is clear that the promotion of the ego in our existence is leading, in
conformity with the utilitarian conception of man that reinforces it, to an ever greater realization of man as
an individual, in other words, in an isolation of the soul that is ever more akin to its original dereliction” (p.
28, italics added).
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Furthermore, the emphasis on quantifiable outcome measures and empiricallyvalidated treatments smacks of obsession and is one anticipated by Lacan. Lacan argued
that the strict regulation of the time and cost of analysis instituted an obsessional structure
“where each analyst had to comply with the demand of the Other for order and
regularity” (Samuels, 1993, p. 136). This obsessional drive is clearly evident in modern
day psychological practice, where treatments are prescribed by manuals, time limits are
strictly reinforced, and success of treatment is judged by mathematical formulas.
Complete self-mastery and self-knowledge (and the accompanying presumption that this
is possible) are the goals of therapy. Little room is left for notions of the unconscious, and
contemporary therapeutic methods often lend themselves to patients’ further
objectification of themselves. Therapy is about “managing” oneself, increasing the
distance between thought and experience, rather than integration of rejected parts of
oneself.
The need for certainty and the drive for mastery are all components Freud
associated with the anal stage over 100 years ago. As a society, we value that which is
“knowable” over that which retains mystery. We actively denigrate novel and historical
ideas that cannot be “proven.” There is no room for what Lacan terms lack in our society.
As will be shown in Chapter Two—denial of lack is a hallmark of Lacan’s obsessive. The
continued emphasis on the “rational” over the “affective” (as if the two constituted a
dichotomy) is likewise suggestive of obsession. We embrace those who have “mastered”
themselves and are in “control” of their emotions, rather than valuing the beauty of an
engaged and emotional life. Pleasure is pursued in thinking and doing rather than in
being. As McWilliams (2011) points out, “Western civilizations, in conspicuous contrast
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to some Asian and Third World societies, esteem scientific rationality and ‘can-do’
pragmatism above most other attributes” (p. 289).
The conditions necessary for the development of obsessive character are eminent
in our culture. We glorify it, in many respects (unless you wash your hands too many
times, and then you’re just crazy). Productivity and egoistic achievement are hailed as the
aim of life in an almost Calvinistic fashion, at the expense of pleasure, the arts, joyful
spontaneity, imagination, and play. I draw attention to these cultural concerns here
because we are not simply isolated beings completely formed by biology. We are also
social beings, and our society influences family patterns and childrearing practices. When
the social world emphasizes precision and certainty at the expense of curiosity and
wonder, we can most certainly expect to see our cultural obsession manifest itself in the
individual.
Method
A larger reason that American analysts and other clinicians have little
familiarity with Lacan and little appreciation for his relevance to their
work is that the bulk of the writing in English on Lacan is devoted to
theory. Clinical case studies in English are in decidedly short supply.
Relatively few clinicians present their own and show how the theory
applies to phenomena that other clinicians encounter in the framework of
their practices.
(Friedlander, 2000, p. 137)
My decision to utilize a qualitative case study methodology reflects, in many
ways, the cultural critiques I offer above. I see psychotherapy as an art rather than a
quantitative science designed to measurably produce specific outcomes. In fact, our
definition of “science” today, with its heavy-handed emphasis on quantifiable
verification, often precludes the generation and revelation of certain types of knowledge.
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As Fenichel (1945) notes, “To order the unknown according to known categories is the
task of science. Compulsive systematizing, performed not for the purpose of mastering
reality but rather in order to deny certain aspects of it, falsifying reality, is a caricature of
science” (p. 286). Additionally, Lacan (1953/2002) writes, “Psychoanalysis can provide
scientific foundations for its theory and technique only by adequately formalizing the
essential dimensions of its experience, which—along with the historical theory of the
symbol—are intersubjective logic and the temporality of the subject” (p.76). Lacan thus
advocates for an unconscious logic that has been ignored by contemporary science. To
further articulate my specific methodology, I will first examine the critique of qualitative
research generally and case-based research specifically and offer a brief history of
Freud’s case studies. Secondly, I will, following Lacan, argue that what has largely been
ignored in contemporary research methodologies (including most qualitative approaches)
has been any notion of the unconscious. As a corrective, I argue that the psychoanalytic
interview is in itself a valid form of qualitative research that takes seriously the notion of
the unconscious, thus strengthening traditional forms of qualitative research by providing
access to a knowledge that has largely been foreclosed by such traditional methods.
Finally, I will offer a brief summary of my own experience with both the case study
methodology and obsessional neurosis as a way of highlighting my unique experience in
these areas.
To begin, I want to emphasize that my interest is in illuminating the how of
psychotherapy—what occurs in the session room, what signifiers are produced and how
they transform over time, the interpretations I offered and how my patients responded to
them, the polyvalence of meaning and language and how this was punctuated—in short, I
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want to offer details of the process of a Lacanian-oriented psychotherapy. I believe this is
necessary as the proliferation of quantitative psychological studies threatens to further
deepen the divide already existing between researchers and clinicians. The grounding of
theoretical data in concrete clinical examples serves to bring clinical practice into the
quotidian realm, rather than leaving it floating in quantitative, empirical research data that
often has little to do with the everyday experiences of patients. Indeed, the divide
between empirical research and clinical practice is often so great that interventions that
look good on paper are either not feasible for clinical application or have little, if any,
direct, meaningful impact on patients. Consequently, there is a “widely acknowledged
gap between research and clinical practice” and “surveys of practicing therapists find that
much of published psychotherapy research is rarely consulted” by them (Walsh, 2004, p.
3).
The dominant discourse in science today holds that there is one objective truth
and that it can be discovered via the scientific method. The ontological assumptions of
natural science discourse thus assume a static world that can be isolated from human
observation and human experience. The contemporary prominence placed on
experimental designs (random controlled trials, or RCTs) intended to deduce causal
relationships between independent and dependent variables, rather than being viewed as
one approach to gaining scientific knowledge, have instead come to ideologically
dominate the field as the only valid research method. Indeed, the very definition of
“science” has come to be equated with that which can be “empirically” validated, where
“empirical” has been wrested from its original definition of “based on experience”
(Edwards, 2007, p. 14) and instead been made to denote that which has been validated
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using multivariate statistical methods. However, as Flyvbjerg (2004) notes, the Germanic
word “science” (Wissenschaft) literally means “to gain knowledge” (p. 424), and thus any
attempt to exclusively reduce that which is “scientific” to that which can be causally
explained is just bad (and incomplete) science. Thus, if RCTs serve as a valuable tool for
gaining knowledge, they are nevertheless only one possible tool. The goals of RCTs—
pristine objectivity, isolation of variables, and replication of results—pose problems
“when we attempt to study psychotherapy, the meeting of two human beings, who engage
in a discussion about subjectivity” (Miller, 2011, p. 28). The immense complexity and
malleability of human experience is not quite so easy to isolate and replicate.
One of the primary complaints often leveled against qualitative research generally
and case-based research specifically is that it is not empirical enough, where, as
previously mentioned, “empirical” is inaccurately equated with the employment of “a
group comparison method using multivariate statistics” (Edwards, Dattilio, & Bromley,
2004, p. 590). However, if taken in its original meaning of “based on experience,” it is
hard to argue that case-based research is actually not more empirical than a quantitative
multivariate method, where individual experiences are often lumped together and
homogenized in the attempt to reduce experience to its lowest common denominators.
Indeed, it is more often the case that a case-based method preserves the complexity of
real-life situations far better than experimental designs which fictitiously isolate variables
from contextual situations. As Yin (2003) suggests, we are always already situated within
a horizon of meaning and the case study method “allows investigators to retain the
holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (p. 4). The emphasis on
context-dependent experience therefore permits the understanding of complex social
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phenomena in a way that cannot be derived from RCTs which have been divorced from
context. Furthermore, case studies remain truer to human experience by illuminating the
qualitative differences between people rather than seeking to eradicate difference by
simply labeling them as “outliers” or “accidents,” as is often the case in RCTs. In case
studies, fractures and differences that arise during the research, rather than being
discarded (because they throw off the mean), are instead explored and valued for what
they can offer. RCTs typically seek a statistical mean across cases and then attempt to
apply the mean of the sample to the greater population at large; however, as Edwards,
Dattilio, and Bromley (2004) point out, there are certain processes which “cannot be
examined by means of cross-sectional group comparison studies” (p. 592) and offer the
example of psychotherapy as such a process. Whereas RCTs may be able to
quantitatively measure the outcomes of various psychotherapeutic interventions, they
cannot tell us anything about the actual individual processes that yielded such outcomes.
A second major critique of a case study methodology is that there is a greater
proclivity for subjective bias when engaging in qualitative research. Of course, this
criticism only makes sense if one is operating from the ontological assumptions
underlying the natural scientific method that truth is something to be found “out there”
and that what is required to ascertain such truth is the removal of any type of subjectivity.
Flyvjberg (2004) writes, “[B]ias toward verification [is] not simply a phenomenon related
to the case study in particular, but [is] a fundamental human characteristic” (p. 428).
Thus, the charge that qualitative methods allow more room for the researcher’s subjective
and arbitrary judgment tends to ignore the fact that all methods are inescapably rooted in
the researcher’s preconceived notions and theoretical subjective biases. The type of
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research method employed is, therefore, not the problem, but rather how subjective bias
is instead addressed by each method. Because qualitative researchers have so consistently
been charged with verification bias, they have become sensitized to the issue in ways that
more traditional quantitative investigators have not. Consequently, a great deal has been
written on the importance of reflexivity in the research process (e.g., Walsh, 2003). It is
thus arguable that, due to the very recognition paid to subjective bias within the
qualitative field, verification bias actually plays a smaller role there than in a good deal of
the quantitative research literature. In this sense, a case study methodology may be
viewed as a scientifically rigorous method. In 2005, the APA task force stated that
“Evidence-based practice in psychology is the integration of the best available research
with clinical expertise in the context of the patient’s characteristics, culture, and
preferences” (as cited in Goodheart, 2005, p. 2, italics added). A case study methodology
takes seriously the patient’s context and culture and attempts to articulate it.
Case studies therefore offer the field of psychology concrete data grounded in the
expertise of clinicians. They “comprise the building blocks of analytic theory” and are “a
vehicle of instruction and transmission” (Goldman, 2004, p. 17). The case study has a
lengthy history and harkens back to Josef Breuer’s and Freud’s (1895/1955) famous
study of “Anna O” and continues with Freud’s elaborate case histories of “Frau Emmy
von N.,” “Miss Lucy R.,” “Katharina,” and “Elisabeth von R.” in Studies on Hysteria. Of
course, most famous are Freud’s detailed cases of Dora, the Rat Man, Little Hans,
Schreber, and the Wolf Man. Furthermore, the literature is replete with case studies of
analysts following Freud who produced a wealth of their own case studies, including
Melanie Klein, Donald Winnicott, Karen Horney, Karl Abraham, and Sandor Ferenczi, to
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name but a few.26 All of these case studies provide intimate minutiae of the patient’s
symptoms, historical context, tangled webs of experience and desire, and most
importantly, how the patients spoke their stories.27 The patient’s speech is the most basic
tool of analytic therapy and a thorough case study allows us to examine this speech to the
letter. It also allows us to see the unfolding of psychotherapy while tying it to a
theoretical formulation. By grounding theoretical concepts in tangible clinical examples,
the process of psychotherapy is spelled out.
Next, following Kvale (2003) and Swales (2012), I argue that the psychoanalytic
interview28 itself is a valid method of inquiry and methodologically rigorous. Swales
notes,
The existing body of qualitative research has, both in method and
interpretation, largely ignored the unconscious [...] This avoidance is
particularly striking within the qualitative research of clinical psychology
because most psychologists attribute some importance to the unconscious
in human existence. (p. 14)
If we take the existence of the unconscious seriously, we must also acknowledge it as a
form of knowledge in itself—one that pays attention to intrapsychic meanings. Most
qualitative research methods reflect conscious (ego) knowledge, allowing no room for the
unknown; however, the psychoanalytic interview “expose[s] the censored chapter of the
unconscious” (Swales, 2012, p. 14). What I am referring to as the “psychoanalytic
interview” is the method by which Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung, Melanie Klein, Jacques
Lacan, and others have obtained their knowledge on human experience that is presented
26

To read a detailed history of the case study methodology, particularly outlining the above-mentioned
theorists’ specific cases, see Goldman (2004, pp. 29-55).
27
All of these case studies, with the exception of Schreber, spoke their stories to Freud. Freud’s analysis of
Schreber was taken from Schreber’s autobiography.
28
The initial meetings between therapist and patient are often referred to as “psychoanalytic interviews”;
however, I am using the term here not only to refer to such initial intake sessions, but also to the therapeutic
sessions that follow. Therapy, in and of itself, consistently produces knowledge that is directly relevant to
the case study.
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in their classic works. What we are examining when looking at the how of psychotherapy
is precisely what is happening when two subjects meet. This does not mean that what we
are interested in from a Lacanian perspective is the relationship between two subjects, but
rather, how interpreting, punctuating, and listening in certain ways affects the patient and
stimulates greater exploration of the unconscious. As Kvale (2003) points out, the
practice of psychoanalysis itself produces significant knowledge, though it is a form of
knowledge production that is rarely given credence. Kvale writes,
After a century of psychoanalytical therapy and knowledge production, the
main evidence of the psychoanalytic theory still rests on knowledge
accumulated through psychoanalytical interviews, a research method that
has hardly been given systematical thought in the social sciences. (p. 88)
Kvale further describes how much of the information presented in current psychology
textbooks is based on knowledge originally obtained through psychoanalytic interviews;
however, because contemporary scientific discourse refuses to acknowledge the
therapeutic interview as a legitimate research method, “Major parts of psychological
knowledge are produced by a method that does not exist in a scientific psychology” (p.
92). The solution is to either ban psychoanalytically derived knowledge from textbooks
(which would eliminate any notion of neurosis, dreams, the unconscious, defenses,
repression, and so on) or to regard the clinical interview as a valid research method and
develop its research potentials. In this dissertation, I have obviously opted for the latter,
methodically reflecting on my case sessions, process notes, and the patients’ verbatim
speech so as to identify repeating signifiers, unconscious manifestations such as slips of
the tongue, unprovoked denials, and the like, and places where the conscious narrative
stream either faltered or conveyed multiple levels of meaning. This is one of the main
benefits of the therapeutic interview: It articulates the gaps and holes—the lack—in the
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patient’s egoic narrative. Those moments when the patient is at a loss are taken seriously
and the clinician/researcher understands that even failures offer invaluable guidance, as I
hope to illustrate in my case studies.
The psychoanalytic interview thus utilizes an interpretive method that pays close
attention to the patient’s speech, seeking to punctuate and interpret polyvalent language
and conflicting meanings. Because it invites the patient to associate freely to whatever
comes to mind, it does not set limits to the patient’s speech in the way a structured
qualitative interview might. It instead opens up a space for the unconscious, paying
attention to and taking seriously manifestations of the unconscious such as slips of the
tongue, bungled actions, affective surprise, unprovoked denials, negation, polyvalent
word usage, and unfinished sentences. Ambiguity is not seen as invalidating the data but
is instead embraced as reflective of human experience and understood as a type of
knowledge in itself. Contrary to the natural science approach, there is no drive to reduce
information to a “certainty,” but rather an invitation to explore the multiple meanings
inherent in discourse. This means that the clinician/researcher does not feel pressured to
fit the patient’s experiences into predetermined categories but can instead attend to the
uniqueness of the patient himself. In itself then, the psychoanalytic interview is an
interpretive method that is already a viable research method. When elucidated through
the case study, I believe the psychoanalytic interview can deepen and enrich case studies
by expanding our idea of what constitutes “knowledge. “ If we take “science” in its literal
translation to mean “to gain knowledge,” the psychoanalytic interview gives us access to
a much-needed and neglected form of knowledge—the unconscious.
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Given the aforementioned gap between clinical practice and the dominant
prevailing research emphasis on RCTs, the psychoanalytic clinical interview operates as a
type of therapeutic research that may function to bridge this gap. Rather than, on the one
hand, simply offering exciting and entertaining case histories, or, on the other—
producing randomly controlled, statistically laden analyses—the therapeutic interviewer
instead attempts to methodically reflect on how the evidence for the case study is
obtained. Freud himself believed that “one of the distinctions of psychoanalysis [is that]
research and treatment proceed hand in hand” (as cited in Kvale, 2003, p. 88). In an
attempt to navigate the murky waters between positivist research and clinical practice,
Kvale suggests approaching the clinical interview with a focus on the concrete
descriptive and interpretative knowledge of human relations produced in a psychoanalytic
session.
It is important to note here that I did not conduct my sessions with the patients
presented in this dissertation from a researcher’s perspective. I was their therapist, and as
trained, I took copious notes both during and after sessions. While I was seeing these
patients, I did not think of them as research subjects or participants but as patients under
my care. Thus, when it came time for the data collection phase of the dissertation, I sifted
through hundreds of pages of process notes, supervision notes, and peer supervision
notes. I also had access to my supervisor’s notes, which provided an alternative
perspective to my own. The accumulation of process notes over the years allowed me to
methodically go through them, seeking out repeating signifiers, patterns in speech and
behavior, unavowed desire and jouissance, and larger historical patterns that I was able to
situate within the context of each patient’s life. Furthermore, I had the benefit of
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discussing my interpretations of the case material with both my clinical supervisor and
with peer supervisors. My interpretation and formulation of the case material therefore
stemmed from careful examination of my own process notes, experience with the patients
themselves, and feedback from at least three other people.
Methodologically speaking, I have thus rigorously formulated these cases with
careful attention paid to where I could potentially be overgeneralizing or overinterpreting.
The benefit of close and multiple supervision is that it places limits on one’s subjective
bias by incorporating outside voices that serve to inhibit dogmatic interpretations.
Consequently, the data produced by the clinical interviews was subjected to careful
scrutiny by others than myself. My interpretations are certainly guided by psychoanalytic
theory, particularly Lacanian theory; however, because Lacan’s emphasis is on the letter
of the patient’s speech (something directly visible and present) rather than on intuition,
affect, or something hidden “deep down,” I feel that the formulations are even more
concrete and methodologically rigorous.
Given my experience across varying treatment modalities, as well as my more
recent attention to Lacanian theory, I believe I am in a position to offer something unique
to the field of psychology through my case studies. Firstly, because I do have such varied
experience in treatment modalities, my case conceptualizations will necessarily reflect
such experience. It is because I have worked with other, more “mainstream” approaches
to treatment of “OCD” that I find myself drawn to the structural approach of Lacan. My
presentations of my cases will consequently reflect the evolution of my thought and
technique, as well as how I believe this evolution affected the development of the cases. I
am thus in the unique position of not only being able to contribute Lacanian-informed
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case studies to the field (which, as previously mentioned, are already in short-supply), but
to also compare and contrast this approach with other symptom-based approaches that I
believe, based on my professional experience, fall short.
Secondly, the cases I intend to present were chosen specifically to illustrate the
difference between structural and symptom-based approaches. My dissertation therefore
focuses on the larger implications of Lacanian theory for diagnosis and treatment rather
than articulation of one specific Lacanian technique (e.g., “listening to the letter,” Miller,
2011). While my cases will most certainly illustrate how the therapist should attend to
patients of differing structural economies (with a specific focus on work with obsession),
this is but one element of the case presentations.
Thirdly, as part of my education at Duquesne University, I designed a qualitative
research course on case study methodology. Consequently, I was able to spend a semester
investigating not only the history of this methodology but also its contemporary
relevance. Since that time, I have continued to follow existing debates and discussions
about the validity of the case study method. As such, I believe my specialization in this
methodology allows me to provide a deeper and more thorough explication of the case
material.
Finally, given my extensive and varied history, both as a student and as a
clinician, I believe my case presentations have the potential to speak to multiple
audiences. First, my hope is to make Lacanian clinical theory accessible to and applicable
for psychodynamically-oriented therapists previously unfamiliar with Lacan. Next, I hope
to offer more “mainstream” practitioners persuasive theoretical and clinical arguments for
a more structural approach to treatment and diagnosis. Finally, because I have knowledge
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of more mainstream treatment modalities, as well as DSM criteria, I believe my
dissertation will also be of interest to Lacanian psychoanalysts unfamiliar with such
information. In addition, because there is a lack of literature in the Lacanian field on
specific ways of working with obsession, I believe this, too, will be of interest to those
already practicing within a Lacanian orientation. Because I am not a Lacanian
psychoanalyst, nor a CBT practitioner, but am familiar with both approaches, I believe I
have the opportunity to contribute truly unique case material and formulations that speak
to multiple audiences.
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CHAPTER TWO
Introducing Lacan
I identify myself in language, but only by losing myself in it as an object.
(Lacan, 1953/2002, p. 84)
Whether it wishes to be an agent of healing, training, or sounding the
depths, psychoanalysis has but one medium: the patient’s speech.
(Lacan, 1953/2002, p. 40)
In what follows, I offer you a simplified description of some of Lacan’s basic
concepts. As previously noted, my desire is to articulate how these concepts shaped my
clinical formulations and practice, and I can best accomplish this through the presentation
of my cases. This chapter serves to introduce some of Lacan’s theory as I currently
understand it and to give a backdrop to the case presentations.
Lacan’s Critique of Ego Psychology
Throughout his career, Lacan unabashedly criticized psychoanalysts who, while
claiming to follow Freud, radically transformed Freud’s teaching by focusing on “ego
strength” at the expense of the drives, as well as intuition and affect at the expense of
speech and language. Lacan (1953/2002) called for a “return to Freud” in “The Function
and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” emphasizing that psychoanalysis
had moved very far, indeed, away from Freud’s revolutionary talking cure. Lacan’s stated
aim was to bring psychoanalysis back to its rootedness in speech and language:
One can trace over the years a growing aversion regarding the functions of
speech and the field of language. It is responsible for the ‘changes in aim
and technique’ that are acknowledged within the psychoanalytic
movement, and whose relation to the general decline in therapeutic
effectiveness is nevertheless ambiguous. (p. 34)
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According to Lacan, ego psychologists such as Ernst Kris, Leo Loewenstein (who had
analyzed Lacan), Heinz Hartmann, Michael Balint, and Anna Freud had wrongly
interpreted Freud, focusing on the “imaginary” communication between two egos as the
therapeutic factor in analysis, rather than on the curative effects of the “symbolic”
register of language (constituted by a discourse between the subject and the Other).
Lacan argued that ego psychology (which, as previously mentioned, was
primarily dominant in America), rather than exploring the symbolic matrices that
structure the unconscious subject, instead served as a behavioral modification tool whose
aim was to adapt the individual to contemporary social norms and institutions (Miller,
2011).29 Lacan thus accused the ego psychologists of acculturating psychoanalysis to an
American paradigm rather than remaining true to Freud’s original teachings—therapy
had become about the patient “modeling” her ego upon that of the therapist, leaving the
patient dependent on the therapist and further alienated from her own desire. For Lacan,
the very becoming of a subject necessarily entails a radical alienation from one’s being
due to the instatement of the symbolic order and the operation of the mirror stage (to be
discussed below); consequently, we are all alienated from our being (with the exception
of the psychotic and the autistic, who refuse the symbolic order) by the very institution of
language. The danger of a therapy that seeks to bring about the identification of the
patient’s “weak” ego with the therapist’s “strong” ego is “not of a negative reaction on
the subject’s part, but rather of his being captured in an objectification—no less
imaginary than before—of his stationary state, indeed, of his statue, in a renewed status
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Many of the critical theorists connected with the Frankfurt school in Germany concurred that the function
of the American ego psychologists was adaptive rather than critical in nature and had moved too far away
from Freud’s fundamental discoveries. See Adorno & Horkheimer (1947/2002).
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of his alienation” (Lacan, 1953/2002, p. 44, italics added). Differentiating psychoanalysis
proper, Lacan proposes,
The analyst’s art must, on the contrary, involve suspending the subject’s
certainties until their final mirages have been consumed. And it is in the
subject’s discourse that their dissolution must be punctuated. (p. 44)
Thus, according to Lacan, the ego psychologists had forsaken the unconscious and the
function of “full speech [...] to reorder [the] past contingencies” (p. 48) that would allow
the subject to assume and subjectivize her history.
The ego psychologists (and I would also add here those of object relations,
interpersonal, and more currently, relational persuasions) fundamentally discount the role
of speech and language in favor of more “intuitive” approaches that emphasize
unmediated contact with the patient and her affect. “[T]he practice of analysis has
become focused on an illusory something situated beyond speech, which makes itself
known in an interpersonal, affective way” (Miller, 2011, p. 4, original italics). This
something beyond speech is presumably best attended to by focusing on the “therapeutic
relationship,” by “following the affect” of the patient, and by attending to one’s
countertransference. Relational models focus on the dyad formed by patient and therapist
and the way the therapeutic relationship is “co-constructed” (Mitchell & Aron, 1999).
Similar to Alexander and French’s (1946) “corrective emotional experience,” the belief is
that a strong alliance between patient and therapist is largely what is psychologically
curative. Emphasis is placed on “sincerity” (e.g., Malan, 1979, p. 187) and attunement to
the patient’s affect and nonverbal gestures—suggesting that the therapist can somehow
knowingly interpret such gestures.
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Furthermore, some therapists actively argue for engaging and sharing one’s own
countertransferential feelings at the expense of analytic neutrality to assist in fostering an
“authentic relationship” that will thus guide the patient to health (see Mitchell & Aron,
1999; Maroda, 2001). This type of therapy by suggestion is one that Freud (1917/1963),
from his earliest days, warned against:
[We] are misinformed if [we] suppose that advice and guidance in the
affairs of life play an integral role in analytic influence. On the contrary,
so far as possible we avoid the role of mentor such as this, and there is
nothing we would rather bring about than that the patient should make his
decisions for himself. (p. 433)
Freud insisted on the neutrality of the analyst to give the patient time and space to work
through her own resistances so as “to produce the solution of [her] own problems”
(Freud, 1917/1963, p. 49) without the accompanying worry of the problems of another
person. Lacan (1953/2002) agrees:
[N]othing could be more misleading for the analyst than to seek to guide
himself by some supposed “contact” he experiences with the subject’s
reality. This vacuous buzzword of intuitionist and even phenomenological
psychology has become extended in contemporary usage in a way that is
thoroughly symptomatic of the ever scarcer effects of speech in the
present social context. But its obsessive value becomes flagrant when it is
recommended in a relationship which, according to its very rules, excludes
all real contact. (p. 39)
Eliciting of the patient’s desire is of primary import, and it is short-circuited if the
therapist becomes a subject for the patient. If, for example, I share my belief in God with
a patient, this may prevent her from expressing anger at a mother whom she felt was a
religious zealot because she assumes, given my own belief in God, that I would be
offended. Here, we are stuck in the imaginary again—an ego-to-ego relationship—when
what is needed is work at the level of the symbolic (Fink, 2007). At best, the therapist
serves as a “pure function” for the patient, as a placeholder (Fink, 1994, p. 14). This
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brings out the transference and allows the patient’s desire to come to the fore and become
a question.
Speech and Language
[S]ymptoms can be entirely resolved in an analysis of language, because a
symptom is itself structured like a language: A symptom is language from
which speech must be delivered.
(Lacan, 1953/2002, p. 58)
For Lacan, the belief that one’s therapeutic intuition can serve as the basis for a
successful analysis betrays the narcissism of the therapist and renders null Freud’s
fundamental discovery in works such as The Interpretation of Dreams (1900/1953), The
Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901/1960), and Jokes and Their Relation to the
Unconscious (1905/1960) of the power of speech and language, as well as of the
unconscious. Language structures us from the beginning of our lives, giving existence to
thoughts, ideas, emotions, and experiences that could not exist without language because
we would have no way of communicating them—of putting words on experience. We
are, from the beginning, subjected to language, born into a prefabricated web of signifiers
that exists before we are even born. These signifying chains, which Lacan (1957/2006)
describes as a series of signifiers that are linked together and depend upon one another
for signification (meaning), structure and define us, often outside of our awareness.
Symptoms themselves are a type of language that have yet to be “signifierized” (Fink,
1995, p. 95). Psychoanalysis aims at discursively translating symptoms, moving them
along their way to full speech. According to Lacan, the only tool the analyst has to work
with is the patient’s speech. “This assumption by the subject of his history, insofar as it is
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constituted by speech addressed to another, is clearly the basis of the new method Freud
called psychoanalysis” (Lacan, 1953/2002, pp. 48-49, italics added).
As is oft-quoted, Lacan (1973/1981) tells us that “The unconscious is structured
like a language” (p. 149); Lacan maintains that dreams, symptoms, and fantasies also
conform to the structure of language. Following Saussure (1972/1986),30 Lacan agrees
that language does not operate via a direct and singular relationship between signifier and
signified, but is instead “characterized by a complex interrelationship via metaphor and
metonymy between one signifier and others” (Miller, 2011, p. 9). Combining his work in
structural linguistics with Freud’s work on dreams, Lacan asserts that the processes of
condensation (which he equates with metaphor) and displacement (equated with
metonymy) are fundamental to language and the two primary mechanisms operative in
the unconscious.
It follows that the unconscious (or the symbolic order) consists of letters,
phonemes, and relationships between its elements that allow for metaphor
and metonymy and thus the production of signification or meaning.
Correspondingly, metaphor and metonymy are ways of understanding
phenomena that have to do with the symbolic order: symptoms, dreams,
parapraxes, subjectivity, desire, and love. (Swales, 2012, p. 21)
In other words, what is important is the letter of the patient’s speech—what is actually
spoken—not what the patient means, as meaning is always situated in the imaginary
register (to be discussed below) and, as such, socially constructed. The subject is
constructed by signifying chains, and indeed, exists and is to be found in language itself.
Language speaks through the subject, and “The unconscious is that part of concrete
discourse qua transindividual, which is not at the subject’s disposal in reestablishing the
30

Significantly, Lacan parts ways with Saussure and asserts that the signifier dominates the signified, in
effect “sliding” over it. Because there is no immediate connection between signifier and signified, language
is polyvalent with one signification referring to another signification. “[T]here is no harmonious, totalizing
relationship between signifier and signified. [...] The signifier dominates the signified” (Fink, 2002, p. 31).
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continuity of his conscious discourse” (Lacan, 1953/2002, p. 50). What are repressed then
are signifiers which come to function differently as they “connec[t] to other repressed
signifiers in the signifying chain” (Swales, 2012, p. 22). The unconscious may be
structured like a language, but it is not the egoic, conscious language of everyday speech;
consequently, psychoanalysis seeks to decipher the language of the symptom as
metaphor, where metaphor is “but a synonym for the symbolic displacement brought into
play in the symptom” (p. 51). In other words, metaphor is the substitution of one signifier
for another.
The Mirror Stage and Lacan’s Three Registers
These reflections lead me to recognize in the spatial capture manifested by
the mirror stage, the effect in man, even prior to this social dialectic, of an
organic inadequacy of his natural reality.
(Lacan, 1949/2002, p. 6)
The function of the mirror stage thus turns out, in my view, to be a
particular case of the function of imagos, which is to establish a
relationship between an organism and its reality—or, as they say, between
the Innenwelt and the Umwelt.31
(Lacan, 1949/2002, p. 6, italics added)
Given Lacan’s assertion that symptoms, fantasies, dreams, and speech all conform
to the structure of language, we are perhaps now better situated to examine his critique of
therapies that seek to “heal” through interpersonal, egoic means. Unlike the ego
psychologists whom he claims have misappropriated Freud’s conception of the ego,
Lacan (1953/2002) does not see the ego as a psychic agency “whose strength...[is]
define[d] by its capacity to bear frustration” but instead views it as “frustration in its very
essence” (p. 42). Far from serving as a “reality function,” Lacan sees the ego as the
31

Inside and outside—concepts which present their own philosophical controversies; however, such a
discussion would lead us too far away from the topic at hand.
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symptom par excellence of neurosis—an objectification and misidentification of the
subject that sets the stage for future symptoms. Ego psychologists such as Anna Freud
and Otto Fenichel misunderstood this and identified the subject with the conscious ego
that speaks, thus focusing on resistances rather than on the symbolic structuring of the
patient (Lacan, 1975/1988).
In “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function,” Lacan (1949/2002)—
drawing upon the work of ethologists and embryologists—posits that the prematurity of
birth specific to the human species results in a fragmented newborn, lacking in
coordination and cohesive structure, that leaves it dependent on caretakers. In the mirror
stage (approximately six to 18 months), the infant encounters a mirror32 image of herself
that gives her a sense of being a whole coordinated unity that reaches far beyond her
actual developmental achievement. The child identifies with this gestalt—indeed, she
invests this image with a certain amount of libido. This identification with the gestalt
provides a structuring image that organizes the prior chaos and provides the infant with a
sense of coordination and unity that is imaginary—based on an image. Lacan writes,
The jubilant assumption [assomption] of his specular image by the kind of
being—still trapped in his motor impotence and nursling dependence—the
little man is at the infans stage thus seems to me to manifest in an
exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a
primordial form. (p. 4, original italics)
In his 1960 reformulation of the mirror stage, Lacan emphasizes that the presence of a
parental Other who recognizes and affirms the child’s image in the mirror (e.g., “Yes!
That’s you there! Good baby!”) facilitates—via discourse—the child’s assumption of the
specular image. Lacan emphasizes that this approval and recognition by the parent is

32

The mirror could be an actual mirror or caretakers who reflect back to the child unified and coherent
figures.
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precisely why the mirror image is libidinally invested by the child and serves to later
assist in the construction of the ego-ideal—the internalization of the parents’ ideals (Fink,
1997). The approving gestures by the parent(s) establish the child as unique in the
parental Other’s world, further strengthening the identification with the image. Lacan
(1948/2002) continues,
It is in this erotic relationship, in which the human individual fixates on an
image that alienates him from himself, that we find the energy and the
form from which the organization of the passions that he will call his ego
originates.
Indeed, this form crystallizes in the subject’s inner conflictual
tension, which leads to the awakening of his desire for the object of the
other’s desire: here the primordial confluence precipitates into aggressive
competition, from which develops the triad of other people, ego, and
object. (p. 21)
In her capture by the image and desire to please her parents, certain “parts” of the child
must necessarily be negated and cast out; such is the price the child pays for a unified,
stable sense of self and the crucial feeling of being desired by the parents. The mirror
image and the resulting ego function as a sort of nucleus upon which further self-images
crystallize, offering a promise of unity and self-mastery that are illusory. The ego,
therefore, is but a small fraction of the subject—whatever has been reflected back and
recognized by the mirrors around her. The subject is therefore alienated from herself,
fundamentally mistaking a small piece of herself (the ego) for the whole. Lacan
(1948/2002) notes, “The I is an other” (p. 24, original italics) shaped by the discourse of
others (e.g., people like the subject) and the Other—where the “Other” with a capital “O”
refers to Lacan’s symbolic order, which includes the register of speech, language (and,
therefore, the unconscious), law, culture, and persons perceived as radically different
from the self.
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The alienating function of the mirror stage thus results in a splitting off of the ego
from the subject and aids in the creation of the split or divided subject—a subject with an
unconscious—as those unacceptable parts of the child undergo repression. Importantly,
(and necessarily), Lacan therefore distinguishes between the ego and the subject. Many
therapists today conflate the conscious ego with the agentic subject who is masterful and
in control. Not so, says Lacan. The subject is the subject of speech—not the subject who
is the agent of speech—but the subject who is determined and conditioned by speech
(Soler, 1996). Lacan maintains that the subject is the effect of speech and, as such, not
identifiable with the ego.33 A brief exploration of Lacan’s three registers will offer further
clarity.
Before the mirror stage, the infant exists in the “real”—one of Lacan’s three
orders of experience (or registers). The real is the register of fullness and presence. It
lacks differentiation; indeed, it lacks lack. “[T]he real is without fissure” (Lacan,
1975/1988, p. 97). Soler (1996) refers to the being that exists in the real as the “living
being” (p. 261)—a body that has yet to be overwritten by the symbolic order—a libidinal
body unmediated by the signifier. It is radically non-discursive and stands outside the
symbolic order. The real before the letter, or R1, (i.e., before the child’s coming into being
in language) is the magical place of (illusory) unity where there is no distinction between
infant and mother, mother and breast, inside and outside. Jouissance, Lacan’s term for a
type of satisfaction that is both painful and pleasurable, is intimately tied to the register of
the real as “something actual in the body”—a sexual excitation that is materially present
and experienced in the body (Soler, 1996, p. 251).
33

Readers interested in Lacan’s exposition of speech are directed to Lacan’s (1955/2006) “Variations on
the Standard Treatment or “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis
(1953/2002), to name but two.
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Much of the real before the letter is overwritten by the institution of the symbolic
order, being drawn into signifiers and restructured; however, there is always a residue of
the real left over—a real after the letter, R2. This second real contains everything that is
excluded from the signifying chain and may be thought of as the site of trauma—as that
which has never been symbolized, leaving the subject stuck or blocked in some way. Fink
(1997) notes accordingly,
The real [...] is what has not yet been put into words or formulated. It can
be thought of, in a certain sense, as the connection or link between two
thoughts that has succumbed to repression and must be restored. (p. 49)
The second real is thus associated with fixation and repetition in the subject: It is the
thing the subject repeatedly comes back to and stumbles over, circling around it while not
quite being able to formulate it in words. It is perhaps an event in the life of the patient
that was so psychically overwhelming, it was unable to be incorporated into the subject’s
chain of discourse. The therapist listens for evidence of this second real in the gaps and
holes in the subject’s discourse—in that which has been excluded—for by its very
exclusion, it takes on a materiality that structures the signifying chain. According to
Lacan, the real must be symbolized through analysis; interpretation therefore aims at the
real, seeking to restore missing links in the signifying chain of the subject. Interpretation
is said to have “hit the real” or “hit the cause” when it creates truth for the subject,
freeing up her desire and shifting her customary ways of achieving jouissance (Fink,
1997).34
The mirror stage and the construction of the ego as a symptom act to firmly
instate the infant in the imaginary register, which refers to the images we have of
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ourselves, others, and the world around us. As we have seen, in the mirror stage, the
imaginary order is based on identifications with and imitation of others and is
characterized by ego-to-ego relations. It is thus a dyadic order whose differentiation
reaches only so far as what is “me” and “not-me,” where what is “not-me” is viewed as
narcissistically threatening to the ego. As we have discovered, the ego is formed by
negating intrapsychic parts of the subject that do not correspond to the unified mirror
image by which the subject has been captured; however it is also the structure of the selfpreservative ego to negate all that is “not-me.” Miller (2011) states,
Not only must the ego say “anything other than the two-dimensional unity
I see in this mirror is not me” to keep itself intact. It must also negate any
Otherness of the mirror or mirror image itself. The mirror must have no
existence for itself. Rather it is there to reflect the ego; for all practical
purposes it is the ego. [T]o be a mirror, the mirror has to be nothing else,
just as to be an ego the subject must be largely negated. (p. 84, original
italics)
The imaginary order is, therefore, structurally characterized by rivalry (and its
complement, identification) and aggression (Fink, 1997). It is not surprising then that in
“Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis,” Lacan (1948/2002) identifies the “paranoiac
structure of the ego [...] that is the very delusion of the misanthropic beautiful soul,
casting out onto the world the disorder that constitutes [its] being” (p. 21). Faced with the
task of defending against all that falls outside the imaginary gestalt (both intra- and
extrapsychically), the ego is a sentinel that must always remain on guard.
Therapies then that seek to “strengthen the ego” function to further alienate
patients by reinforcing the narcissistic mirage that lies at the heart of their neurosis—they
only deepen the (mis)identification with the ego and do not inspire the patient to ask what
s/he as a subject desires. Psychotherapeutic approaches that focus on the relationship
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between therapist and patient remain trapped at the level of the imaginary order, focusing
on dyadic relations rather than on speech, language, and the unconscious—in other
words, on the symbolic order and the way the patient positions herself with regard to the
Other. Such “two-bod[y] psycholog[ies]” focus on affect, countertransference,35 and
intuition; they function to make the patient an object for herself, thus replicating the
narcissistic wound that already lies at the core of her being (Lacan, 1975/1988, p. 11).
What is at stake for Lacan is “the realization of the truth of the subject” (p. 21). Thus,
If, as we must, we take speech as the central feature of our perspective,
then it is within a three- rather than two-term relation that we have to
formulate the analytic experience in its totality. (p. 11)
In other words, the issue Lacan takes with ego-oriented therapies is their lack of
recognition of the symbolic. For Lacan, the imaginary register is “[r]estructured,
rewritten, or ‘overwritten’ by the symbolic, by the words and phrases the parents use to
express their view of the child” (Fink, 1997, p. 88). The linguistic order supersedes the
imaginary, replacing the rivalry and aggression characteristic of it with symbolic
concerns regarding achievement, guilt, the law, and authority, to name but a few. This
overwriting is closely tied to Freud’s Oedipus complex whereby the child gives up the
mother as the source of jouissance to become a socialized being—in a word moving from
a dyadic relationship to triadic ones. Verhaege (1999) writes, “[T]he Oedipus complex is
the process through which everyone has to go in order to move from two to three
elements, that is, to break away from a mirror relationship with another person who is the
same, and take the steps towards a third person, another other” (pp. 33-34). Further
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explorations of Lacan’s view of the development of the subject will help articulate these
processes.36
On Becoming a Subject: Alienation, Separation, and the Paternal Metaphor
What is at issue is the subjectivity of the subject, in his desire, in his
relation to his environment, to others, to life itself.
(Lacan, 1975/1988, p. 1)
According to Lacan, the advent of the subject occurs via two logical movements
and is closely tied to what Lacan terms the paternal metaphor or the paternal function.
The paternal function is responsible for the birth of the subject into the symbolic order
and serves as the “button tie” that anchors the entire symbolic realm (Fink, 1997, p. 93).
An in-depth discussion of the paternal function and its accompanying movements of
alienation and separation are not necessary for our purposes, so I will direct the reader to
Fink (1995, pp. 49-79) for a more theoretically sophisticated account and give a general
overview here.
The paternal function is the process by which an authority figure or
someone/thing representing the law (typically the father in traditional nuclear families)
comes between the mother and child, effecting at least a partial separation between the
two—resulting in the instatement of what Lacan terms the Name-of-the-Father. Despite
its name, it is important to note that the paternal function is a symbolic function—it is a
metaphor for the institution of a third between mother and child. Consequently, the
successful instatement of the paternal function does not require the actual presence of a
father or a male figure: It requires the presence of someone—a third—representing the
law (the symbolic order) that stands outside of the mother/child dyad. Thus, the authority
36
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that comes between the mother and the child can be of any gender and may, indeed, be
the mother herself.37 This intervening figure may be thought of as the “second Other,”
where the primary caretaker is the “first Other” (Verhaege, 2009, p. 79). What is
important is that a separation is effected that provides the child the symbolic space
necessary in which to come into being as a desiring subject.38 This occurs through the
movements of alienation and separation.
Alienation
The first movement of this function is called alienation and corresponds to what
Freud termed “primal repression.” The living being in the real (not yet a subject in
Lacan’s terms) is confronted with the radical Other of language and is forced to make a
choice—submit to the Other of language and become a socialized, speaking being or
reject the symbolic order altogether. The odds are obviously stacked against the child, so
in a sense, the “choice” of the child is forced; however, it is possible for the child to reject
the incorporation of the symbolic order, thus resulting in psychosis. In submitting to the
Other as language, the child essentially allows the signifier to stand in for her. This can
be represented as follows:
Other
child
I say the child must submit to language because in so doing, she is irrevocably separated
from the real—from her living being. Language pre-exists her, and as such, acts as a sort
of straightjacket, allowing her to operate only within the parameters of that pre-existing
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For a detailed description of the Name-of-the-Father, see Fink (1997, pp. 80-81) and Swales (2012, pp.
30-33).
38
Lacan reformulates Freud’s Oedipus complex here. Samuels (1993) writes, “The Oedipus Complex
structures the relation between the Real subject of sexuality, the narcissistic relation with the image of the
mother, and the Symbolic intervention of the father” (p. 75).
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symbolic system. In a sense, this first step toward subjectivity requires the child to give
up her real being in exchange for a place within language and the symbolic order. The
certainty and wholeness of the real are given up for the possibility of being, thus creating
lack and doubt about one’s existential place. “Alienation engenders [...] a place in which
it is clear that there is, as of yet, no subject: a place where something is conspicuously
lacking. The subject’s first guise is this very lack” (Fink, 1995, p. 52, original italics). In
other words, the child is alienated within language. There is a gap or a lack engendered
by the incorporation of language that is structurally necessary and unavoidable (if one is
to become a subject).
This incorporation of language consists of a further knotting that must occur
between language and meaning—signifier and signified. According to Lacan, this occurs
via the father’s (or second Other’s) prohibition of the jouissance the child enjoys with the
mother (as first Other). Jouissance is a term that is not easily translated into English, nor
is it one that remains static in Lacan’s work, but roughly speaking it entails a type of
pleasure in pain or a “getting off” of sorts. Before the intrusion of the second Other, the
mother serves as the sole source of the child’s jouissance—lovingly holding her, gazing
into her eyes, breastfeeding her, and so on. The two are a unity, and the child has
exclusive access to the mother. In a typical Western family, it is usually the father who
intervenes in this relationship, perhaps admonishing the child for being a “baby” or a
“Momma’s boy.” In so doing, he pushes the child to separate from the mother, thereby
prohibiting the jouissance the child derives from her. Metaphorically, the father’s “No!”
cancels out the mother as the source of jouissance:
Father’s No!
Mother as Source of Jouissance
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The child is forced to give up a certain jouissance—a certain satisfaction he derives from
her. In Freudian terms, the child undergoes a certain castration, a loss of the primary love
object.
As I have indicated, jouissance implies a satisfaction that entails both pain and
pleasure. Certainly, the child enjoys its special relationship with the mother, enjoying her
touch and gaze, and perhaps (likely) hates the second Other for imposing restrictions on
this jouissance; however, the immediacy of the relationship with the mother also
produces anxiety for the child. Indeed, the mOther’s39 closeness is often perceived as
dangerous to the child who perhaps fears being devoured, smothered, or engulfed by her.
The lack of a gap, or to use Lacan’s terms, the lack of a lack is precisely what produces
this anxiety. This could reflect the child’s wish to be the unique desire of the mother, or it
could also be a genuine reaction on the child’s part to a mother who is seeking
gratification of her desires via the child (Fink, 1997). In either case, the important point is
the anxiety produced in the child as a result of the overproximity of the mother is eased
by the interruption of the second Other’s prohibition. Fink writes,
The father protects the child from the mother (as desiring or as desired),
setting himself up as the one who prohibits, forbids, thwarts, and
protects—in a word, as the one who lays down the law at home, telling
both mother and child what is allowed and what is not. (p. 80)
“Successful” alienation thus entails the child’s incorporation of language and sacrificing
of her living being, as well as a sacrificing of satisfaction obtained with the mother. The
Name-of-the-Father or the second Other’s “No!” serves as a powerful signifier that
indicates something to the child about her relationship with mother: “Daddy doesn’t like
it when Mommy holds me/I am not supposed to like touching Mommy, etc.” In other
39
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words, the prohibitive signifier creates a meaning for the child. Consequently, word is
tied to meaning, signifier to signified, in a bond that cannot be broken once instituted.
This is what Lacan (1960/2002) refers to as the “button tie” that securely situates the
subject in the linguistic order (p. 291).
Lacan notes that prohibition creates desire: It is when I no longer have something
that I realize I want it, that I am lacking it. Due to the prohibition enunciated by the
second Other, the child is no longer supposed to crave the mother’s warm touch, her soft
embrace (the law says it’s not okay); consequently, the child must repress her desire for
the jouissance she experienced with her. While the child’s incorporation of language and
separation from the mother provide the initial symbolic space necessary for the subject to
come into being, they also produce a residue—a remainder—of that which has been
sacrificed. Lacan calls this remainder object a and identifies it as a result of primary
repression. The notion of object a undergoes significant transformations and revisions in
Lacan’s oeuvre.40 (Indeed, one could dedicate an entire dissertation to the topic.) For our
purposes, I will highlight Lacan’s formulation of object a as the residue of the real that is
left over and continues to exist after the institution of the symbolic order. Object a is, on
the one hand, the ineffable agalma (see Lacan, 2001) that interrupts the automatic
unfolding of the signifying chain precisely because it resists symbolization. It is the thing
that cannot be accounted for, therefore, disrupting the symbolic order. Object a can, on
the other hand, be understood as the rem(a)inder produced by the limitations placed on
the child’s jouissance with the mother: It is a last reminder of the supposed mother-child
unity that the child clings to in an effort to ignore her division and sustain the illusion of
wholeness. Object a is thus a symbol that indicates the lack in the child’s being (what has
40
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been lost), as well as the lost object the child clings to in her attempt to avoid
acknowledging that lack. Lacan later identifies object a as the cause of desire—the ever
elusive object that, if it could just be found, would offer the hope of a return to a fullness
of being and to the jouissance one experienced before the letter.41 As such, object a
structures the drives and desires of the subject and represents the presence of an
unsymbolized real element in the symbolic order (Samuels, 1993). It is worth noting that
these formulations of object a are not mutually exclusive; indeed, they both point to that
ineffable rem(a)inder that escapes symbolization and is thus recaptured in fantasy. (As
we will see, the subject’s fantasy involving object a tells us something about the way the
subject positions herself with respect to the Other’s desire.)
Lacan tells us that, in undergoing alienation, the child is “eclipsed” by
language—“that the subject here slips under or behind the signifier” (Fink, 1995, p. 52);
however, as of yet, s/he is only a placeholder in the symbolic order. The signifier takes
the place of the child’s living being. For the complete advent of the subject, however, the
second movement of the paternal function must occur.
Separation
This second movement in the paternal metaphor is what Lacan terms separation.
Whereas alienation involves the child’s encounter with the Other as language, separation
involves the child’s encounter with the Other as desire. By way of alienation, there has
been a separation between mother and child and a repression of the child’s longing to
return to the jouissance-filled harmony s/he imagines existed before alienation. As a
separate being, the child is left to wonder what purpose s/he serves. S/he may ask, “Why
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We might refer to the jouissance of the real (before the letter, before the institution of the symbolic order)
as J1 and the jouissance after the institution of the symbolic as J 2. See Fink (1995, pp. 60-61).
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did my parents have me?” “Who am I to my parents?” “What do they want from me?”
“Who am I?” Now separate, the subject is unknown to herself and seeks the answer to her
existential questions via the recognition and approval of her parents. In short, s/he wants
to know that s/he is desired. This leads the child to an encounter with the mOther’s desire
and the question of what she wants. The child asks of the mother, “Chè Vuoi?” What do
you want (Lacan, 1960/2002, p. 300)? This question is fueled by both anxiety and
curiosity. On the one hand, the child wants nothing more than to be the mother’s ultimate
desire—this would ensure her uniqueness and answer her existential questions.
Furthermore, this would provide the child with a sense of the fullness s/he believes s/he
experienced pre-alienation and further aid her in ignoring her own division. On the other
hand, this longing to be the object of the mother’s desire is fraught with anxiety,
predominantly because, post-alienation, the Other is initially taken up as the Other of
demand. Thus, despite her longing for love and recognition, the child’s anxiety regarding
the mother’s demand is still present, though to a lesser degree. If the child perceives that
the mother is seeking to gratify herself via the child, anxiety will be provoked. The child
will perceive herself as being the object that would fill the demanding Other’s lack, thus
leaving her no symbolic space of her own. Essentially, s/he will see herself as nothing
more than an extension of the mother and fear that s/he will be swallowed up by
mOther’s lack.
For the child to further separate from the mother, demand must be superseded by
desire. This occurs through the articulation of the mOther’s lack/desire.42 Oftentimes, this
occurs by the mother expressing her desire for her partner, or she may express a desire
for a certain dress or piece of artwork. The point is, the child recognizes that s/he is not
42
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the be-all and end-all for her mother—that mOther desires something outside of her. The
symbolization of the mOther’s desire thus opens up a space for the child to come into
being in her own subjective position with her own desires, rather than remaining trapped
in the anxiety-filled role as the mother’s object of jouissance.43 The child’s anxiety is,
therefore, allayed by the naming of the mOther’s desire. Lacan tells us that the word is
the death of the thing—that by putting words on that which has not yet been named, some
of the affective force of the real is “drained away.” When the mOther’s desire has not
been named, the child is left with her demand alone and the accompanying belief that
s/he will be swallowed up by that demand.
Furthermore, the general structure of desire enables the child to further separate
from the mother. Whereas jouissance can be satisfied with a specific object (the child
fears s/he is that object), desire desires more desire. It does not seek an object—it seeks
its own continuation (Lacan, 1957/2006). Due to the fundamental lack in language, desire
is something that can never be fully satisfied; it is structurally impossible. Because
language is imperfect, we can never quite ask for what we want. Desire is that unnamable
thing that cannot be articulated and that supersedes demand, going beyond what the
subject asks for. Consequently, the child can never satisfy the mOther’s desire, as the
satisfaction of desire is structurally impossible (except, perhaps, in dreams and fantasies);
however, the nature of the mOther’s desire is enigmatic to the child—s/he wonders what
her mOther desires. Fink (1997) writes,
Once that which the mOther is missing is named, the object the child was
for his mOther can no longer exist. For once desire is articulated in words,
it does not sit still, but displaces, drifting metonymically from one thing to
the next. Desire is a product of language and cannot be satisfied with an
43
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object. The naming of the mOther’s desire forces the child out of his
position as object, and propels him into the quest for the elusive key to her
desire. What does she want? Something ineffable that seems to
characterize the endless series of things her desire alights upon—what in
Western society is known as the phallus. (p. 178)
Lacan’s conceptions of the phallus are numerous, but for our purposes we can
conceptualize the phallus as the signifier of lack or the signifier of the Other’s desire. It is
what the Other wants. The child attempts to ascertain what it is and to model her desires
on those of the parental Other. Not only does s/he want to be desired by the Other, s/he
wants to desire like the Other, having no being of her own. Thus, Lacan’s well-known
dictum, “Man’s desire is the Other’s desire.” What is important here is that the encounter
with the Other’s desire stimulates the child’s—it serves as the motor force of her
developing desire. S/he wants to understand others’ desires, and this necessarily leads to
the engagement with desire itself. Thus, “The Other’s desire causes ours” (Fink, 1997, p.
55).
In summary, the first movement of the paternal metaphor is the encounter with
language and the prohibition of the child’s jouissance with the mother as the first Other.
The child sacrifices both her living being and jouissance before the letter in exchange for
a place within the symbolic order. As a result of these sacrifices, object a falls away and
is left as a rem(a)inder and reminder of the real, forever constituted as the “lost object”
that will structure the subject’s desires.44 The second moment of the paternal metaphor
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involves the child’s encounter with the mOther’s lack and the symbolization of her
desire. The two moments can thus be represented as follows:
Alienation

Separation

Father’s No!
Mother as jouissance

Father’s Name____
Mother as desire

Alienation thus entails a coming-into-existence of the divided being who is alienated in
language; whereas, separation leads to the advent of a desiring subject.
A Structural Approach: Diagnostic Considerations
Medical diagnostics begins with the particular (the symptom) and moves
toward the general (the syndrome), based on a semiotic system that is
entirely focused on the individual’s complaints. Clinical psychodiagnostics
begins from the general (the incipient complaint) and proceeds toward the
particular (where N = 1), based on a system of signifiers that is part of a
wider relationship between the subject and the Other.
(Verhaege, 2004, p. 6)
Given our understanding of the two movements of the paternal function, we are
now in a position to examine Lacan’s diagnostic schema. Contrary to a symptom-based
approach to diagnosis, Lacan’s structural approach seeks to situate the symptom within
the context of the subject’s psychic structure and the symbolic matrix in which each and
every person is born. Lacan’s diagnostic criteria are ontological—they posit that people
take up certain subjective positions in the face of suffering, specifically in the way they
respond to separation. To address the distinction between a descriptive approach to
diagnosis and a structural one, I would first like to address the concept of structure.
For Lacan, we are not simply bundles of neural networks and neurotransmitters,
but rather, desiring beings moving about in the languaged world of the Other. The
symbolic matrix is thus the context in which we are embedded—the network of
preexisting signifiers, cultural rules, relationships, and history that “determine what is
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allowed to be said, done, or even experienced” (Goldman, 2004, p. 110; see also Fink,
1995, p. 18 and p. 179). While some of the “context” in which we are embedded is
certainly social and interpersonal in nature, what Lacan refers to as “structural” is
essentially the symbolic dimension as Other that inhabits the subject and operates outside
her awareness. Fink (1995) writes,
The unconscious is not something one knows, but rather something that is
known. What is unconscious is known unbeknownst to the “person” in
question: it is not something one “actively” consciously grasps, but rather
something which is “passively” registered, inscribed, or counted. And this
unknown knowledge is locked into the connection between signifiers; it
consists in this very connection. This kind of knowledge has no subject,
nor does it need one. (p. 23, original italics)
This is a concept that is often difficult to grasp because of the all-too-frequent conflation
of “knowledge” with “consciousness;” however, what Fink is articulating is that a
symbolic system develops in the subject that remembers without conscious thinking and
that acts in accordance with certain internally established rules. For example, as a child
develops, her unconscious inscribes certain signifiers and experiences of which the child
has no conscious knowledge. As the child traverses the movements of alienation and
separation, signifiers are repressed, connecting with other elements in the signifying
chain, developing complex connections with them. Thus, in the very process of being
repressed, these words or parts of them take on new roles. The unconscious is thus an
assemblage of signifiers, phonemes, and letters that cannot be forgotten precisely because
the “past is recorded in the [signifying] chain itself, determining what is yet to come” (p.
19). Thus, the symbolic matrix is governed by a syntax—a set of rules or laws that
prohibits certain combinations, resulting in impossibilities in the signifying chain. The
way the symbolic matrix is constructed ciphers new experiences and events according to
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its syntax. Consciousness is not necessary for memory—the unconscious counts,
inscribes, remembers: “The unconscious is nothing but a “chain” of signifying elements,
such as words, phonemes, and letters, which “unfolds” in accordance with very precise
rules over which the ego or self has no control whatsoever” (p. 9). Stated otherwise, the
subject contains and acts on knowledge without having any idea s/he is doing so.
Utilizing set theory, Lacan suggests that unconscious processes have little to do
with conscious thinking or meaning, and concludes that analysis entails a deciphering
process that does not so much aim at revealing meaning as at “reducing signifiers to their
nonmeaning (lack of meaning) so as to find the determinants of the whole subject’s
behavior” (as cited in Fink, 1995, p. 21). In his analysis of the Rat Man, Freud
(1909/1955) draws attention to the fact that ideas can become grafted onto words to
which they bear no obvious relation by what he terms “verbal bridges” (p. 213). These
verbal bridges have nothing to do with conscious meaning and instead refer to the literal
relations among words as they are constituted in the unconscious. Lacan’s point here is
that the subject is subjugated by the signifier and is structurally defined by these
unconscious determinants.
When I speak of a structural approach to diagnosis and treatment, it is this
symbolic system and all of its manifestations to which I refer. Via repression, which
signifies a breaking of a link for Lacan rather than a “pushing down,” signifiers become
displaced; thus what counts in a structural approach is the wording, the signifiers that are
specifically chosen, and how they are linked to other signifiers. It is the letter that
manifests the unconscious. Lacan thus suggests the therapist “become practiced in the art
of finding these displaced signifiers [...] in the letter of the speech we actually hear,” as
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“The goal of finding the letter is to free it to become once again a part of the patient’s
discourse” (Miller, 2011, pp. 42-43). Part of the work of therapy is, therefore, to make the
implicit rules of the symbolic matrix more explicit to patients themselves so that they
may come to “subjectify” their desires (Fink, 1997, p. 56). What is required is an
articulation of the unconscious logic operating within the patient so that missing links
may be restored in the patient’s thoughts and feelings.
I am emphasizing here what can seem like abstract theorizing on Lacan’s part not
only to address the difference between a descriptive nosology and a structural approach,
but also to highlight the difference between Lacan and insight-oriented therapies that
emphasize the “personality organization” of the patient (e.g., Gabbard, 2005;
McWilliams, 2011). While the latter certainly contextualize symptoms and view the
patient in terms of underlying dynamics, their approach differs in that it does not identify
deeper structural components that defy signification; therefore, the focus remains on
helping the patient develop “insight.” In Seminar I, Lacan (1975/1988) writes, “One
shouldn’t make a character trait into a constant of the personality, still less a
characteristic of the subject” (p. 27). Diagnostic schemas that focus on personality
organization differ from Lacan in that they tend to be defined by a mixture of personality
traits, customary defenses of that particular personality, and underlying causal dynamics.
What are left out of such diagnostics are the deeper symbolic constellations that structure
the subject’s relationship to the Other’s desire. For Lacan, desire organizes human
experience, and this emphasis on desire and its manifestations via the signifier are what
differentiate a Lacanian approach.
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Neurotic Questioning
Lacan (1957/2006) tells us in “The Instance of the Letter or Reason since Freud”
that neurosis is a question being poses for the subject. Diagnosis indicates a structural
position that a subject takes with regard to the symbolic Other, as well as to the object. A
Lacanian approach to therapy does not set as its goal symptom remission but instead aims
at a shift in the patient’s psychic economy, transformations in desire, and subjectification
of one’s jouissance. Structural positions are instated via an individual’s response to the
processes of alienation and separation as described above; consequently, each structural
position is essentially a way of solving the problems of alienation, separation, and
castration. For Lacan, there are three primary diagnostic structures: neurosis, perversion,
and psychosis and each is constituted by a defining form of negation.
In this dissertation, I am interested in the structure of neurosis, which is further
broken down by Lacan into hysteria, obsession, and phobia.45 Repression is the form of
negation operative in neurosis, though what is repressed is different in each structural
category (Fink, 1997). (For example, hysterics tend to repress ideas, whereas obsessives
separate ideas from affect, as outlined in Chapter One.) Structural differences between
hysteria and obsession concern the way the subject relates to the Other’s desire, as well as
the parsing of the existential question of being that is of most concern to the patient.
Lacan (1981/1993) tells us that obsessives are concerned with the question of existence,
“Am I dead or alive?” or “To be or not to be?” (p. 168, 180). The hysteric, however, is
concerned with her sexual being, “What is it to be a woman?” or “Am I a man or a
woman?” (p. 171). These questions are often posed via symptoms, relationships, patterns,
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and unconscious manifestations; the therapist must thus decipher the symptom in relation
to the psychic structure of the individual.
Soler (1996) reminds us of Freud’s discovery of infantile sexuality and
emphasizes the loss of sexual satisfaction (owing to the prohibition of jouissance) as
constitutive of neurosis. It is the frustration of the infantile desire to remain at one with
the mother that poses a problem for the neurotic. Freud posited that the sexual excitation
(or jouissance) the child encountered was experienced as something heterogeneous, and
thus something to be defended against. Thus, the first sexual experiences of the child are
traumatic, and the child assumes a position with regard to this experience. The defense is
her answer to the problem posed by sexuality as real—as jouissance that is something
actual, something material, in the body. The sacrifice of jouissance that is required in the
process of socialization is therefore one the neurotic struggles with, feeling as if s/he got
a raw deal in this process (Lacan, 1973/1981). Perhaps the satisfaction s/he gave up was
better than what s/he was promised? To put it differently, in castration, the child
relinquishes some jouissance in exchange for the promise of symbolic achievements. Via
the Oedipal complex, the child gives up bodily attachment to the parental Other for the
ego-ideal—striving to please her parents by getting good grades, being a star soccer
player, winning awards, and so on. The problem for the neurotic, however, is that s/he
feels that the praise s/he receives for doing so is not all it was made out to be. S/he
experiences guilt, anxiety, fear, and so on as s/he struggles to ascertain her place in the
world. S/he wonders, “Who am I to others?” “Am I desired?” The neurotic subject seeks
to answer these questions of separation via the Other’s desire (Soler, 1996). S/he models
her desire on the Other’s desire, desiring the objects the Other seems to want, liking the
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music the Other likes, etc. Perhaps s/he attempts to ascertain the Other’s desire so that
s/he can become the object that would fulfill the Other (object a).46 Essentially, s/he
incorporates aspects of the Other’s desire as her own and attempts to embody those
qualities that would make her desired by the Other. These strategies represent attempts to
overcome separation by denying one’s division in the hope of regaining the jouissance
and wholeness that was sacrificed. (The image of the child trying to crawl back into the
mother’s womb is one that would be illustrative here.) In short: the neurotic subject has
not completed the process of separation—s/he has not accepted her castration, to use
Freud’s terms. As such s/he takes up a position—a stance—with regard to the Other (the
Other as desire, the law, language, cultural norms, etc.). It is this position that often gets
in the way of what the neurotic says s/he wants. Indeed, most neurotic subjects complain
of wanting something but getting in their own way. They are inhibited by factors they do
not comprehend. These factors are situated in the deeper structure of the subject, and
symptoms are “sites of localized jouissance” (Soler, 1996, p. 255). In other words, there
has been a failure of defense that has resulted in a return of the repressed as a symptom.
If what the subject was defending against was a certain type or amount of jouissance¸ it
makes sense that the symptom itself would contain a certain amount of “kick” for the
neurotic subject.
How does this formulation fit with the questions of this dissertation? What are
called “classic OCD” symptoms do not necessarily indicate an obsessive structure, but
are rather ways of speaking that have yet to be symbolized. From a Lacanian standpoint,
to merely “attack” such symptoms would produce no transformative effect on structure,
nor would it allow us to “interrogate the unconscious” (Lacan, 1961/2002, p. 283). To
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take such symptoms at face value and to apply a medical diagnosis to them is to miss
what they are speaking to and for. Lacan (1953/2002) tells us that the subject is a
question (p. 84). What question is the subject attempting to answer? How are symptoms a
movement toward speech? How can we help the patient speak this question in words
rather than through symptoms? Freud’s great achievement was his recognition of the
power of words—the ability of the symbolic to transform the real, in Lacanian terms.
Psychoanalysis allows for the working through of symptoms by allowing “strangulated
affect to find a way out through speech” (Breuer & Freud, 1895/1955, p. 68). Indeed,
Lacan (1953/2002) tells us that “Psychoanalysis has but one medium: the patient’s
speech” (p. 40).
Given that in differing structures the relationship to the symbolic Other and to the
Other’s desire is organized in different ways, the importance of early diagnosis in a
Lacanian-oriented therapy cannot be overstated. This is not to suggest that the therapist’s
provisional diagnosis never changes as therapy progresses, but that the Lacanian-oriented
clinician attempts to structurally diagnose the patient as early as possible as differing
structures require differing stances on the therapist’s part. This was a position that Freud
(1895/1955) advocated as well: “A decision on the diagnosis and the form of therapy to
be adopted has to be made before any thorough knowledge of the case has been arrived
at” (p. 256). In a Lacanian-oriented therapy, the diagnosis orients the treatment. There is
no manualized treatment, and while there are certain therapeutic guidelines that are
adhered to (punctuating signifiers, interpreting in an evocative manner, etc.), symptoms
are examined for their uniqueness and the therapist’s stance is determined by the patient’s
structural economy. For example, because the hysteric is constantly attempting to
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ascertain the Other’s desire to cover over lack, I would be more prone as a clinician to
situate the hysteric on the therapeutic couch so that she would be unable to read my facial
expressions. Likewise, because the obsessive is most comfortable pretending the Other is
dead, I would perhaps make my presence more known to him in an attempt to
“hystericize” him, or open him to the Other. When, as clinicians, we begin to see the
patient as more than a mass of symptoms and instead delve into underlying structural
components, we open up a space so that desires trapped in a circuit of suffering may be
loosened and transformed—egoic identifications dissolved—in hopes that the person may
come to enjoy more freely.
A Note on Gender
In psychoanalytic literature, hysterics are typically identified as female, while
obsessives are usually male. There has been much criticism of psychoanalysis from
feminists who are less than enthused by Freud’s positioning of women as “passive” and
men as “active”—to name but one critique. I want to draw attention here to the fact that
historically, the majority of hysterics have been female and obsessives male; however,
this has nothing to do with biology nor does it indicate anything about how proactive a
woman is. Rather, structure reflects culture in many ways: childrearing practices,
patriarchal configurations, family systems, educational practices, and religious and
spiritual beliefs, to name but a few. In his Clinical Introduction to Lacanian
Psychoanalysis, Fink (1997) offers a social-psychological explanation for the
correspondence between hysteria in females and obsession in males. Fink suggests that in
Western culture, there is a tendency for mothers to nurture their male children more
generously than their female children. This suggests to male children that they are lacking
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in something—something that mother can provide. Later, boys attempt to overcome
separation by completing themselves with an object (object a) related to the mother. They
thus seek in fantasy an object that will complete them.
Daughters, on the other hand, tend to be breastfed for shorter amounts of time and
are given the impression that it is the mother who is lacking something. Consequently, as
a strategy for overcoming separation, daughters attempt to become the object that can
fulfill the mOther. It is, therefore, the mOther who is lacking and the daughter positions
herself as object a—the object that fills the mOther’s lack. Fink notes that if
oedipalization occurs, she then attempts to complete the male Other instead of the
mOther. Fink further suggests that the role of the father influences the adoption of
structure because fathers tend to compete with their sons more readily than daughters and
vice versa. Thus, fathers are more vigorous about separating theirs sons from mOther,
while remaining content to allow the daughter to occupy mOther’s time.
It is important to note here that what Fink is suggesting arises, in many ways,
from the learned sex roles prevalent in society today. Lacan does not believe that
anatomy is destiny; in fact, his masculine and feminine structures refer instead to the way
a subject desires and obtains jouissance.47 The idea that men are supposed to be
“stronger” and “less emotional,” while women are supposed to be “softer” and “more
emotional” plays a significant role in the development of structure. Historically, women
have been assigned the role of caretaker—anticipating others’ needs and fulfilling
them—hallmarks of hysteria. The modern day caricature of men as objectifying rascals
who love their beer and pornography illustrates, in many ways, the filling up of one’s
lack with objects. While these characterizations are certainly not true of all families, they
47
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are, as Fink writes “statistical generalities in contemporary Western societies” (p. 258). In
other words, there are specific types of ideals and traits at work in obsession and hysteria
that are inculcated within a family context. Structures then are not universal but instead
reflect the typical organization of society and culture.
Lacan has been critiqued heavily by feminists for his concept of the “phallus”
(e.g., Irigiray, 1985); however, I think it is important to note that Lacan is being
descriptive here rather than prescriptive.48 He is not suggesting that the current state of
affairs is the way things should be, but rather describing the way things are. The phallus,
as the signifier of desire, does not mean in antiquated Freudian terms that all women
would like to have a penis; instead, it points to the very real fact that historically (and I
would certainly argue contemporarily) having a penis has been associated with power and
privilege. The phallus, therefore, does not refer to the penis as an anatomical organ—the
penis as real—but rather to the symbolic phallus—as the signifier of desire, which in
Western culture is typically associated with power, prestige, and money: things only
available to men historically. In my view, what Lacan is drawing attention to (and Freud
before him with his notion of hysteria) was precisely the fact that women have not had
access to the phallus (as Lacan tells us, there is no signifier for Woman).49 For example,
Freud’s hysterics manifested “glove anesthesia” as a protest against their proscribed and
limited roles as caretakers of the family. While I am not suggesting that Freud’s
descriptions of women were always complimentary, I do believe that psychoanalysis has
attempted to highlight the social discrepancies between men and women. I, therefore,
disagree with many of the feminist critiques lodged against Lacan as “phallocentric,”
48

He has also been praised for highlighting the role of cultural factors above biology (as I seek to do here)
by some feminist writers. See Ragland-Sullivan (2000).
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See Soler (1996, pp. 56-57, 59).
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specifically because I believe they derive primarily from misunderstandings of his notion
of the phallus. That being said, Fink writes, “All efforts to change women’s and men’s
roles notwithstanding, as long as the phallus remains the signifier of desire, these
different structures seem unlikely to disappear” (p. 162).50
The second case I present is somewhat unique in that it is a case of male hysteria.
Female obsessives certainly also exist—in fact, some would argue that we are seeing an
increase in women who are obsessively structured (see D. Miller, 2005). (Given the drive
toward an increasingly obsessive culture as explained above, this is not surprising.) Fink
(1997) suggests that oftentimes patients who do not conform to traditional clinical
categories pose diagnostic problems for clinicians who often end up lumping them
together into the category of “borderline.”51 This crossing over of categories presents
significant challenges, particularly if one is only working at the level of the symptom
rather than situating the symptom within the context of the subject’s psychic structure.
My case presentations will highlight these difficulties further.
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For an in-depth look at Lacan’s notion of masculine and feminine structure, see Lacan (1975/1998).
Lacan does not recognize “borderline” as a structural category. See Fink (1997, p. 77).
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CHAPTER THREE
Dead Man Walking (Into a Dead End): A Case Study of Obsession
I have always been alone. I assume it’s because something is wrong with
me. So I watch what others do and try to imitate that. But the more I do
that, the further I feel from myself.
Keenan, March 2010
The question of death is another mode of the neurotic creation of the
question—the obsessional mode.
(Lacan, 1981/1993, p. 180)
Introduction
In this chapter, I explicate Lacan’s formulation of obsessive structure via a case
study of a former patient of mine. My aims are to illustrate how Lacan’s formulations
guide my clinical work and to likewise articulate how my own understanding of Lacanian
theory has been furthered by my work with this patient (and others, as well). My hope is
that by presenting such concepts in a clinical context, they may be more concretely
understood and useful to clinicians. Readers interested in more in-depth discussion of
theoretical concepts are directed to listed sources. My primary goal is to illustrate how I
utilized Lacan in my clinical approach.
In my presentation of “Keenan” (an alias, of course), I discuss Keenan’s issues
with time, death, deferral, and desire, and I draw attention to how his symptoms are tied
to his history and parental discourse. I also situate Keenan’s symptoms within the context
of the obsessive’s psychic structure. I end by discussing the particular therapeutic
techniques I utilized with Keenan.
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On Being “Nothing”
Presenting Problem and Initial Interviews
Keenan began therapy with me in his early twenties. For 30 months, he attended
therapy twice weekly, rarely missing sessions. Prior to our work together, Keenan had
been in therapy for approximately two years with another therapist at the clinic where I
trained. Our work together ended when I completed my graduate training. Keenan made
the decision at that time to not continue with a new therapist, despite my expressed desire
for him to do so,52 stating he was “frustrated by the idea of opening to another person,”
and that he “avoid[ed] it at all costs.” As will be seen, this desire to avoid opening to
another person “at all costs” is a key component of obsessive structure; indeed, the
obsessive is characterized by what Lacan refers to as his “nullification” of the Other.
Obsessives would prefer, for the most part, for the Other to just not exist, for the
existence of the Other seems to wreak havoc on their ability to desire. As will be shown,
a “hysterization” of sorts had to occur before Keenan fully engaged in therapy.
Keenan arrived early for his first appointment—a behavior he would continue
throughout our work together. Time was important to Keenan: He did not want to “keep
[me] waiting.” Initially, he would keep rigid watch over the clock in the session room,
often telling me when it was time to end the session. When I noted his strict adherence to
the clock, he said he was “measuring time” so that he knew “when it [was] time to end.”
Keenan rarely requested to extend a session a couple of extra minutes to finish a story
(something that differentiates the obsessive from the hysteric), and his ability to do so—
to articulate a demand—only came toward the end of our work together; Keenan was
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I clearly indicated to Keenan my desire for him to continue his work in therapy. Lacan says the motor
force of therapy is the “analyst’s desire,” and certain Lacanians advocate for calling patients when they
miss sessions, expressing the desire for them to continue therapy, etc. This is different from many therapies
that take a more “hands off” approach. See Lacan (1960/2002, p. 309) and Fink (1997, pp. 4-21).

94

strictly regulated by the Other’s time—another characteristic of obsessive structure. In
Seminar VIII, Lacan (2001) describes how the obsessive believes he is doing “everything
for the Other” (Ch. 14),53 including living according to their time schedule. To shake up
Keenan’s rigid compliance with (and reliance on) the Other’s time, I eventually turned
the clock so that he could not see it and began scanding sessions. Scansion, leading to
what is known as the variable-length session, is a technique whereby the therapist ends
the session on a particularly noteworthy or striking point, so as to punctuate the patient’s
speech (Fink, 2007). This punctuation may serve to highlight polyvalent meanings in
something the patient said or draw attention to a manifestation of the patient’s jouissance
or desire of which he is unaware. Scansion has not been particularly popular in American
psychology, where time and money are equated (“But I paid for a 45 minute session!”);
however, I have found it to be especially useful in getting the patient’s unconscious
moving because it serves as a type of castration and intervenes at the level of the real—
instituting a “cut” that disrupts the subject’s fixation. With Keenan, “cutting” sessions
short or allowing them to go over when needed interrupted his ability to “measure time”
according to the Other.54
Keenan’s presenting complaint was that he felt socially isolated because of the
abject anxiety he felt around other people. He wanted to find a way to socialize “without
having to adapt [his] individual self to other people.” He emphasized this last point,
stating he was willing to forego social and dating relationships if it meant he had to
“change [him]self.” Keenan said,
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The version of Seminar VIII I am drawing from is the forthcoming translation from Bruce Fink. As such,
I do not yet have accurate page numbers.
54
For more on the process of scansion, see Fink (2007, pp. 47-73).
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I have reached a plateau in the events of my life, living routinely without
any desires being satisfied. I’d like to discuss thoughts on that but have no
one in my personal life to talk to. I will never set aside or cover up my
individuality, no matter the benefits it may allow, such as having a more
active social life due to being less selective of the company I keep or
assimilating others’ interests or perspectives. I have no goals.55
At the time, Keenan only had one friend whom he rarely saw or spoke with and had
never been in a dating relationship or had sex. His social interactions were limited to his
daily encounters with his bosses at the local store where he worked for minimum wage as
a sales clerk. He described feeling “uncertain” and “nervous” when “thinking” of
approaching people. Keenan said he was also hoping therapy would give him some
“increased intellectual stimulation” as he felt his life was “repetitive.” He worried that
life would “always be the same” and that “nothing would ever change.” He hoped
engaging in intellectual thinking would alleviate some of the monotony he felt. Finally,
Keenan reported feeling “depressed” because of his social isolation, a feeling he said
began around the age of 11 when his family moved from Michigan to a small town in
West Virginia without telling him of their intention to do so.56
In spite of his stated desire for increased social contact and change in his life,
Keenan rarely altered anything about his daily routine—often working long hours
without adequate compensation—something he complained about vigorously but did
little to change. When I inquired why he did not ask his bosses for a raise, his standard
reply was, “I don’t know.” In fact, despite his obviously high intelligence, there was a lot
Keenan seemed to “not know.” For example, he longed to find a new job where he would
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All direct quotes derive from my own note taking. At times, I took notes during sessions, while at others,
I took them immediately following. Throughout my training, I experimented with differing techniques;
however, writing down patients’ speech verbatim was something I found valuable throughout.
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Keenan’s parents told him they were going on vacation. It was only upon arrival in West Virginia that
Keenan was told the family would not be returning to Michigan.
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be “respected” but told me he “d[idn’t] know how a person finds a job.” Similarly, he
shared that he wanted to learn how to drive and obtain a driver’s license, but again,
claimed ignorance as to how one would go about such a process. Initially, I responded by
inquiring as to whether he had checked the local paper for job notifications or searched
the internet for driving schools.57 My questions were typically met with a blank look, a
shrug of the shoulders or a shifting downward of gaze with no verbal answer. It became
increasingly obvious that, despite his professed desire for a more stimulating life, Keenan
was profoundly invested in his own inaction and in his own failure. He seemed to want
me to outline a plan—a set of rules—that he could follow, so that he could then not
follow them. He would frequently begin sessions by saying, “I don’t know what to say...”
or “I don’t really have anything to talk about...” followed by a blank stare that would last
for several minutes, as if he was waiting for me to speak first. At other times, he would
come with a readymade list of conversation topics and would seem irritated if I
interrupted him, often telling me he needed to get through everything before “time was
up.”
Keenan said he felt “stuck” and as if he “should be further along in life.” He felt
he was not really living the life he was “supposed” to be living, which was that of an
artist. Keenan had attended a local art school for approximately three years before
“dropping out” a few semesters shy of graduation. “Dropping out” would perhaps make
the decision seem a bit more decisive than it actually was: In reality, Keenan felt unable
to meet the “deadlines” required by the school and told me he could not finish many of
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This is not a tactic I would take now, as it amounts to therapy by suggestion, something both Freud and
Lacan warn against. At the time I began seeing Keenan, I was not yet engaged in Lacanian praxis. Indeed,
much of my shift toward Lacan occurred because of the change I saw in patients such as Keenan when I
began utilizing Lacan in therapeutic practice.
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his class projects because he did not “have enough experience yet” to complete them.
When I asked if that wasn’t precisely why he was attending school—to gain
experience—he merely shrugged his shoulders. This feeling of always being behind and
trying to catch-up was characteristic of Keenan—he never felt ready or prepared—
preferring instead to defer acting until he was “completely” ready. Keenan did not want
to be lacking in anything. This constant deferral led to a state of complete inaction for
Keenan wherein he felt incapable of making any decisions for himself. Indeed, Keenan
often told me he felt he was just “waiting for something to happen.” With regard to his
“dropping out” of school, this “waiting for something to happen” eventually resulted in
the school dropping Keenan, effectively removing the responsibility of making a decision
from Keenan and allowing him to instead volley any number of complaints against the
school. While Keenan seemed to not know how to pursue social relationships, a driver’s
license, or a new job, he was quite adept at identifying what was wrong with society and
eloquent in articulating his critiques of the “conformist sheep” around him. He indicated
that part of the reason he had “dropped out” of school was because “they” were not
interested in “true art,” but instead were only interested in producing “capitalist”
propaganda for advertising agencies. He felt disillusioned and wanted “nothing” to do
with it. This is what led to Keenan’s low paying job and dissatisfaction with his life. In
many ways, Keenan’s attention to social issues was admirable. He felt strongly about
political issues and attempted to act ethically in his life. This was certainly the case he
presented when describing the reason he “dropped out” of school. He cared deeply about
the state of society; however, there were also ways where such “caring” served as a
defense for him, as will be shown.
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I noticed in our initial interviews that Keenan barely mentioned his family. He
told me he had two older brothers with whom he barely spoke, that his father worked
with computers, and that his mother was a housewife who “used every possible
mechanism to escape, including pills, food, and religion.” Interestingly, he also referred
disgustedly to his mother as a “conformist sheep,” suggesting she had “found religion” to
be like “everyone else.” Beyond that, Keenan had little to say and when I pushed for
more information, he responded by telling me he was not “interested in talking about
[his] past because it [was] unimportant.” Furthermore, he said he had moved away from
West Virginia to “get away from [his] family.” All of this was said with little affect,
another predominant characteristic of Keenan. He spoke in an almost regimented style,
with little inflection in his voice. He rarely made any slips of the tongue and seemed to
think about every word before actually speaking it—again exhibiting a deferral of action
(speech in this case) in favor of thought. He sat as far as possible from me in the session
room and most often stared down at his lap during session. During the initial interviews, I
mostly just listened, but if I did happen to make a comment or an interpretation, he would
become quite upset if I did not use his exact wording—glaring at me and stating, “That’s
not what I said.” Keenan could not tolerate me as an Other, intruding upon or interrupting
him in anyway. He made this quite evident in a variety of ways which I will address
throughout the case.
Many of the structural features of obsession are identifiable in Keenan’s initial
interviews, both in his speech and action (or rather, inaction): his need to annul me as an
Other (as evidenced by his irritation when I spoke and his frequent refusal to speak,
among other things), the repetition he felt “stuck” in and his inability to move forward
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(despite his professed desire to do so), his constant deferral of action when he felt he was
not “completely ready” (i.e., when he felt lacking), his feelings of superiority to the
“conformist sheep” of society (yet his expressed desire to connect with them), his
feelings of guilt and shame, his emphasis on thinking at the expense of affect, his
withholding tendencies, and his concern with “measuring time,” which, as we shall see, is
a metaphor for death in the obsessive. As should already be evident, the structurally
obsessive person is a massive mixture of paradox and contradiction—stuck between one
pole and another—leaving him unable to move. In his case study of the Rat Man, Freud
(1909/1955) noted the ambivalence between love and hate in the obsessive. While Lacan
reformulates this somewhat, this ambivalence, and the inaction that results from it, are
structural features of the obsessive.58 Did Keenan really want social relationships or did
he want to maintain his isolated position of superiority? If he longed for life to be more
stimulating, why did he constantly retreat to his thoughts?
The obsessive is caught in a trap and this is manifested via his symptoms. In a
way, we can view his symptoms as both questions themselves and as answers to the
questions he poses (Lacan, 1981/1993). What is important here is that the symptoms tell
us something about the way the obsessive takes up the Other—the way he relates to the
Other’s desire and to jouissance. My role as a therapist is to listen at the level of the
symbolic, so that I may embody the Other for the patient and assist him as he explores the
unconscious coordinates that have unknowingly governed him up to this point. As
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Lacan (1953/2002) writes, “[T]he obsessive manifests one of the attitudes that Hegel did not develop in
his master/slave dialectic. The slave [the obsessive] slips away when faced with the risk of death, when the
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mortal, he also knows that the master can die. Hence he can accept to work for the master and give up
jouissance in the meantime; and, unsure as to when the master will die, he waits. This is the intersubjective
reason for both the doubt and the procrastination that are obsessive character traits” (p. 97).
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previously indicated, Lacan tells us that neurosis is a question being poses for the subject.
Let’s begin by exploring Keenan’s question.
Keenan’s Question and the Obsessive’s Desire
According to Lacan, the obsessive’s question concerns his very existence—“Am I
alive or dead?” or “To be or not to be?” His question derives directly from his stance with
regard to the Other—particularly the Other’s desire. The obsessive’s response to the
processes of alienation and separation is to deny his own being as a divided subject by
clinging to the lost object; however, he refuses to admit any relationship between the
object and the Other. In a word, the obsessive refuses to acknowledge lack, which, as we
have seen, is coextensive with desire. Fink (1997) cites an example that may help us
concretize this somewhat abstract formulation. The child’s first source of satisfaction is
the mother’s breast: We can say it is his primary source of jouissance. Via the weaning
process, a sort of separation from the mother occurs whereby the child’s jouissance is
prohibited and the breast is constituted as object a (the lost object)—the cause of his
desire. This loss of something so pleasurable is traumatic for the child, and the obsessive
attempts to overcome this enforced separation by fantasizing that he retains the object,
thus remaining a unified whole. However, he refuses to acknowledge that the breast (the
object) was part of the mOther, instead fantasizing that he is complete so long as he has
any number of available fungible objects at his disposal (pp. 118-119). What the
obsessive cannot abide is lack/desire—his or the Other’s—because it points to his very
castration;59 therefore, to defend against the loss of his jouissance and the separation from
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Fink (1997) writes, “What the neurotic wishes not to recognize is that desire is not so much something
you have as something you do not have. It springs from lack, and no one can say what he or she really
wants, desire having no unique object. A demand is a specific want, not a vaguer, more diffuse wanting. It
is something you seem to ‘have,’ like a need, a biological need to eat. It is the Other’s wanting—or as
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the mOther, he nullifies or neutralizes the Other. The obsessive finds it far easier to
tolerate the pain of separation by pretending he did not need anyone in the first place;
however, to desire—to feel alive—one must be able to experience lack. If desire is
sustained by the Other and the obsessive is perpetually nullifying the Other, we can see
why his very existence would be a question.60
In “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire,” Lacan
(1960/2006) tells us that the obsessive subject refuses his own fading (aphanisis) when
faced with the object; he fears his own annihilation in the face of the Other’s desire (and,
therefore, his own). In a sense, it is an either/or situation: either you exist or I do.
Consequently, he plays dead and prefers if the Other does too. In so doing, he hopes to
relieve himself of any encounter with desire: He hopes to master his desire by petrifying
himself (Soler, 1996). We can therefore say that the obsessive subject’s strategy for
dealing with separation falls on the side of the subject:61 He seeks to prevent his own
vanishing by annulling the Other. However, in destroying the Other’s desire, he destroys
his own as well. With this background, we can now begin to situate many of Keenan’s
presenting problems and symptoms within the context of obsessive structure.
Initial Therapeutic Aims
Given the tendency to nullify the Other, how is therapy possible with an obsessive
subject—particularly a psychoanalytic therapy that emphasizes the unconscious, which is
perhaps the example of the Other par excellence? Lacan tells us that a “hysterization” of

Lacan says, ‘the lack in the Other,’ the incompleteness of the Other—that the neurotic cannot abide” (p. 64,
original italics).
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Leclaire (1959/1980) writes, “The other is necessary to sustain desire. [...] There is no desire that can
sustain itself in the isolation of a solitary daydream” (p. 127).
61
In distinction to the hysteric, whose strategy falls on the side of the object, as will be shown in the next
case study.
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the obsessive is needed—an opening and attentiveness to the Other that indicates a
change of position in relation to desire. As obsessives tend to strive to be fiercely
independent of the Other, this is not an easy task to accomplish, nor is it an easy state to
maintain. In a Lacanian-oriented therapy, the therapist must initially seek to be situated as
the “subject-supposed-to-know,” meaning the patient places the therapist in the position
of the Other and assumes the therapist possesses a certain knowledge about him of which
he is not yet aware. Given that the obsessive barely acknowledges the Other, much less
attributes any type of knowledge to him or her, this is one of the more difficult feats to
achieve.
My first sessions with Keenan vacillated between his idealization of me and his
complete nullification of me. (Really, the two are the same, as idealization is based on a
fantasy rather than on any actual person in the room.) Initially, Keenan told me he had
never met anyone who “understood [him]” the way I did, and he attempted to do
everything he assumed I wanted to the letter. This is a seemingly peculiar characteristic
of the obsessive: Despite their proclaimed fierce independence from the Other, they
prefer to know the rules and procedures upfront and tend to rigidly follow them. They are
essentially trapped by the Other or “suspended in the time of the Other” (Lacan,
1957/1977, p. 12). This makes sense, however, if we understand that such rigid
conformity to the rules prohibits any spontaneous movement or desire on the part of the
obsessive. It also serves to cut the Other’s desire off at the pass: If Keenan could do
everything he thought I wanted, perhaps I would be lacking in nothing, thus permitting
him to escape any encounter with my desire (he having plugged it up, so to speak).
Samuels (1993) writes,
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[T]he obsessional subject attempts to hide its symptoms by complying
with the demand of the Other insofar as the Other’s desire does not put its
narcissism and feeling of self-security at risk. [...] For what the
obsessional seeks is an unconditional form of love where it receives
everything that it is lacking from the Other. [T]he subject’s constant
compliance with the demand of the Other [...] serves to hide the inner
feelings of hostility towards both the Other and himself. (p. 89-90)
Keenan’s idealization of me was short-lived and was quickly replaced by his
complete annulment of me. He would come to session (always on time), sit as far from
me as possible, tell me he had “nothing to say” and then sit and wait, staring down at his
pants. As previously mentioned, when he would speak, he would engage in long social
critiques or complaints about his job. Any interpretations I made were either met with a
shrug of his shoulders or no answer at all. When we would have a session where I felt as
though some progress had been made, he would come to the next session with no
memory of the previous one. If I asked him a question, he would often ignore me,
choosing instead to keep his head lowered. At times, he would begin to speak, saying,
“Oh, I wanted to tell you something....” and then he would go quiet. When I prompted
him, he would say, “I forgot.” This “forgetting” happened during every session for a few
months. I was at a loss; certainly, spontaneous forgetting can be indicative of repression;
however, this “brick wall” (as it came to be known) that kept “coming down” seemed a
little too well-timed.
In “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” Lacan
(1953/2002) writes, “For the function of language in speech is not to inform but to evoke.
What I seek in speech is a response from the other” (p. 84). And, in Seminar I, Lacan
(1975/1988) writes, “An essential element of the coming into being of the other is the
capacity of speech to unite us to him” (p. 48). For Lacan, symbolic exchange is what
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links human beings to each other. Keenan did not want a response from me, much less a
connection to the Other. His refusal to speak can thus be seen not only as a negating of
the Other, but also as a refusal of the Other. The one thing Keenan knew I wanted from
him was his speech—his free associations, fantasies, dreams, and so on. Yet, his “brick
wall” would conveniently “come down” when his response was called for, thus
preventing any symbolic exchange between us. In this sense, he was refusing to give me
what I wanted: He was refusing to be the cause of my jouissance. This stance regarding
the Other’s jouissance is characteristic of neurosis in general; however, with the
obsessive it is closely tied to the anal stage and to withholding—a symptom of Keenan’s
that became more predominant as therapy progressed.
Samuels (1993) writes, “In the anal stage, the subject’s refusal of the demand of
the other results in a generation of pleasure and the feeling of self-control” (p. 48). This
need for self-control is closely linked with the desire for mastery—both imply a
contained, unified subject. In Seminar VIII, Lacan (2001) formulates the demand in the
anal stage as “[t]he demand to retain excrement, insofar as it no doubt founds something
which is a desire to excrete” (Ch. 14). He continues, “[E]xcretion is also mandated at a
certain time by the educating parent. The latter demands that the subject give something
which satisfies the maternal educator’s expectation” (Ch. 14, italics added). This
“excremental gift” is thus demanded by the Other on the Other’s time table—in other
words, when mommy or daddy says so. Thus, in the anal stage, the child is almost
completely dominated by the Other. This formulation plays a significant role in many of
Keenan’s symptoms, as I will continue to illustrate; however, for our purposes now, what
is important is to recognize that Keenan’s “inability” to speak—his withholding—served
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the purpose most certainly of nullifying me as an Other, but also served as a source of
jouissance for him—a way of “getting off” by not producing for me. It was, therefore,
both an act of aggression, as well as a source of satisfaction for him.62 Because I was not
initially listening at the level of the symbolic, I missed this; instead, I focused on things
such as his lack of affect or his relationship with me. I’ll turn next to what changed this
element in my therapeutic stance.
On Listening Differently
What it means for the analyst to occupy the place of the Other is to
attempt to hear the double entendres and homophones in the analysand’s
speech, to hear how they resonate with his or her history and the
oppositions and categories most prominent in her culture, religion,
education, and general background.
(Fink, 2012, personal communication)
One thing Keenan was never at a loss of speech for were descriptors of himself.
Lacan speaks of master signifiers and how they form the fabric of the symbolic matrix
that contributes to the constitution of the subject’s unconscious. These master signifiers
are evident in the patient’s discourse if the therapist is listening for them and often
connect back to the discourse of the parents, providing clues to the wording of symptoms.
Furthermore, master signifiers often serve the purpose of freezing the subject in time,
disallowing any type of movement. One of the aims of therapy is the “dialectization” of
these master signifiers, resulting in a shaking up of the subject’s discourse so that
movement (via metaphorization)63 can occur (Fink, 1995, p. 79). Swales (2012) notes,
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I am not suggesting these were conscious manipulations on Keenan’s part—quite the contrary. He was
unaware of where he was obtaining jouissance. Part of the therapy involved highlighting or punctuating
unrecognized desires and sources of jouissance.
63
Fink (1995) writes, “Metaphor [...] brings about a new configuration of thoughts, establishing a new
combination or permutation, a new order in the signifying chain, a shakedown of the old order.
Connections between signifiers are definitively changed” (p. 71, original italics).
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Master signifiers, in their locus in the unconscious, do not become
meaningful until they are dialectized through interpretation—until they
rise above the bar, making connections with signifiers in the conscious
signifying chain. When interpretation reveals a master signifier, the
revelation is experienced by the subject as a jubilant one [...] because she
feels as though she has mastered a previously insistent, inexplicable
determinant of her behavior by gaining some knowledge about it. (p. 40)
According to Lacan, the unconscious content that drives the symptom is typically hidden
in plain sight—in the discourse of the patient—and not in the “depths” of the psyche as
many depth psychologies suggest (Miller, 2011).64 Consequently, master signifiers may
be readily available in a patient’s speech; however, the historical constitution of the
signifier and its consequent role in the formation of symptoms has been repressed. The
revelation of master signifiers in the subject’s discourse is therefore a primary aim of
analysis. Thus, in analyzing the specific signifiers Keenan used to describe himself, we
can begin to relate these to the constellation of signifiers that constitute his history
(Schneiderman, 1980).
Keenan described himself as an “outsider” who felt both “conspicuous and
invisible at the same time.” He said he was “boring, repetitive, nonexistent, excluded,
empty,” and “just taking up space.” Furthermore, he told me he “[didn’t] know [his]
feelings,” and he didn’t feel much “other than shame.” Indeed, when I would ask Keenan
how he felt about something, his reply was always, “I don’t know.” He could not identify
sadness or happiness in other people; in fact, he claimed ignorance of all feelings
whatsoever. This was interesting given his statement, “Feelings threaten to overwhelm
me, swallow me. It’s like the stuffing of a teddy bear—if you pull it out, I worry you
won’t be able to get it back in.” Above all, Keenan’s favorite way of describing himself
was as “nothing.”
64

See Lacan’s “Seminar on the ‘Purloined Letter’” (1966/2006, pp. 6-30).
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Keenan seemed content to spend sessions talking about how worthless he was,
how little others thought of him, how people were always trying to take advantage of
him, and how boring and repetitive life was. He would become irritated if I attempted to
point out any type of manifestation of the unconscious saying, “You know, I do actually
think about this stuff,” as if the unconscious was simply something available to rational
inspection. When not passively ignoring me, he would become irritated with me for
“blaming” him for not living his life the way he “should.” Any attempts I made to bring
such statements into question were met with silence. Keenan was fine with speaking so
long as I did not actually enter the picture. Boring and repetitive was precisely how I was
beginning to feel about our sessions, and it was this realization, combined with two
particular sessions with Keenan, that helped me understand Lacan’s distinction between
listening at the level of the imaginary and the symbolic. These sessions also marked a
turning point in Keenan’s situating of me as the subject-supposed-to-know.
About eight months into therapy, Keenan was quite excited because he had begun
dating a woman for the first time. Abbay had approached him on the bus, and he had
been moved by her smile and free-spiritedness. Despite the fact (or likely because of the
fact) that she told him initially that she was not interested in a relationship with a man
right then, they began dating and moved in together fairly quickly. New to all things
sexual, Keenan was nervous about his “lack” of experience. During one of their first
“make out” sessions, Keenan described feeling as though he didn’t have the right to touch
Abbay, in spite of the fact that she was “thrusting” into him. I replied, “Is it difficult to
feel worthy?” What followed stunned me: He began crying and shouting, “It wasn’t like
that—you’re making a big deal out of a moment. Can’t you see I don’t feel that way
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about myself anymore? I want to leave the bad stuff in the past, and you’re fixing me in
that spot. You’re not letting me be different!” I attempted to clarify my meaning,
engaging with him as another person in the room; however, things only got worse and the
session ended with him telling me he “[couldn’t] have a good weekend now” because of
me.
The second session occurred about two weeks later. Keenan was still complaining
about his lackluster job and occasionally looking at job postings online (a suggestion I
had made when he told me he did not know how a person goes about finding a job). He
came to session excited about this “amazing job” he had found, but then told me he did
not want to apply for it because if “they” told him his art portfolio (something he had yet
to put together) was no good, he would know for certain that he could not do what he
wanted to do. Our conversation was as follows:
Keenan:
Me:
Keenan:
Me:
Keenan:
Me:
Keenan:

“If they don’t like my work, it would mean I am no good.”
“You would feel rejected?”
“Yes, so I need to get a lot better before I apply.”
“Do you think it’s possible that you could be rejected even if you were
really good, almost perfect?”
“Yes, but it’s less likely.”
“Perhaps you would like to control the rejection?”
“You know, it’s really insulting when you do that. Tell me what I’m
thinking. You completely disregard what I’m saying.”

I tried, at this point, to explain that I was not disregarding what he was saying but was
simply attempting to share what I thought. It did not matter: No matter what I said,
Keenan did not comprehend. He began crying and became hyperfocused on my words,
yelling at me, “That’s not what I said!” when I so much as inserted an extra “the” into a
sentence. The session ended with Keenan telling me, “It just reminds me of the way
everyone has always spoken to me. Teachers, parents [...] then when I try to tell them
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they’re wrong, they don’t listen. I don’t know how to communicate. I don’t want to talk
to you anymore because I don’t know how to speak.”
There are several points to be made about these sessions. The first is that Keenan
had begun to allow himself to be affected by me. Despite his best efforts, I was becoming
a person who could upset him as evidenced by his tears in both sessions (which were two
of the three total sessions in which he cried during the three years we worked together).
Many therapists would say this was progress as the transference was beginning to
develop, even if negative; however true this may be, the mistake I made was engaging
this transference at the level of the imaginary rather than the symbolic. As a reminder, the
imaginary is characterized by ego-to-ego relationships that are fundamentally aggressive
and centered on rivalry. The imaginary is thus the register of the ego and of narcissism,
where narcissism indicates a fixated belief in one’s unity and wholeness (as constituted in
the mirror stage). The ego, as the neurotic symptom par excellence, is the site of fixation,
repetition, negation, and death; it seeks its own continuance at the expense of desire and
movement. Thus, it seeks, above all else, its own self-preservation. The imaginary is
dominated by the ego, and therefore, “The narcissist can only define itself by the
response or feedback that is received from the Other. Without the response of the Other,
the subject feels like nothing, as if it had no definition or form” (Samuels, 1993, p. 73,
italics added).
In the first session, Keenan (who had spent months telling me he was “nothing”)
was upset because I interpreted his sexual discomfort as his feeling “unworthy” and
because I was “fixing” him in that place. We can clearly see here the manifestation of the
imaginary: What I say Keenan is, he becomes. My reflection of him is what he must be,
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and furthermore, I am “fixing” him there—he has no choice. “The level on which the
other is experienced locates exactly the level on which, quite literally, the ego exists for
the subject” (Lacan, 1975/1988, p. 50). Keenan’s experience of me was as an other (with
a small o), a rival—someone just like him, what Lacan refers to as a “semblable” (Fink,
2004, p. 169). This is precisely the place the therapist does not want to occupy because it
traps the therapy in the register of the imaginary rather than bringing to the fore the
patient’s relationship to the symbolic Other. By responding to Keenan’s outcries by
attempting to explain myself or help him understand my interpretation, I simply engaged
him at the level of the ego. What other response could he have other than to tell me I had
ruined his weekend? For him, in that moment, I was just another person telling him who
he was, and I was not telling him what he wanted to hear. As has been noted extensively
in the psychoanalytic literature, part of the issue in obsession is precocious ego
development that outstrips libidinal development (or an overly rigid ego that excludes
desire, to use Lacan’s terms). The last thing Keenan needed at that moment was further
engagement of his already rigid ego.
The second of the two sessions introduced two issues: the fundamental lack in
language and the symptom of deferral so present in the obsessive. I will take the former
up first and discuss the latter further on. Keenan’s accusation was fundamentally that I
was misunderstanding him—telling him what he thought instead of listening to what he
was saying. When I attempted to explain that I was listening to him but merely offering a
different insight (my own), he grew hyperfocused on the way I was wording what he had
said. He needed me to repeat his sentences exactly as he had spoken them. This need for
certainty and exactness reflects Keenan’s inability to tolerate the basic limitations of
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language, as well as his irritation at my offering a different viewpoint. Again, we can
clearly see the manifestation of the imaginary here: There is no room for difference, for
Otherness. What Keenan was coming up against was the fact that language, by its very
nature, is fundamentally misrecognition. No amount of strict adherence to wording can
cover over the lack intrinsic in language—the gap between signifier and signified. The
certainty the obsessive searches for represents his attempt to deny lack and division—
even that which structurally exists in language itself. Freud (1909/1955) noted the Rat
Man had an “obsession for understanding” whereby he needed to understand the precise
meaning of every syllable spoken to him. What else is this if not the denial of lack and an
attempt at refusing one’s very alienation within language? Language points to the
irretrievable real left behind with its attendant promise of wholeness and unity. We can
thus view Keenan’s anxiety in light of this encounter with the Other of language. Indeed,
his final words of the session, “I don’t know how to communicate. I don’t want to talk to
you anymore because I don’t know how to speak,” are suggestive of his struggle with the
limitations of speech and language.
In both sessions, I responded to Keenan at the level of the imaginary, arguing with
him, attempting to get my point across. A particularly illuminating supervision session,
the introduction of Lacan to my theoretical curriculum, and almost a year with Keenan
changed my approach. I realized that giving him suggestions or specific tasks was
essentially telling him what he needed to do in order to be lovable in my eyes. Such an
approach could only further alienate Keenan in the mirror image of the Other in which he
had been captured from the beginning. It also “spared him the more anxiety-provoking
question: What does [s]he want of me?” (Fink, 1995, p. 145). Stated otherwise, Keenan
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needed a symbolic space in which to encounter his terror of desire, so that he could
ascertain what he wanted rather than what everyone else wanted him to be. To allow for
such a process, his identification with and misrecognition of his ego as an I needed to be
revealed. In “Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis,” Lacan (1948/2002) writes, “Again, let
me repeat, this imago reveals itself only to the extent that our attitude offers the subject
the pure mirror of a smooth surface” (p. 17). By not engaging as a semblable and instead
listening and interpreting at the level of the symbolic, I could more readily bring
Keenan’s stance in relation to the Other to the forefront, allowing him to confront the
stagnancy and misrepresentations of his ego. By giving him my lack—my pure
desirousness—I could offer him the place to come into being. For Lacan, this is what
constitutes love: giving what one does not have.65
Before delving into Keenan’s childhood—a step he gradually grew ready to
take—I would like to return to the issues of deferral, inaction, and death in the obsessive.
Keenan was very good at doing nothing while always being busy. A year and a half into
therapy, he was still working at the same low paying job he had sought to escape since
our first session. He had made some progress: He told his bosses he would no longer do
any free labor, but he had yet to ask them for a much-deserved raise. This was significant
for Keenan, as his ability to ask for anything—to make a demand—was almost
completely non-existent. To ask for something would be to engage himself in some
way—to put himself into the picture—and, in his mind, to ingratiate himself to the Other.
The second session noted above is indicative of what kept Keenan from moving forward:
65

Lacan (1961/2002) writes, “But the child does not always fall asleep in this way in the bosom of being,
especially if the Other, which has its own ideas about his needs, interferes and, instead of what it does not
have, stuffs him with the smothering baby food it does have, that is, confuses the care it provides with the
gift of its love” (p. 252, italics added). To give one’s lack is to allow the subject the symbolic space
necessary to come into being on his own terms rather than on the therapist’s. This is the gift of love.
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his sense that he was never quite prepared enough. Keenan was always catching up or
preparing but never acting. He was always “measuring time,” waiting for others to tell
him what to do, waiting for something to happen. Lacan (1959/1977) notes that the
obsessive is awaiting “the death of the Master.” In Seminar I, Lacan (1975/1988) writes,
What is the obsessional waiting for? The death of the master. What use
does this waiting have for him? It is interposed between him and death.
When the master is dead, everything will begin. (p. 286)
Lacan is referring to Hegel’s master/slave dialectic here. Keenan played the role of the
slave—accepting that he must sacrifice himself to others at the expense of his own
satisfaction—until the Master died. Thus he waited, sitting in his martyrdom. He played
dead because to do otherwise would have meant to engage desire, to enjoy, and to risk the
encounter with the Other. If death was coming anyway, at least Keenan would be
prepared. The obsessive does not feel free; he feels the demands made upon him by the
(m)Other in the anal stage were too much and that he is still enslaved. Consequently, he
“commit[s] suicide so the Other can wring nothing out of [him]” (Fink, 2012, personal
communication). He thus dutifully works, shows up on time, but remains fixated and
stuck, unwilling to give up anything to the Other. This was Keenan’s constant concern—
that “nothing would ever move.” The anal metaphor is apparent. Yet, Keenan put more
effort into keeping things the same than he did anything else. Perhaps his constant
deferral was a way of putting off death: a way of remaining frozen. His statement that he
was “measuring time” so he would know when it was “time to end” was suggestive of
such a notion. A look at Keenan’s early years may cast greater light on many of his
symptoms.
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Family Context and Personal History
As our work continued, Keenan began to speak more freely about his past. He
stopped withholding his speech from me as much, indicating a change in the way he
obtained jouissance. He slowly began to open to me as an Other—allowing me to make
interpretations without needing to counter my every word and becoming more accepting
of manifestations of the unconscious. His need to oppose me lessened, and I attribute this,
in large part, to my situating myself at the level of the symbolic rather than the imaginary.
Without an opposing ego to engage in battle, he was left to truly confront the question of
his subjectivity. With my removal of myself as a parental other came some relief on
Keenan’s part that I believe allowed him to become genuinely curious about the symbolic
matrix that structured him (though I did not use those words with him). He was no longer
fighting me the way he unconsciously was still fighting his parents (and the Other—the
“they”). Finally, though I do not believe the therapeutic relationship is the curative factor
in therapy, I do believe that my toleration of his frustration and anger allowed him to
begin to vent directly much of the hostility he had so far only passively expressed (e.g.,
remaining silent in therapy). Keenan shared that, “Frustration was punished when [he]
was a kid. All showing of emotion was punished.” Aggression and hostility remained
difficult for him to express, as well as any type of demand or request; however, Keenan
did begin to situate me as the subject-supposed-to-know and this provided fertile ground
for us to begin to explore his childhood and his dreams. As a therapeutic note: When I
feel as though the patient has situated me as object a—as the cause of his desire—I will
typically invite him to begin lying on the couch as a way of further removing myself as
an other in the room. With Keenan, I decided to keep our sessions face-to-face because of
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his desire, more often than not, for me to simply disappear. Had I asked him to lie on the
couch, it would have been far too easy for him to escape the confrontation with the
Other’s desire. By keeping him upright, he was forced to interact with me as an Other;
consequently, the question of what I wanted from him—of my desire—was one he could
not evade.66
MOTHER...and Everyone Else: The Early Years
I feel stuck in a rut. I find it hard when I can’t make something better for
others, like I can’t move on. It reminds me of Mom—not being able to fix
Mom...
Keenan, January 2012
Keenan was the youngest of three boys—the middle brother was two years older
and the eldest, four. He described his family as “distant and isolated” from one another
and his childhood as a lonely place where he was largely left to fend for himself. Keenan
reported that he did not talk much with his parents growing up and was not particularly
close to either of his brothers who typically “retreated” to their bedrooms to play
videogames. Before the family’s move to West Virginia at age 11, Keenan said his father
was “barely around”—leaving for work before Keenan awoke and typically arriving
home after he had gone to bed. After the family’s move, Keenan’s father worked from
home; however, Keenan said they “barely interacted” as his father did not like to be
“interrupted.” Keenan described his father and brothers with little affect, merely reporting
factual information; however, when he began to describe his mother, there was visible
disgust on his face and agitation in his voice.

66

Lacan says that the subject’s speech to the Other comes back to him in an inverted form. By asking
“What does she want from me,” Keenan was also asking, “What do I want?”
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Keenan described his mother as “always depressed and sick” and as continuously
“popping pills.” She was a housewife who had never worked and spent most of her days
sleeping and eating large amounts of food. When he was a young boy, Keenan said he
would often arrive home from school and his mom would be “passed out on pills” or else
would be “inattentive” to him, leaving him to take care of himself until bedtime. Keenan
said, “She wouldn’t acknowledge me when I got home [from school]. There was no
communication. I thought I wasn’t doing enough to get attention or earn affection.”
Keenan can rarely recall his mother making him dinner and said when she did that “her
food made [him] nauseous.” Keenan further described his mother as a “morbidly obese”
diabetic who would spend her nights consuming large amounts of candy. She would
frequently request that he “stop” her when she headed to the kitchen to get bags of candy;
however, when Keenan attempted to do so, she would yell at him that she was a grown
woman and could do what she wanted. (It is worth noting here that Keenan is an
extremely thin man who told me he “never developed an appetite.”) When recounting this
story to me, Keenan disgustedly said, “She knows she’s diabetic. She’s killing herself.”
The manifestation of disgust in a patient’s discourse is often indicative of jouissance—of
a secret enjoyment he cannot admit and of which he is likely unaware. It is quite
conceivable that Keenan secretly enjoyed that his mother was “killing herself”—
something that Keenan’s childhood dreams and compulsions also pointed to.
Furthermore, as will be shown, Keenan’s general disgust with his mother indicated an
eroticization of sorts that will be articulated in Lacan’s formulation of the child’s position
in relation to the mOther’s desire in obsession.
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Keenan’s earliest memories (going back to around the age of three) are suggestive
of a time when the family experienced more cohesiveness and happiness. Keenan
recalled his parents spending time together and family vacations to a nearby waterfall
where he fell into the water and soaked his clothing three years in a row, which always
resulted in Keenan getting to wear one of his dad’s dry shirts. When I asked how it was
possible that he fell into the water every time the family visited the waterfall, Keenan
shrugged his shoulders and laughed. Likely, Keenan enjoyed wearing his father’s
clothing—perhaps fantasizing about being his father or taking his father’s place. Other
memories from early childhood support this formulation. With the exception of the
family vacation memory, Keenan’s early memories consisted almost exclusively of time
spent alone with his mother. His brothers had left for school and his father was working
long hours, leaving Keenan alone with his mother. He recalled the two of them going
places and enjoying their time together, telling me that she mostly lived for him because
he needed her. However, he had a particularly vivid memory of being in the park with his
mother at the age of four in which he noticed “she had changed.” He was running around
and playing and noticed his mother was not engaging with him as she typically did. “She
looked very sad. I just remember worrying that she was so sad.” Shortly thereafter,
Keenan went to West Virginia to visit his grandparents and said, “When I returned, I
didn’t recognize my mother. She looked different. I pulled away from her and began
crying.” According to Keenan, his mother had gained a significant amount of weight
while he had been away. The details of how long he was away were not available to
memory, but what is important is that Keenan perceived a change in his mother—both
physically and in her emotional availability. “She was just different.”
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In an effort to make his mother feel better, Keenan—the already burgeoning
artist—drew a picture for her of Garfield the cat standing on a scale. When he presented
it to her, she burst into tears and slapped him, accusing Keenan of insinuating she was
“fat.” In recounting this story to me, Keenan claimed he had no idea what she was upset
by—he had just tried to draw a picture for her to cheer her up, unaware of the link his
mother would make between the fat cat standing on a scale and her recent weight gain.67
Keenan was “confused” and “upset” by the fact that he had hurt his mother’s feelings.
Shortly after this incident, it was time for Keenan—almost six years old—to
begin kindergarten. He described his mother as “sad” when he began school and himself
as “feeling anxious” about leaving her. Keenan would often pretend to be sick at school
so that he could be sent home to “check” on his mother. One memory of Keenan’s
captures this early dynamic with his mother well: It was raining quite hard, and Keenan
got out of the car and began to cross the huge parking lot to the school. He looked back
and realized that the road atlas had fallen out of the car. Concerned that his mother might
need it, he ran back—soaking himself in the process—to put the map back in the car. He
told me, “I had to look out for things to make sure she didn’t get any more sad. I was
willing to get more soaked.”
Around this same time, Keenan noted that his father, who was already largely
absent, began spending even more time away from home. Keenan’s mother began
spending more time in bed, leaving Keenan almost exclusively to himself. Regarding his
parents’ relationship, Keenan shared, “I just remember feeling sad for my mom. I don’t
remember seeing them happy.” I responded, “Shouldn’t it have been dad’s job to make
67

It is quite possible that Keenan was not yet mature enough to understand this “change” in his mother and
was trying to work it out for himself by visually articulating it. This does not mean that he was trying to
insult his mother, which was her assumption.
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mom happy?” Keenan’s response was to tell me that his dad was “working all the time”
and that “he just wasn’t there.” He ended the session by stating, “I remember my mom
making me feel safe until I went away to school.”
How can we make sense of Keenan’s early childhood, particularly with regard to
the development of his obsessive structure? Boothby (1991) writes, “For Lacan [...] the
key issue in the Oedipus complex is not the availability of the mother to the desire of the
child but the position of the child in relation to the desire of the mother” (p. 148). In
many ways, we can see that early on Keenan functioned as the privileged object of his
mother’s desire: They were always together with little intervention from a third party, and
Keenan probably felt like her special, favored child. It has been noted in the
psychoanalytic literature that the obsessive feels he was loved too much by his mother
and typically held a privileged place with her (Dor, 1991; Leclaire, 1959/1980). Indeed,
Keenan’s mother seemed to be gratifying her needs with Keenan rather than with her
absent husband. Furthermore, we can see from Keenan’s belief that “[he] had to look out
for things to make sure she didn’t get any more sad,” as well as from the emphasis he
placed on the absence of his father, that Keenan likely situated himself as the object with
whom his mother could find the satisfaction she was not able to get from his father. In
other words, he identified himself as the phallic object for his mother. Lacan (1961/2002)
asks, “To be the phallus, isn’t that the final identification with the signifier of desire” (p.
251)? If we stopped here, we would perhaps be describing the pervert; however,
What is at issue is not, strictly speaking, a standing-in for the object of the
mother’s desire. [...] The question here is rather one of supplementing
what is missing in the satisfaction of the mother’s desire, which
presupposes that this satisfaction was clearly represented to the child as
lacking. [...] On the one hand, the child is well aware that the mother is
dependent on the father when it comes to her desire; but, on the other
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hand, she does not seem to be getting from the father everything she
presumably expects from him. When the child perceives this gap in
maternal satisfaction, he sees the way clear to providing a supplement.
(Dor, 1999, p. 111)
Keenan clearly encountered his mOther’s desire for something outside of him—this was
likely “the difference” in her he could not quite put words to. Several incidences noted
above suggest a shift that removed Keenan from the position of his mother’s privileged
object; indeed, we can see Keenan’s separation anxiety when entering school as
representative of his desire to recapture that privileged position. It is also quite possible
that Keenan felt the need to put on a show for his mother in order to make her feel better.
In spite of this encounter with his mOther’s desire, Keenan’s recognition of his
mother’s dissatisfaction and their special dyadic relationship early on constituted a source
of jouissance for him. Freud posited that obsession was a response to infantile sexual
activity that was experienced as overwhelmingly pleasurable. In Lacanian terms, we can
say that “The subject is captivated by jouissance” (Soler, 1996, p. 252). In response to his
assumption that his mother was dissatisfied, Keenan became the passive object of her
jouissance which was a source of pleasure for him, as well as a source of anxiety. On the
one hand, Keenan was his mother’s special object; however, on the other, he likely
experienced this as overwhelming—as if he was going to be engulfed by his mOther’s
desire. The captivation by the mother’s dissatisfaction, even while acknowledging the
law of the Father, is characteristic of obsessive structure and leads to a short-circuiting in
the obsessive’s own circuit of desire. Keenan felt necessary to his mother: As he said,
“She needed me.” This need on the part of the mother makes it difficult for the child’s
own demands and desire to manifest. In “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic
of Desire,” Lacan (1960/2006) states,
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Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand rips away from
need, this margin being the one that demand—whose appeal can be
unconditional only with respect to the Other—opens up in the guise of the
possible gap need may give rise to here, because it has no universal
satisfaction. (p. 689)
Consequently, the future obsessive’s needs are satisfied as soon as the beginnings of a
demand are articulated—as the unfulfilled mother takes charge, seeing the child as a
possible source of compensation. The obsessive is satisfied at the first sign of desire.
Leclaire (1959/1980) notes, “The mother answers her son’s hope with a manifestation of
her own desire. The burgeoning desire of the child, just barely emerging from the
exactions of need or the awaiting of demands, finds itself all at once disengaged,
confirmed, and better yet, satisfied” (p. 124). Desire cannot manifest without lack and
space must be given for demands to be articulated. Both are short-circuited in obsession;
consequently, desire and demand collapse. Lacan (1961/2002) writes,
Those passions for being are, moreover, evoked by any demand beyond
the need articulated in that demand, and the more the need articulated in
that demand is satisfied, the more the subject remains deprived of those
passions. (p. 252)
The obsessive thus remains trapped in his mother’s orbit and his jouissance remains tied
to her—this is where anxiety prevails—structuring the obsessive’s desire as impossible
because the closer the obsessive gets to realizing his desire, the more he (as subject) feels
eclipsed by the object (his mOther’s overwhelming desire). He adopts a position with
respect to this desire—the Other’s desire: neutralizing it by playing dead. He thus either
“tucks his own desire away” or longs for things he can never have. Both strategies are
ways of maintaining his desire when faced with the object. It is perhaps clearer now why
it is an either/or for the obsessive: It is either you or me, not both/and—either you can
desire or I can.
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Closely connected to his strategy for maintaining desire is the obsessive’s refusal
of castration which is “first and foremost a refusal of the Other’s castration (of the
mOther’s first of all)” (Lacan, 1961/2001, p. 256). Not only does the obsessive deny his
lack, he refuses to accept that his mOther is castrated—that she does not have the phallus
and is thus lacking in something. Fink (2004) notes,
The obsessive refuses to accept this [his mOther’s castration] because he
feels that it means something about him: It means that she wants
something unthinkable from him, his very being perhaps. Better to deny
the existence of her lack (“the lack in the Other”) than face the horrible
anxiety her desire (“the Other’s desire”) elicits in him. Nevertheless, his
jouissance remains tied to her, and it is only by veiling the connection
between her and the contraband that excites him that he can find any
satisfaction. (p. 36)
It is, therefore, far easier to plug up one’s own lack with exchangeable objects (and
compulsive symptoms) than to face the Other’s desire. Objects thus serve an imaginary
function for the obsessive—allowing him to evade the desire of the (m)Other.
Let’s return to Keenan to illustrate these theoretical concepts concretely. With the
retreat of Keenan’s mother to her bed came the retreat of any type of activity or desire on
Keenan’s part. The reaction of his mother to his drawing of Garfield—consciously
designed to cheer her up—served, alongside other factors, as a type of condemnation of
Keenan that resulted in feelings of guilt, shame, and a covering over of his desire. How
could he have hurt mother so much? We can see from Keenan’s early interactions with
his mother that his guilt and feelings of responsibility were already firmly instated and
were thus a significant component of his symbolic matrix. Lacan (1953/2002), discussing
Freud’s analysis of the Rat Man, speaks of the “symbolic debt” of the obsessive—“the
fateful constellation that presided over the subject’s birth, the unfillable gap constituted
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by the symbolic debt against which his neurosis is a protest” (p. 87).68 What was the
symbolic debt that led to Keenan having such feelings of guilt? Keenan’s comment to me
(with regard to his Garfield drawing) that he “was being nice but hurt someone,” suggests
a deeply ingrained fear of his own impulses. Soler (1996) notes,
The obsessive generally feels guilty [...] This is why Freud, in deciphering
the symptoms, finds shame regarding the first sexual experience in the
obsessive [...] [T]he fact that the obsessive takes the sexual blame or fault
(in French the word “faute” has two meanings: a sin and lack, fault and
deficiency) upon himself, feeling guilty and shameful, is linked to the fact
that he is greatly attracted to the sexual experience. (p. 255, original
italics)
The obsessive defends against overwhelming jouissance69—he likes it too much.
Excessive enjoyment is thus something to be feared and distrusted. We can recall
Keenan’s falling into the water three years in a row during the family’s vacation and his
laughter when telling the story: The result of his falling into the water was that he got to
wear Dad’s clothing. The oedipal implications are patent: He was three to five years of
age when he fell in the water and fantasized about being his father, longing for his
mother’s exclusive attention. Once rejected by his mother,70 his desire to enjoy her was
repressed, leading to feelings of guilt and debt that could not be linked to any conscious
idea. We can hypothesize that Keenan’s constant sacrificing of himself when confronted
68

In his analysis of Freud’s treatment of the Rat Man, Lacan (1953/2002) writes, “[I]t is by recognizing the
forced subjectivization of the obsessive debt—in the scenario of futile attempts at restitution, a scenario
that too perfectly expresses its imaginary terms for the subject to even try to enact it, the pressure to repay
the debt being exploited by the subject to the point of delusion—that Freud achieves his goal. This is the
goal of bringing the subject to rediscover—in the story of his father’s lack of delicacy, his marriage to the
subject’s mother, the ‘pretty but penniless girl,’ his wounded love-life, and his ungrateful forgetting of his
beneficent friend—to rediscover in this story, along with the fateful constellation that presided over the
subject’s very birth, the unfillable gap constituted by the symbolic debt against which his neurosis is a
protest” (p. 87). See also Freud (1909/1955).
69
The hysteric likewise defends against jouissance but, as we will see in the next chapter, for different
reasons.
70
Note here that, in this instance, the mother instituted the law—she enacted the Name-of-the-Father and
her consequent separation from her son. As Keenan noted, his father was “barely around,” unlike his
mother who was very much “around.” We can see that in Keenan’s case, his mother enacted the Name-ofthe-Father.
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with the Other was a way of assuaging this ever-present guilt, as well as a way of
avoiding his desire. While this may sound like an antiquated theoretical construction, I
believe much of what followed supports such a formulation.
I’ll Never Be Fat: Keenan’s Middle Years
At the age of six, Keenan recalled running across the schoolyard and “feeling
[his] cheeks bouncing.” He associated this with his mother’s weight gain and decided to
stop eating. As mentioned earlier, Keenan told me he “never developed an appetite.” We
can see this as a metaphor for desire: Food as that which nourishes and gives life was
rejected by Keenan with the loss of his mother. It also symbolized a refusal of his mother
and a move to almost complete isolation. Although Keenan indicated he would
occasionally play with the neighborhood kids, he said they “didn’t really like [him]” and
“were just letting [him] hang around.” Keenan made few attempts to befriend other
children, instead passively sitting by and watching. This passivity may be linked to his
position as his mother’s early privileged object (Dor, 1999) and, as we have seen,
continued to play a prominent role in Keenan’s adult life.
From age seven to 11, Keenan’s mother underwent a series of back surgeries that
left her almost completely confined to her bed (a place she was already largely
occupying). During this time, Keenan recalled his mother “making fun” of him for
having no friends, telling him he was no good at math, and punishing him for comments
she deemed “sexual.” At age seven, he found these random punishments confusing, as he
did not yet understand sexual innuendo. For example, Keenan was attempting to screw a
garden hose into a spigot one day and he said, “I can’t get it on.” This was met by a slap
across the face from his mother that did not make sense to Keenan until he was much
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older. Around this same time, his mother also “found religion,” something that had never
been present in the household before. When speaking one day, Keenan exclaimed, “Oh
my god!” and this, too, was punished with a slap across the face. During this same time,
Keenan’s eldest brother frequently “beat [him] up and choked [him].” Dad was nowhere
in the picture, and though he was unable to voice it then, Keenan eventually shared in
therapy that he was “angry” with his father for not “stopping mom.”
All of this culminated in what Keenan declared were “a rejection of [his] parents’
values system” at the age of seven and a further drawing inward. Concomitant with this
withdrawal were the development of feelings of panic, being trapped, and a slew of
compulsive symptoms. Before delving into these symptoms, how can we situate their
origin in terms of desire? Fink (2004) writes, “If I condemn someone’s desire, I signify to
him that his desire does not correspond to any lack in me. If I stop him from seeing any
sort of lack in me, his desire vanishes and his being evaporates” (p. 33). Faced with
constant ridicule and derision, Keenan’s choice was to conceal his desire and to “make
[him]self as small as possible.” There was no room in the household for anyone but
mother, and it is perhaps in this context that we can understand Keenan’s presenting
complaints that he was just “taking up space” and that he was “nonexistent.” Indeed,
these are signifiers of Keenan’s “lack of appetite” and the wording of many of his
symptoms. Perhaps he hoped he could make himself small enough to disappear?
Keenan’s compulsive symptoms, as well as his childhood dreams, communicated what
Keenan was not yet able to speak.
Shortly after the rejection of his family’s value system (his denial/refusal of the
Other), Keenan began needing to do things a certain number of times or else “someone
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would die.” This included turning the locks on the doors six times to “check” they were
locked, saying “excuse me” multiple times after he sneezed or belched when his mother
was nearby, and having to walk to the kitchen in a certain number of steps or else
“lightning would strike [him].” During this time, he also began having nightmares of
someone “grabbing [him] from behind and kidnapping [him].” He was terrified of the
dark, particularly of the cracks in the basement, where he thought someone could
possibly “crawl in and take [him].” Keenan also became concerned with symmetry. As an
example: If he stood up and turned to the right, he had to sit back down so that he could
stand back up and turn to the left. Finally, Keenan took the common kid’s game “step on
a crack, break your mother’s back” seriously—worrying about stepping on cracks and
holes in the concrete. Notably, this last symptom developed around the age of 12—
shortly after the last of his mother’s back surgeries.
Keenan clearly struggled as a child with the ambivalence he felt toward his
mother—he loved her, yet she had betrayed him. Consequently, the hostility he felt
manifested itself in symptoms and dreams. As we discussed each of these symptoms in
their particularity, I punctuated certain signifiers and polyvalent phrases, allowing
Keenan to make connections. For example, I punctuated mother’s back as he repeated the
child’s rhyme to me, which prompted him to talk about his anger toward his mother for
her invalidity. When he talked about needing to walk a certain number of steps to the
kitchen or else lightning would strike him, I gently said, “or your mother?” He snapped
his head up in surprise—the surprise that crosses the face of a patient when the
unconscious has broken through and a link has been reestablished. The punctuation of
kitchen led to a discussion of Keenan’s disgust for his mother’s overeating and her lack
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of self-care. Perhaps he hoped his mother would be struck by lightning on her way to the
kitchen—punished for her excessive jouissance? Such an interpretation on my part also
aimed at revealing Keenan’s own discomfort with the excess of jouissance so clearly
present in his mother’s relationship with food. Moreover, his “disgust” with his mother
pointed toward something beyond simple disgust, as will be demonstrated shortly.
A particularly interesting session involved Keenan’s sneezing and belching
compulsion. If Keenan did either in the presence of other people, he felt the need to say
“excuse me” twice, then four times, then eight times, and so on, which others found quite
irritating. Keenan said he felt he needed to be certain that he had “corrected [his]
rudeness” because it felt as though he had “upset some balance.” He recalled that his
mother very much despised when anyone in the household would belch. I repeated (i.e.,
punctuated) despised, and he said, “Yes, it really irritated her.” Keenan continued, “In
fact, now that I think about it, I would continue saying excuse me until she turned around
and yelled, ‘WE HEARD YOU!’” In session, Keenan was able to identify in his
symptom a desire to irritate his mother—to express hostility rather than to “correct some
rudeness”; however, we can also see how his mother’s response that she had “heard him”
reinforced his symptom: It made him feel he existed.
Keenan’s dreams of being kidnapped and his compulsion to “check” the locks by
locking and unlocking them six times were closely connected. When I asked him to
associate to the word “check,” he responded, “coming home to check on my mom when I
was in first grade.” This led to a discussion of his feelings about having responsibility for
his mother at such a young age and his sense that she had not reciprocally provided that
kind of care for him. He seemed to be circling around something—just on the edge—so I
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asked, “If your concern was that someone might come in to kidnap you, why would you
turn the lock to the unlock position? Couldn’t they enter in the split moment when the
door was unlocked?”71 It was then that Keenan was able to connect the fear of being
kidnapped with the wish to perhaps vanish and his “checking” of the door locks with his
desire to be rid of the mother whom he had always had to “check” on. In Seminar I,
Lacan (1975/1988) writes,
The fact that the subject relives, comes to remember, in the intuitive sense
of the word, the formative events of his existence, is not in itself so very
important. What matters is what he reconstructs of it. (p. 13)
A bit further, he continues, “It is less a matter of remembering than of rewriting history”
(p. 14). What occurred in those sessions with Keenan was his assumption of his role in
the formation of his symptoms—the assumption of his place in his history. Such a
rewriting entails an integration of those parts of the subject that have been rejected, as
well as recognition of the position the subject has taken with regard to the Other: In
Keenan’s case, his hatred for his mother and father and his wish to be rid of them.
Keenan’s need for symmetry, what he called his need to “cancel out” things, was
not a symptom he was able to integrate fully into his history by the time of our
termination. He said, “When things are even, I can calm down.” At the end of our work,
Keenan was no longer turning right to cancel out the left, but he did still appreciate
symmetry. J.-A. Miller (2003) describes the compulsion as a way to “suture the subject
together, even illogically” (n.p.). In other words, it serves to conceal lack. When things
are even, there is nothing left out—there is no remainder. When Keenan canceled out left
by turning right, he created a perfect sphere—the symbol of an uncastrated and unified
71

It is interesting to note that Keenan needed to turn the lock six times. If we surmise that the first turn was
to the “locked” position, that would leave the sixth turn at the “unlocked” position. It is also interesting to
note that it was at the age of six that Keenan first separated from his mother when going to school.
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whole. In Seminar VIII, Lacan (2001) speaks of the sphere as representative of a rejection
of castration. While Keenan was not yet able to articulate such thoughts, his ability to
tolerate the holes in the whole had certainly grown by the end of our work together.
Castrating Mothers and Dead Ends: Keenan’s High School Years and Beyond
Keenan’s high school years were characterized by what he termed his mother’s
“humiliation” of him and his own inaction. Keenan’s mother continued to dominate the
household as an absolute authority—often suddenly developing headaches on special
occasions, including Keenan’s birthday, so that family outings were regularly canceled
due to her “illness.” This happened more often than not, resulting in little interaction
within the family. Particularly notable during this time were the confusing sexual
messages Keenan’s mother conveyed. When the family would venture out for dinner,
Keenan’s mother was fond of yelling, “PENIS!” as loudly as possible—often when
Keenan’s schoolmates were dining at the same restaurant. Keenan’s father would idly sit
by as this happened, making no attempt to restrain his wife to save his sons’
embarrassment. At other times, she would yell upstairs, “Your father and I are going to
have sex on the couch now! Don’t come down!” On the few occasions when she would
cook for her sons, she was fond of “stabbing sausages” viciously and laughing as Keenan
stood by watching. Keenan, now old enough to understand sexual innuendo, felt
humiliated by his mother’s castrating—even mutilating—tendencies. This type of
behavior culminated in a routine visit to the doctor’s office where Keenan’s mother
“grabbed [his] ass” when faced with the doctor and laughed, telling the doctor, “Don’t
worry. We’re just friends.”
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When discussing his mother’s behavior in session, Keenan said, “She really gave
mixed messages.” The conscious meaning of Keenan’s statement was that he felt his
mother both condemned sex (the water hose incident), yet also took every opportunity to
sexualize anything she could. However, I was listening for what was not being said—for
what was being excluded from his conscious narrative. Another way of hearing Keenan’s
statement that his mother was sending “mixed messages” was that he was confused about
his position with regard to his mOther—was he her privileged object or outcasted son?
Keenan’s discourse suggested a certain nostalgic evoking of his phallic identification. He
said,
My mom would often mumble under her breath such that I couldn’t hear
her. When I would ask her what she said, she would say, “Nothing.” I felt
like Mom knew things but was keeping them from me—sexual things. I
think she enjoyed being the only one who knew something. It frustrated
me. I felt excluded.
Keenan’s oedipal frustration was clear here: He had been “excluded”—he could no
longer be the phallic object for his mother. Notably, the signifiers “excluded” and
“nothing” were words Keenan used in his initial interviews to describe himself—they
were aspects of his parental discourse that unconsciously formed the fabric of his
symbolic matrix, carrying him along and determining his relation to his desire, as well as
his symptoms.
We can see further evidence of Keenan’s continued erotic attachment to his
mother in the signifier “disgusting.” Keenan would frequently refer to his mother as
“disgusting” or would say he felt “disgusted” by her. During the session when he
described his mother “grabbing [his] ass,” he immediately began talking about how
“disgusting” and unworthy he felt in his everyday life. These kinds of seemingly
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unassociated leaps from one topic to the next are usually indicative of a repressed link or
connection that, when listened for, can provide fruitful associations. As previously
mentioned, disgust typically points to a certain jouissance the subject has but of which he
is unaware. We can hypothesize that Keenan’s “disgust” for himself indicated an
unconscious desire to be his mother’s phallic object and served as a source of
overwhelming jouissance that further contributed to a veiling of his desire.
Keenan spent the rest of high school underperforming academically and
essentially being a bystander. He described how his parents would often forget to pick
him up at school and never expressed interest in his grades or school activities. When his
family began having financial issues, Keenan “stopped asking for anything” and began
eating even less. In his words, “There was never enough for the five of us,” so he
“wanted to cause the least interference.” Keenan’s sacrifice of himself, while appearing
to be an act of giving on his part, also allowed him to escape responsibility to the Other.
It functioned to keep his desire tucked away neatly and afforded him the opportunity to
blame others for his lack of engagement.72 Keenan’s tendency to situate himself as a
spectator is structurally characteristic of the obsessive. Fink (2004) describes how the
obsessive identifies with the Other:
The Other here is placed on the sidelines, in the position of a spectator in
his box, a spectator who is bored precisely because he does not participate
in the games but who remains intact thanks to his isolation. [...] The
subject’s unconscious desire is removed from the game and retracted into
the position of the spectator. (p. 27)
Lacan suggests that the role of spectator functions as a way of sheltering the obsessive
from death. For Keenan, it also served to shelter him from further ridicule by his mother.

72

This was, of course, not consciously Keenan’s reason for his sacrifice, and I very much believe he was
attempting to help his family; however, the underlying hostility was what needed to be brought to light.
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Keenan said the way he survived high school was by focusing on the rational. He
stated,
People who dominate have a place. I’ve never understood why people do
certain things or why certain people feel bad to me. I came to realize that
power comes from understanding the reasons people do what they do. It
helps in not being hurt by others and in not getting lost. I never knew what
was going on as a child. I felt overwhelmed. I just stayed as small as
possible. I withdrew. I figured I’d get so small, I would eventually
disappear. So I started studying people in high school. Being cognitive has
really helped me.
When he shared this, I was reminded of his statement early in our work together that,
“Feelings threaten to overwhelm me, swallow me.” When talking with Keenan, one
would never guess he felt as if his feelings were going to engulf him—he was as steady
and pedantic in his speech as almost every other obsessive with whom I’ve spoken.
Indeed, the isolation of thought and affect that is typical of the obsessive was one of
Keenan’s most distinguishing characteristics. Soler (1996) notes,
In obsession, the link with the Other’s desire is not absent but
dissimulated, covered over. The repressed term comes back in the mind.
[...] The return of the repressed in the signifying chain dissimulates the
gap [...] that is, it sutures it. (p. 263)
We can comprehend Keenan’s emphasis on understanding and rationality as a denial of
lack; however, we can also locate his symptoms in his words—in the signifiers he
chooses: “Feelings threaten to overwhelm me, swallow me.” Swallow is a word that
readily connects to Keenan’s mother and her overwhelming appetite—her excessive
jouissance—and Keenan’s failure as a young child to prevent her from eating her bags of
candy each night. Stemming from such failure was Keenan’s ever-present guilt and his
unconscious hatred that manifested itself in compulsive symptoms (e.g., the step on a
crack...game). To swallow was thus indicative of having an appetite—of metaphorically
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engaging desire. Thus, to feel would be to be engulfed by mOther—to be swallowed up
by her. We can thus tie a constellation of symptoms to this one master signifier: swallow.
Keenan’s symptoms were certainly overdetermined, but by attending to his speech, we
can see how his symptoms manifested in his discourse and repeated his parents’
discourse from so long ago. Keenan’s symptoms were structured like a language—they
were carried along by the words of his past and constituted by conditions that pre-existed
him.
The Dream of Dead Grandma
I will end my presentation of Keenan’s childhood with a dream that plagued him
throughout his youth and that, at times, still recurred during his adult years. The dream
was so important to him that he drew a full-sized illustration of it to show me. I think the
dream illustrates well many of the issues that define the obsessive. Keenan shared that he
often had dreams where he was inside a school, a building, or a house of some sort that
had endless hallways or staircases that went nowhere or came to a “dead end.” In the
dreams, he would wander from hallway to hallway, turning around when he reached a
“dead end,” but never really going anywhere because it was impossible—the hallways led
nowhere or the stairwells just kept going down, “leading you someplace where you don’t
know what’s going on.” Keenan said, “There was always one more path, another
hallway.”73
In one particular rendition of this dream, Keenan was in a house that reminded
him of his great grandmother’s. Keenan had no memory of his great grandmother, as she
had died when he was fairly young; however, the house had remained in the family. As a
child, he visited the house once and remembered it being like a “tomb” he didn’t want to
73

There were thus always infinite decisions to be made.
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disturb. He recalled that the basement was “claustrophobic” and contained “old pickled
foods that looked like body parts.” He thought it was “creepy” and described “feeling
trapped.” Here is the dream and his associations to it:
I’m in a house that looks like my great grandmother’s. There are infinite
staircases going up. I keep climbing, up and up. I don’t have to make a
decision. I never have to make a decision. I don’t have to struggle with
decisions. I never stop and say I should do something else. I just keep
going deeper. The goal is of reaching the top. It takes a really long time to
get there. It’s an attic door, and I go up the final staircase. I finally arrive
and it’s my dead end. My great grandmother is sitting there in a rocking
chair. She’s silhouetted from behind, rocking, looking at me. The room is
dusty. I wasn’t supposed to find her. She’s hidden away to wait for other
people. She died waiting...
In many ways, the dream captured Keenan’s struggles well: his desire to evade
responsibility by “just waiting” for something to happen, his constant deferral of action,
the repetition in his life, and his repressed hostility (perhaps dead great grandma
represented his mother?). But, above all, what the dream represented were Keenan’s
questions: Am I dead or alive? Am I going to die waiting, hidden away from others? Am
I going to die alone, waiting for others that never arrive? This was a dream that we
repeatedly returned to over the thirty months we worked together. Keenan’s associations
to it changed as he grew and changed. I will leave his final associations for the end of the
case presentation. I now turn to Keenan’s life once he departed from his parents’ home.
Fantasy, Sex, and Impossible Desire
Keenan had a problem with dead ends, deadlines, and playing dead. When he
described what happened before “dropping out” of school, he said, “I felt trapped. I just
let anxiety overwhelm me until something happened.”74 He talked about how he couldn’t
(wouldn’t) meet the school’s (Other’s) deadlines and how he didn’t like “finished
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Schneiderman (1986) writes, “If the obsessional boxes himself into a dead end situation, it is because he
has a problem with the question of his desire” (p. 90).
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projects.” He preferred things to be left undone so that there was always something that
could be added or bettered. He complained the school did not give him the tools he
needed to do well and his teachers did not provide adequate instruction. Furthermore, he
said he did not feel he could “compete” with other people. Keenan constantly worried he
was going to be “stuck” in a “dead end” job. Keenan had a view of himself that he was
trying to protect, and if he didn’t try at anything or really engage then he did not have to
call that view of himself into question: His ideal ego could remain intact. Much of
Keenan’s inaction was in the service of maintaining this ideal ego. It was easier to give in
or not try than to compete. At least then he could continue to imagine himself as great.
Keenan made it impossible for himself to advance in life by constant inaction. He
enjoyed desiring things he could not have. Consequently, nothing ever moved in
Keenan’s life: Life was on repeat. Desire was stuck. It was high school all over again.
Keenan did not fantasize or daydream much. He had difficulties masturbating
because he worried the people he fantasized about would “find [him] disgusting” and be
“offended” if they knew he was thinking of them. When he was able to masturbate
“successfully” (to use Keenan’s word), he “couldn’t feel good” about himself the
following day. Keenan’s definition of successful masturbation was to be able to
ejaculate—something that rarely occurred for him. Even in masturbation, Keenan’s
tendency to withhold was evident. Keenan had begun masturbating at the age of nine and
described it as “new and exciting.” His mother told him at the age of 10 that masturbation
was sinful and wrong, but Keenan said he “felt no guilt” and “found it pleasurable,”
despite (or because of) his mother’s disapproval. His problems with masturbation now, he
claimed, owed simply to his inability to fantasize. He saw no connection between his
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mother’s early remonstrations and his current difficulties. Indeed, it was impossible for
Keenan to even put “sex” and his mother in the same sentence. Despite the many
statements he made that were obviously oedipal in nature, it was an idea Keenan could
not bear. I simply let him talk about his inability to “compete,” punctuating words that
pointed toward where he was unknowingly obtaining jouissance. For example, when he
told me of his mother’s early disapproval of his masturbation, he clearly looked pleased. I
said, “Perhaps you enjoyed pissing your mom off?” Keenan looked surprised—he had
been unaware of just how much he enjoyed his passive retaliation toward his mother.
A clear example of the jouissance Keenan obtained from the “disgust” he
assumed people would have for him if they knew of his fantasies was evinced by the
“shame” and “disgust” he expressed at himself when he began sexually fantasizing about
me. Keenan spent several sessions discussing how worried he was that I would never
“want to see” him again if I knew what he was thinking. He felt incapable of verbalizing
his fantasies, yet he brought them up during every session. It was as if he wanted me to
drag them out of him—a game of withholding something from me that he knew I wanted
(his fantasies)—or perhaps wanted me to want. It was a repeat of the game of speech, “I
won’t speak first.” I was unwilling to be complicit in the game, which forced Keenan to
take initiative if he wanted me to know his sexual fantasies. More importantly, it served
as a realization for him that he actually did want me to know his sexual thoughts about
me. This was the jouissance—the “disgust” he was worried others would feel if they
knew he was fantasizing about them: A desire to be recognized and a “getting off” on
making others into sexual objects. A comment Keenan made highlighted his growing
awareness of his positioning of others as objects rather than as people:
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I find it troublesome, worrisome. I can go long stretches of time alone. I
don’t even think of people until I get lonely, and then I think of them only
for my needs. It doesn’t even matter who it is.
I responded, “It sounds as though you feel you use people?”
Yeah. I don’t even think of them. I mean, as long as they serve my needs,
it could be anybody. I end up being separate because of it.
Keenan’s tendency to erase the person with whom he was involved, and yet still retain
her to reap the benefits of what she had to offer—in other words, his nullification of the
Other—was beginning to come into view for him (Miller, 2011). Furthermore, his
constant erasure of the Other left him “separate”—something that was increasingly
dissatisfying to Keenan and that indicated a slight shift in his relation to desire.
Keenan’s sexual relationship with Abbay (the girlfriend he had moved in with
almost immediately after meeting) echoed several themes that arose when we discussed
masturbation. Initially, he didn’t feel as though he “[had] the right to touch her.” He
worried he was somehow being aggressive toward her—that she wouldn’t want him to
touch her. This was in the context of Abbay actually being the more aggressive one in
their sexual play. We can read in such comments Keenan’s early guilt about his
overwhelming attraction to jouissance and his fear of his own impulses. Because it was
not okay to experience such satisfaction (with mother), he positioned himself as
“aggressive” and worried about harming her. (Such a fear also suggested that Keenan
entertained sadistic sexual fantasies that did not conform to his ego identifications.) The
purpose this stance served for Keenan was as a defense against his own jouissance, as
well as a refusal of Abbay’s. Perhaps he did not want to give her any satisfaction either?
Keenan’s desire to have Abbay watch him masturbate supports such a formulation. He
spoke at length about receiving his first “blow job” from Abbay and about feeling
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“carefree” and “wanted,” but he never mentioned giving Abbay oral sex or pleasuring her
in any way. In fact, when he did talk about Abbay, he told me he thought she was
“faking” her orgasms and complained about how loudly she “moaned.” It was as if
Abbay’s very presence bothered him, or as if her “moaning” represented a jouissance she
had that he experienced as overwhelming. Keenan would fantasize about other women
during sex (he seemed to have no problem fantasizing at these moments) and shared that
he “still look[ed] at other girls” because he “wanted to keep [his] options open.” We can
see here how Keenan constantly maintained his desire as impossible. While having sex
with Abbay, he was dreaming of all the women he was missing out on by being with
Abbay. Yet, he stayed with her, signing new apartment leases and continuing their daily
lives, despite his comment that he “[didn’t] think [he’d] ever be able to be with Abbay
and be satisfied.”
Keenan’s inability to orgasm during sex provided “fertile” material for therapy,
allowing him to connect elements of his past with his present—something that only
became possible when Keenan began to take seriously the existence of the Other. When
describing his relationship with Abbay, Keenan’s speech was peppered with spatial and
temporal metaphors. Abbay gave him “no space.” He had “no space” of his own. Abbay
“bulldozed” over him, allowing him “no space or time,” and so on. Keenan seemed
unable to ask Abbay for what he needed—to articulate a demand to her. This brought up
the question of his needs. He stated, “I can’t express anything with her. I have no time
alone.” I asked, “You’re not allowed to have needs and ask for them to be met?” He
responded, “My needs aren’t needs at all. My needs are food, water, and sleep.” He
continued, “It seems strange to me. At age 14, I didn’t ask for anything. No clothes. I ate
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twice a day. I got good at just getting by, not asking for anything. I do the same with
Abbay. I just push my needs aside, and it’s wearing me down.” I responded, “So an
orgasm isn’t a need, so therefore, not okay?” I scanded the session there, hoping to set
Keenan’s unconscious moving. The session, indeed, marked a change for Keenan: He
was beginning to call into question his own sacrifice of himself and his desire.
Furthermore, he was beginning to identify the difference between needs and desire.
Increasingly, Keenan was becoming a question for himself, again indicating a
dialectization of his desire. Movement was occurring.
We spent several more sessions discussing Keenan’s inability to ask for the space
he needed. He “didn’t want to hurt Abbay’s feelings,” to which I responded, “How did
that work out with your mother?” Keenan was ready by this point to begin examining the
connections between his past and present—it did not need to be so covered over anymore
for him to feel safe. This was evidenced by Keenan’s next session. He arrived jubilant:
I sat Abbay down and I explained to her my need for solitude. I told her I
felt like I only had THIS much space and that I needed more. I feel like
she actually listened and heard me. I feel as though I’ve created a better
place for myself. There’s a distinction between me and her now. She keeps
trying to make us one.
Exactly two weeks later, Keenan experienced his first orgasm with Abbay—that is, with
another person. We can perhaps better understand this by examining Keenan’s last two
sentences: “There’s a distinction between me and her now. She keeps trying to make us
one.” There was little separation between Keenan and his mother. She dominated him in
the present as she had in the past. He had never left her orbit and thus was swallowed up
by her lack. Without a clear distinction between the two of them, there was no space for
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Keenan to desire or to come into being as a separate subject. He had to keep his desire
tucked away; when he felt he had no space, he played dead.
We can situate some of Keenan’s discourse around sexuality in this context. For
example, we can now see Keenan’s inability to fantasize while masturbating as an
inability to distinguish between his mother and other women. His own disgust suggested
there was an unconscious connection between his mother and the women and men who
played a prominent role in his fantasy life, as well as the jouissance he derived from such
fantasy. Keenan’s comment that he “couldn’t feel good about [him]self” the day after
masturbating was suggestive of an incredible moral censor that served to punish him for
such fantasies.75 It also was suggestive of a need to punish himself for enjoying—to
distance him again from too much pleasure. Likewise, Keenan’s comment that he felt he
did not have the “right” to touch Abbay indicated a strong and continued attachment to
his mother. What is important to note here is that in creating space between Keenan and
Abbay, a further separation from his mother was also enacted that allowed him to stop
identifying everyone with her. Keenan identified this connection himself when he
remarked, “Abbay wants to fill the role of my mother. She (s)mOthers me. She needs
constant reassurance of my love.” He then associated Abbay’s “mothering” with “death.”
I scanded the session there.
I did not articulate this formulation for Keenan so that he could have “insight”
into what had transpired: I did not need to. What was important was that a shift had
occurred, and it did not come about because Keenan somehow consciously “understood”
it. Therapy aims at change, not understanding (Fink, 2010). Missing connections,
dissimulated links had found their place in Keenan’s signifying chain—in his symbolic
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matrix and history—allowing for greater movement on his part. Keenan continued to
work through much of his early childhood in his relationship with Abbay, increasingly
voicing what he needed. In one of our later sessions, he said, “My relationship with
Abbay is just like my parents. My dad let my mom run everything, just like I do.”
The anal metaphors in his speech pointed to the demand he still felt in the face of
the Other. Referring to emotions, he said, “I always hold it in...” and was able to identify
how such withholding constituted a way of blaming the Other rather than taking action.
Keenan was also able to identify how sacrificing himself for the sake of the Other
allowed him to actually escape truly being responsive and engaged. I asked him one day
if there was a way that choosing to stay with Abbay kept him from having to truly open
up. He responded, “Yeah, I guess if I’m so busy with her steamrolling over me, I don’t
really have to think about what I want or feel.”
Keenan went back to school and began to take more initiative. When he felt
confused, he asked for the teacher’s assistance rather than just “waiting for something to
happen.” His need to erase the Other slowly lessened as he began to explore what he
wanted and what he enjoyed—as he became more of a subject. In Lacanian terms, we can
say he felt less eclipsed as a subject when faced with the object. The problem of
“deadlines” that had resulted in his initial failure in school seemed to hold him up less the
second time around. He said, “Before, I would put it off and put it off and put it off rather
than face the deadline. It feels less anxiety-provoking now—like more of a challenge.” In
the same session, he said he felt more capable of competing now:
I feel invigorated, creative. I’ve never had a long-term project or
something to plan for. I’ve always just had short-term projects. [...] I’m
not familiar with wanting anything. I stopped wanting things a long time
ago. I always thought wanting something would hurt someone else. In
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high school, joining clubs would financially hurt my parents, etc. So I just
stopped wanting. It’s a very different approach, allowing yourself to want
things. I used to just follow others’ plans. There was nothing specific
about what I wanted. Now, there’s increasing specificity.
Keenan had now found enjoyment in working toward something—in giving of himself
rather than withholding. He earned straight As that semester and joined an art
competition with a group of other students.
In one of our final sessions, I asked Keenan when he felt most alive. He said,
“When I complete a piece of artwork. I see myself coming into existence.” We can
contrast such a statement with Keenan’s statement two years earlier that he “didn’t like
finished products.” In the former, there’s a satisfaction obtained in his creativity. In the
latter, there is only a desire to keep desiring. We ended the session by discussing his
childhood dreams of endless hallways and staircases that went nowhere, always ending in
a “dead end.” I asked him how the dream would be different now, to which he responded,
“I would go out the door. I would decide to create something. Pick something up and
create. Enjoy creating something.” Where before there were only dead ends, there was
now a door—a choice—that led to something life-sustaining and satisfying.
Final Dreams
Keenan made tremendous strides during our work together; however, his decision
not to continue therapy with another therapist after my departure from the clinic because
of his fear of “opening [him]self up” to anOther person certainly points to the work that
remained for him. At the time of termination, he still had trouble asserting himself,
continued to struggle with self-defeating behaviors (though they were shorter in
duration), and remained in a relationship in which he felt dissatisfied. I believe two
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dreams he brought toward the end of our time together signify, in many ways, both the
work Keenan accomplished and what was left unfinished. Here is the first dream:
In my dream, there’s a disembodied penis. There’s a person in the other
room, and what I do to the penis impacts the other person. I’m doing
sexual things to it. I’m giving it fellatio. I’m stroking it. Masturbating.
Enjoying it. What bothers me is that it’s disembodied...
Here is the second dream:
My friend is having problems with a picture frame. I tell her, “I know
something about framing.” It wasn’t working because she was trying to fit
a frame into a frame. I realize it’s like old patterns repeating.
Rather than provide a lengthy analysis, I will simply point out two things about the first
dream: On the one hand, it is a disembodied penis—it is an object with which he is
satisfying himself. The onanism is apparent. On the other hand, there is a person in the
other room, and he is aware that his actions impact this other person. In the second
dream, Keenan makes a change—he stops trying to fit a new frame into an old one. He
realizes he has to make a change and stop simply repeating old patterns. The dreams offer
a nice picture of where I left off with Keenan—situated somewhere between his endless
hallways that always led to dead ends and his desire to create a new frame for himself,
one enlivened by vitality and creativity.76
The Language of Symptoms: Therapeutic Aims and Conclusions
In order to free the subject’s speech, we introduce him to the language of
his desire, that is, to the primary language in which—beyond what he tells
us of himself—he is already speaking to us unbeknown to himself, first
and foremost, in the symbols of his symptom.
(Lacan, 1953/2002, p. 80)
76

For IRB purposes, I saw Keenan once more following termination. Again, his speech was a nice example
of how far he had come and the work that remained. He said, “I’m definitely changing, taking more
initiative. I wonder now why I do so much for people. School is different. Now, when I don’t like
something, I ask what I can do to change it. I feel a bit of spark. [...] Our last session was rough. It took me
10 minutes after I had left to realize I wasn’t going to have my person to talk to anymore. It might be better
that I don’t have you to talk to. It makes me speak to others.”
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My work with Keenan aimed at encouraging him to become a question for
himself—to explore and question what he thought he knew. A sampling of questions that
arose for Keenan along the way included what it would mean to really want something,
what it would mean to compete and succeed, and how feelings could be sources of vigor
and vitality rather than of terror and dread. We were able to explore these questions by
examining the deeper components of Keenan’s psychic structure and by giving a
historical context to Keenan’s symptoms. By paying attention to the singularity of his
symptoms, we were able to situate them within the symbolic matrix that was
unconsciously formative of Keenan. We looked at his symptoms in light of the context of
his family history, his parents’ discourse, and Keenan’s psychic structure. We identified
how Keenan’s symptoms were tied to master signifiers that needed to be brought to light
in order to be put in their place in his signifying chain (as S2s instead of S1s).
Through this exploration, we came to understand the function that Keenan’s
symptoms served with regard to the Other’s desire (which, of course, was also his own),
as well as his stance with regard to jouissance. Keenan’s case illustrates how compulsive
symptoms serve as a type of suture that allow one to cover over one’s own lack by
offering satisfaction that “plugs up” one’s division (Soler, 1996). Helping Keenan face
this lack so that he could relinquish some of his symptoms entailed enabling him to speak
that which he had never felt able to speak before. Language helps master early trauma; it
puts words on that which fixates, thus impacting the real—draining it of its affective
power. Keenan needed to find words so that he could move beyond the repetition that is
engendered by things that have yet to be symbolized. The automatism of repetition was
identifiable in Keenan’s speech—in his pedantic language that rarely changed. I knew
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things were beginning to shift for Keenan when he began making use of more
metaphorical language in session, and when his signifiers began to expand and change.
Keenan did not recognize that his rationality and thinking were two of the
symptoms he used to ensure his own existence (if he was thinking, he could be sure he
was alive). Consequently, his thoughts and the thought process were eroticized—they
were a form of substitute satisfaction and carried a jouissance of their own. Soler (1996)
writes,
In the strictest sense, the obsessive symptom itself is what Freud called
Zwang, a compulsive thought of jouissance. Thoughts of jouissance are
not thoughts about jouissance; they are thoughts that serve as a vehicle for
jouissance. The result is that, in the obsessive’s thoughts or signifying
chain, we have, side by side, thought as a defense and thought as a vehicle
of jouissance. The result is the sense of absurdity felt by the obsessive,
when, for example, he cannot help thinking about insults, or when he is
full of doubt and inhibition that make it impossible for him to arrive at a
conclusion due to contradictory terms in his thoughts. (p. 274, original
italics)
Thus, we can understand Keenan’s “rational thinking” as an indication of his own lack of
awareness of what he was “getting off” on—of where he was unknowingly obtaining
jouissance. As Keenan began working through his own “dead ends,” his source of
jouissance began to shift: He found satisfaction in creativity and working toward longterm goals.
We can similarly comprehend many of Keenan’s symptoms in light of his need to
tuck his desire away or to maintain it as impossible. In Seminar VIII, Lacan (2001)
writes, “In action, desire ordinarily achieves its demise rather than its fulfillment” (p. 5).
Keenan’s symptoms were certainly overdetermined; however, his symptoms served the
purpose of allowing him to continue desiring. By not acting, Keenan could continue to
want. He could also maintain his ideal ego. By maintaining his superiority over the
146

“conformist sheep” of society, he protected himself from having to actually engage and
take the risk associated with any action. He also avoided any real responsibility to others.
If Keenan was to actually desire something publicly and then not get it, it would be the
ultimate castration. To state his desire was to expose himself to vulnerability and loss. All
choice entails loss. So instead, Keenan veiled his desire and never made any choices,
instead sitting back and “just waiting” for things to happen.
Keenan’s constant deferral because he “didn’t know enough yet” was also a way
of maintaining his desire; however, it also pointed to the problem of mastery that is
structurally characteristic of the obsessive. The obsessive longs to master everything, so
there can be nothing left out—no lack is allowed. By focusing on concrete knowledge
and understanding, Keenan hoped to be able to comprehend people and “why some
people felt bad.” It was easier for him to search for answers by being a spectator of others
than to acknowledge that there are just some things that cannot be known or
comprehended. It was also easier to maintain this position than to feel the pain of a
mother who shut him out so early in life and a father who never was really there to begin
with. Above all, Keenan’s deferral and wish for mastery reflected his desire to master his
own desire. By playing dead, Keenan could perhaps achieve such a state. Lacan
(1975/1988) writes, “Death is experienced as a problem of mastery” (p. 48). Keenan’s
childhood dream of climbing up and up and up with the goal of reaching the top, only to
be met by “[his] own dead end”—his dead great grandmother who died “waiting”—
reflected his question, the obsessive’s question: Am I dead or alive? Until Keenan began
to ask this question and address it via his words, he was doomed to repeat the same
patterns over and over—which was one of his primary complaints about his life. He was
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stuck in the imaginary, with all of its attendant doubt, sameness, and illusory promises of
unity.
My role
Throughout our work together, I encouraged Keenan to put words to what had
never been spoken before. I invited him to speak what had thus far remained
unspeakable. This meant facilitating his openness to the Other—particularly the
unconscious as Other. To do so, I invited him to speak whatever was on his mind and to
associate to dreams, fantasies, and parapraxes (e.g., slips of the tongue and bungled
actions). I asked him to complete sentences that he began and did not finish. Oftentimes,
when a patient begins a thought and then drifts off, this is indicative of a competing,
unconscious thought seeking to break through. By asking Keenan to finish his sentences,
I was emphasizing the manifestations of his unconscious. As has been noted, Keenan did
not take kindly to notions of the unconscious initially. Despite this, I continued to
punctuate the few slips of the tongue he did make, to punctuate polyvalent phrases, and to
draw connections between past and present. I highlighted unprovoked denials and
suggested that perhaps they were hiding a truth he did not want to face. He gradually
grew more curious about this “Other” language that was speaking through him. When
Keenan grew less afraid of the Other and began to become intrigued by the unconscious,
he remarked, “This stuff is crazy! I can’t believe all of this is connected!” This is the
beauty and power of the unconscious—it always surprises the patient, shaking him from
his center where he is convinced he has it “all figured out.” This was particularly
important with Keenan, as his desire was almost completely veiled due to his denial of
the very lack the unconscious so beautifully illustrates.
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In order to offer Keenan the space he needed to come into being, I simply gave
him my lack—my desire that he become a question for himself. As we have seen,
space—or rather the lack of space—was a major component in Keenan’s
symptomatology. By giving him my lack—my desire—I forced Keenan to confront the
Other’s desire, and I allowed him to do so without imposing my beliefs or values upon
him. Aside from the first few months when I mistakenly offered suggestions to Keenan, I
kept myself as a subject out of the room. I did not share any personal information with
Keenan, nor did I talk about my countertransference with him. It is worth noting that
Keenan’s poor response to those first few months of therapy was what led me to Lacan
and to the realization that there is a sort of violence that occurs when therapists tell their
patients what to do. Firstly, it entails a certain arrogance—a belief that somehow the
therapist “knows” best, and therefore, the patient should model himself on the therapist.
Secondly, it serves to alienate the patient from his desires even further by repeating what
occurred in the mirror stage—a construction of an ego based on the Other.
There may be times when patients need more guidance and direction, and I do not
take an absolutist approach here. But, generally speaking, by my taking a more “blank
screen” approach, Keenan was compelled to face the anxiety necessary to shift his
subjective position in relation to the Other, as well as his stance with regard to jouissance.
If I had been a flesh and blood “person” in the room, Keenan (as his history shows us)
would have concerned himself with what I wanted, attempting to please me rather than
asking questions about himself. Thus, I acted as object a for Keenan—as the cause of his
desire, as that which inspired him to question and explore. I acted as a placeholder for his
unconscious, for those unacceptable parts of himself he needed to put into words.
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So what did I do? I actively listened to the letter of Keenan’s language, reiterating
(i.e., punctuating) signifiers that repeated and offering interpretations only when Keenan
was right on the brink of a discovery. I helped him connect signifiers to his parents’
discourse and aided him in reconstructing and rewriting his history. By doing so,
Keenan’s symbolic matrix—all of the implicit rules he had unknowingly been living
by—was brought to the foreground. Above all, I situated myself as a symbolic Other, not
engaging in imaginary ego-to-ego battles with Keenan. (I learned my lesson there.) I
sought to bring to light Keenan’s relationship with the Other, not with the many egos he
battled daily. For, in the ego-to-ego battle, there was jouissance for Keenan. Always
guiding me were the questions: What is at stake in desiring for Keenan? In enjoying?
What is at stake in making a choice? And, of course, what is the fundamental structure of
Keenan’s desire and jouissance?
For Keenan to come alive—to stop playing dead—there had to be a shift in both
his desire and jouissance. In many ways, I think we accomplished this. In other ways, I
wish he had continued therapy. Perhaps there is no better way to end than with Keenan’s
own words: “I’m here. Speaking more freely. I have thoughts. Feelings. I’m not so
blank.” Keenan is more connected now to the living than to the dead. He feels less need
to withhold—to go blank—when faced with the Other. He has discovered that desire and
satisfaction are the stuff of life and that to hide his desire away was and always will be a
death sentence.
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CHAPTER FOUR
An Hysteric in Obsessive’s Clothing: A Case Study of Hysteria as
Differential Diagnosis
For by responding to the analysand’s demand for advice and
interpretation, for “understanding” of his or her symptoms, the analyst
gives what he or she has (“knowledge”) instead of what he or she does not
have (lack, in other words, desire), and encourages the analysand to
demand rather than desire, to remain alienated rather than separate.
(Fink, 1995, p. 88)
I had everything structured so that I could feel nothing but sorrow. If I had
approached her, she would have said “yes,” so I didn’t. Now, I could
approach her because she would have to reject me. There’s excitement in
disaster and pain.
Vincent, September 2010
Introduction
What follows is a case study of my clinical work with an hysterically-structured
male patient. As in the previous case, the patient suffered from classic obsessional
symptoms; however, despite this similarity in symptomatology, the prominent features of
his case are in marked contrast to those presented in the previous chapter. These
differences primarily revolve around the hysteric’s stance with regard to desire and
jouissance, his position in relation to the Other, and the hysteric’s existential question:
“Am I a man or a woman?” I offer this study as a differential diagnosis to the previous
case study as an example of how symptom-based diagnoses can mislead and inhibit the
therapeutic work; consequently, I focus predominantly on the structural characteristics
that are definitive of the hysterical position, as well as the way the patient’s hysterical
structure guided my work with him. Before turning to the case presentation, I would like
to briefly outline the obsessive symptoms with which Vincent presented that would lead
most clinicians utilizing a DSM nosology to diagnose Vincent with obsessive-compulsive
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disorder, and I would like to draw attention to the similarities between Keenan and
Vincent’s superficial obsessive symptoms.
Both Keenan and Vincent were distressed by intrusive thoughts and images they
felt subjected to and engaged in repetitive behaviors in an attempt to neutralize their
anxiety. Keenan suffered intrusive thoughts of being kidnapped and “grabbed from
behind”; whereas, Vincent (as will be shown) was plagued by thoughts of the devil, his
criminal nature (he was convinced he was a pedophile, despite no sexual feelings for
children), and unwanted sexual intrusions. Both recognized the “pathologic quality of
these unwanted thoughts [...] and would not act on them, but the thoughts [were] very
disturbing and difficult to discuss with others” (DSM-IV-TR, p. 456). Like Keenan,
Vincent engaged in many “undoing” rituals to combat his obsessive thoughts. He sought
to “cancel out” any perceived “imbalances” through a variety of ritualistic actions.
Whereas Keenan felt the need to turn right to cancel out turning left (making a complete
sphere) or turn locks a certain numbers of times, Vincent often felt the need to carry
around magical beads or sprinkle salt around his room to “cancel out” any evil thoughts
he had. Both were excessively concerned with symmetry and the need to have things
“just right.” (Indeed, Vincent often needed to rearrange the furniture in the session room
before we could begin.)
Both Keenan and Vincent suffered from omnipotent and “magical” thinking—the
idea that their mere thoughts could impact or hurt others. With Keenan, we saw how this
manifested in his fear that others he fantasized about would somehow know or be affected
negatively by his thinking. Vincent, too, was convinced of the power of his thoughts over
others and also believed that others somehow knew what he was thinking. As is noted in
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the DSM-IV-TR, both men “recognize[d] that the obsessional thoughts, impulses, or
images [were] a product of [their] [...] own mind[s] (not imposed from without, as in
thought insertion)” (p. 456). Neither Keenan nor Vincent was psychotic: It bothered them
both that they seemed to have no control over what they termed “silly” acts or rituals.
Despite their rational thinking, however, the “irrational” symptoms persisted. (This was
particularly true of Vincent, who was still engaging in many obsessive symptoms when
we began treatment.) Consequently, both men leaned heavily on thinking over affect,
denigrating feelings and venerating intellect.
Perhaps most notable was the use of propositional language by both men. One of
the criterion for OCD listed in the DSM is that “The behaviors or mental acts are aimed at
preventing or reducing distress or preventing some dreaded event or situation. However,
these behaviors or mental acts either are not connected in a way that could realistically
neutralize or prevent whatever they are meant to address or they are clearly excessive” (p.
456). Recall the wording of Keenan’s symptom: “If I don’t walk to the kitchen in x
number of steps, someone is going to die.” Vincent, too, suffered from such propositions.
I will offer one example here, as Vincent’s symptoms will be detailed below. Vincent had
the recurring thought that “If x [didn’t] happen, the devil would come and steal [his]
soul." Consequently, Vincent used his beads, his magic rituals (including knocking on
wood), and any number of other repetitive behaviors that were designed to prevent some
dreaded event from occurring. He recognized that sprinkling salt around the room was
not likely to actually prevent whatever terrible doom awaited; however, he felt compelled
to perform the ritual. Coupled with frequent panic attacks and the sheer amount of time
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his compulsive rituals took up, Vincent easily met the criteria for OCD. In fact, it was his
DSM diagnosis in the clinic where I trained.
I offer this brief exposition of Vincent’s OCD symptoms here to illustrate that,
given a one hour intake (the standard these days), he easily would meet the criteria for
OCD. Thus, given a diagnosis of a “medical syndrome,” he would be treated for his
symptoms thus precluding exploration of his underlying structural dynamics. Vincent
clearly “had OCD,” but when working from a Lacanian orientation, symptoms are simply
a language to be deciphered—not a medical syndrome to be treated. Let’s turn to
Vincent’s case history for a concrete explication of this difference.
“I Just Want to Be Loved”
Presenting Problems
Vincent was a Caucasian male in his early twenties attending college and
majoring in philosophy and theater. I worked with Vincent for approximately 35 months:
For 20 months, he came once weekly and then began coming twice weekly. Vincent
consistently attended sessions and occasionally requested additional sessions when he
was feeling particularly overwhelmed. Vincent’s commitment to therapy as evidenced by
his consistent attendance was a strength that, from the beginning, allowed him to really
engage in his therapy. Prior to our work together, he had been in counseling for a brief
period following his parents’ divorce at the age of 10. Vincent did not remember much
about his previous experience in counseling, saying only that he remembered being
“encouraged to discuss [his] emotions.”
Vincent was a petite man, quite effeminate in appearance, who typically dressed
casually in jeans and t-shirts. His hair was usually wildly strewn about as if he had been
rushing from place to place and, indeed, this was often the case. Vincent’s gaze was
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intense, and at times, he engaged in a somewhat-paranoid surveillance of the environment
around him. Before our first session, Vincent called to cancel his appointment because he
was concerned that information garnered in session might be “used against [him].” After
being assured of his privacy, Vincent decided to keep his appointment. During our first
session, Vincent stated it had been over a month since he had contacted the clinic seeking
psychological services (he had been put on the clinic’s waiting list), and that he felt as
though the “issues” he had been having then were now “no longer an issue.” When I
inquired as to why he had kept our appointment given that he felt his issues were now
resolved, he quoted the Dalai Lama, saying, “A tree with strong roots can withstand the
most violent storm, but a tree cannot grow roots just as the storm appears on the horizon,”
and that he wanted to “grow roots” while he could. Vincent also expressed his desire to
delve into an “exploration” of his life. Throughout our first session (and all of subsequent
therapy), Vincent spoke grandly, often in a quite performative manner, describing his life
in metaphors, symbols, and colors because he found language to be “limiting” when
attempting to convey his experiences.77 Throughout the intake, Vincent attempted to
create an intellectual rapport with me, speaking of philosophical and psychological
theories.78 79 Vincent’s demand to know what I was thinking was predominant in our
initial meetings and remained consistent throughout our work together. This was evinced
by the fact that he would end every statement he made by looking at me inquisitively and
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Vincent’s larger-than-life speech was one indicator that pointed away from obsessive structure.
Schneiderman (1986) notes that the obsessive tends to avoid highly metaphorical language, instead leaning
on “pure grammar.” The act of speech itself engages the subject as a participant in action—something the
obsessive is loathe to do.
78
In what amounts to a beginner’s mistake, I allowed this imaginary identification between us, believing it
would strengthen rapport.
79
The philosophy and psychology departments are closely related at the university Vincent and I attended.
He saw this as a point of identity between us and focused on it quite frequently throughout therapy.
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saying, “You know?” This need to check-in with me and seek my approval characterized
the therapy, as will be shown.
The “issues” that prompted Vincent to call the clinic that he felt were “no longer
an issue” were that he was “having problems with the opposite gender” and had recently
noticed a recurring pattern where he would find himself attracted to a woman but “within
a couple of weeks, all feelings [would be] gone.” Consequently, there had been one girl
after another in his life, and this pattern was increasingly bothersome to Vincent. He also
stated he believed he was “too dramatic” and “overly analytical” and he found these to be
frustrating qualities. When I inquired what “overly analytical” meant for him, Vincent
said he had great difficulty making decisions, often losing himself in the details. Of
particular concern was his inability to decide whether to pursue a graduate career in
philosophy or theater. The fact that Vincent was highly talented in both areas made his
decision all the more difficult. He routinely earned top honors in philosophy and was
frequently cast in many theater productions.
Vincent’s concern that he was “too dramatic” centered around his feeling that he
“often bl[ew] things out of proportion.” In his estimation, he was “too needy” and
believed others found him “creepy” because of this neediness. Vincent chronically
worried about how other people perceived him—a feeling that pervaded the therapy from
beginning to end. With great disgust, he said he was “false” and an “actor.” Vincent
indicated he “felt powerless” against the need to “play a role” for other people because he
feared his “true self” would ultimately be rejected by others as “ugly” and “displeasing.”
Vincent worried he would never be able to overcome his need to mold himself according
to others’ desires and, as a result, would remain “nonexistent.” Vincent described his
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existence as “not really being [his] own” and said he felt an ever-present sense of guilt
over his inability to find and follow his own desire, often disparaging his achievements in
theater, stating, “I’m an actor. The thing I’m best at, I’m good at because I like the
praise.” His compulsive need to please others was confusing for Vincent because he
found most people to be “inane” and “ignorant,” and therefore wondered why he worried
so much about being approved of by them.
Finally, Vincent’s sexuality and sexual orientation were highly-charged areas that
elicited a great deal of anxiety for him—indeed, Vincent was characterized by constant
anxiety. Initially, Vincent identified as heterosexual; however, he would say things such
as, “I know that makes me sound gay, but I’m reasonably sure I’m not.” This type of
unprovoked denial regarding his sexuality was common, suggesting very much the
opposite: Vincent feared deeply that he might be gay and worried what other people
would think of him if he was gay. His worries took the more specific form of a paranoid
fear of being “beaten up” by “big, burly men” if they were to discover his sexual
orientation. Vincent’s fear of being hurt by large, “gruff” men peppered our sessions
from the beginning, and while Vincent had never been in a physical altercation with
anyone, he often looked panicked when discussing his lifelong fear of “large men.” When
describing his fear, Vincent disgustedly equated these “manly men” with what it meant to
be masculine in contemporary society. It was obvious from our initial meetings that
Vincent was deeply confused about his sexual identity and felt great revulsion toward
sexuality in general. Vincent claimed what he desired most in life was “to be loved.”
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Family Context
Vincent was an only child who was primarily raised by his mother. His parents
divorced when Vincent was 10 due, in large part, to his father’s philandering. Vincent’s
father eventually remarried a woman who had a son from a previous marriage. Vincent
remembered feeling “happy” when his father moved out but also jealous of his new
stepbrother—particularly when his stepbrother would call his father “Dad.” While
Vincent had a few good early memories of time spent with his father, he said this good
relationship changed fairly early in childhood for reasons which were unknown (and
confusing) to Vincent. He described his father as largely “ignoring” him as a child. In
contradistinction, Vincent recalled being very close to his mother and described her as his
“safe place” growing up—a description that changed as therapy progressed. Vincent
almost exclusively identified with his mother and considered his father to be an
“ignorant, large, gruff man.”
Dad
Vincent’s father had a career doing skilled manual labor and exemplified for
Vincent the “typical, weak, disgusting man” who “control[led] through fear.” He recalled
being “terrified” of his father and feeling as though he was an inconvenience to him.
Vincent’s father rarely participated in his life, instead spending most of his time in front
of the television set. When he did interact with Vincent, it was usually in a dominating
and ridiculing fashion that often included arbitrary decisions Vincent found confusing.
For example, Vincent once asked if he could have more milk for his cereal (around the
age of four), and his father told him he could have a glass of milk but that he could not
pour it on his cereal. A particularly precocious child, this made no sense to Vincent;
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however, he was not allowed to question such commandments. On another occasion,
Vincent spilled a soda in his father’s truck, and his father began “screaming at [him] as if
[he] had done it on purpose.” Vincent said, “He never believed me. He always assumed I
purposefully did things that were accidents.” When Vincent did tell a lie to his father, he
remembered “waiting in terror to be punished.” While Vincent’s father rarely physically
hit him (only twice), he would often “rough [him] up” in their play. Vincent described
this “roughing up” as somewhat “violent.” In spite of his terror of his father, Vincent
“idolized” him until the age of six, describing him as his “hero.” As previously
mentioned, this idealization rapidly changed to hatred and disdain for his father for
reasons which never became clear in our work together.80
A few months into therapy, Vincent speculated, “I wonder if my father left us
because of my close relationship with my mother,” and further stated, “My father is the
person who spoiled the relationship between me and my mother. He was the one to be
feared in the household.”81 Vincent’s disgust at what he termed his father’s “piggish”
attitude toward women began at a young age (in no small part because of the discourse of
his mother, as will be shown). Vincent’s father talked about women in a “degrading
manner,” and looked at magazines such as Playboy, disparagingly talking about women’s
“titties” in a way that made Vincent feel “ashamed.” While Vincent admitted he was
“enthralled” by those “tabooed” magazines, he “always pretended to not be interested”
because he did not want to hear his father talk about women in such a “gross” manner
80

My guess is that, around this time, Vincent became aware of his father’s extramarital affairs. Perhaps he
overhead his parents arguing about his father’s infidelity. This hypothesis is given credence by a memory
Vincent had around age five of feeling “vindictive and angry” and cutting off the head of one of his stuffed
bears. As will be shown, this is also around the time Vincent experienced his first compulsion. I would also
hypothesize that Vincent felt responsible for his father’s philandering because of his “close relationship
with [his] mother.”
81
As will be shown, Vincent also feared his mother.
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(and, of course, because he did not want to identify with his father). When combined with
his father’s frequent infidelity, these “piggish” behaviors left Vincent with a repugnance
for the “manly man” he believed his father personified.
In 6th grade, Vincent’s father asked him if he was “getting laid yet,” and this
evoked both terror and loathing in him. He saw his father as “objectifiying” women, only
further perpetuating his distaste for his “dumb” father. Vincent’s father had moved out of
the family home at this point, leaving Vincent with his mother. Throughout high school,
his father frequently made sarcastic comments to Vincent about how “feminine” he was,
once saying, “If you’re gonna be gay, please don’t act like a girl!” Vincent felt he was a
constant disappointment to his father because he never embodied the “masculine” traits
he believed were so important to his father. Consequently, Vincent very much situated
himself on his mother’s side, in an “us” against “him” scenario. Vincent said that, as he
grew older, he enjoyed “putting [his] father in his place” when he made “ignorant”
comments. This “putting [his] father in his place” took the form of one-upping his
“dumb” father in all areas intellectual, resulting in Vincent’s father’s statement:
“Someday you will get your ass beat for being smarter than everyone else. People with
muscles are better because they can beat smart people in the face.” Vincent said, “Dad
was always stronger. He always won, except intellectually.”
Mom
Vincent’s mother was a nurse who never remarried or dated much after her
divorce. Vincent described his mother as being “sad and depressed” when he was a child
and of feeling an immense responsibility and corresponding need to “take care of her.”
While on the one hand, Vincent called his mother his “safe space,” on the other, he said
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she was often “uncomfortable” when she thought “[he] needed her too much.” Vincent
stated that his childhood desire was to have his mother pay attention to him and validate
his needs but felt as though his emotions were mostly “belittled” and that his mother
“desired to not feel more than she desired me.” Vincent longed to be his mother’s “most
favorite thing”; consequently, he tried to stifle much of his emotion and need because it
would “overwhelm” her and “break [her] heart if [he] was angry.” Vincent noted,
My mom moved too quickly. I couldn’t reason through it. She would tell
me that I was wrong [as a child]. In the face of that, how could I know
when I was right? I felt like she could read my mind and knew all of my
thoughts. Like I couldn’t hide anything from her—no secrets. When Dad
left me, it was like a vacuum. Mom fell apart. She felt dangerous. I needed
to hold her together so that she could take care of me. I was so terrified
when she was angry and falling apart.
Vincent felt he couldn’t “depend” on his mother, yet he often described her as
“overprotective” and felt she rarely gave him the space to be whom he wanted. Vincent
stated, “It was very important to her that I follow my own path, so long as it was in
conformity with others.” This mixed message from his mother exemplified much of
Vincent’s discourse with regard to his mother. On the one hand, she felt all-powerful and
all-knowing, yet, on the other, she was the depressed victim of his “repulsive” father’s
sexual escapades whom Vincent had to rescue.
Vincent was exposed to an almost daily onslaught of anti-male rhetoric, from
both his mother and his aunt, who played a large role in his life after his parents’ divorce.
Vincent recalled the two women denigrating men, calling them “disgusting pigs” who
sought nothing but the objectification of women. Vincent remembered his mom being
“super offended” when men would whistle at women, yelling, “WOMEN DON’T
WANT THEIR BODIES LOOKED AT!” Unlike women (who were soft and reasonable),
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men were barbaric users of women who could not control their lustful feelings, seeking to
unashamedly take what they wanted from women.
In high school, Vincent’s mother would “make fun of [Vincent] for liking girls,”
leading to feelings of anxiety around dating for him. At age 14, she told him he was “too
young to be in love” and disparaged his budding relationships with girls at school.
Vincent noted that his mother seemed “uncomfortable” with her own sexuality—never
going on dates or having men over to the house. Consequently, it was usually just the two
of them. Vincent’s mother frequently shared that she would “kill [her]self” if anything
ever happened to him, and she also worried that Vincent might take his own life.
Consequently, Vincent “always worried about mom killing herself” in high school
because she was “so depressed.” Vincent’s maternal grandmother had attempted suicide
when his mother was a teenager, further intensifying the already anxious household.
Vincent said, “Mom was always depressed and would lie and say she wasn’t. So, I’m left
thinking it’s all me. I invested so much energy in just trying to be loved.”
And Then There Were Three
Vincent was conceived on his parents’ first date—an event he described as
“irresponsible” on his parents’ part. The spontaneity and enjoyment of his parents’ first
date was obviously distasteful to Vincent, and he felt they never “truly wanted [him].”
This feeling was amplified when he learned his aunt had recommended his mother have
an abortion and that his mother had hoped for a little girl. Vincent felt that if he had been
born a girl, his parents would not have gotten divorced because then “[he] would have
been lovable.” He felt his father would not have been so “disappointed” in him when he
did not “live up to his expectations.” At the same time, Vincent said it would have been
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“the worst thing to be born a girl because then [his] mother would have been even more
overprotective.” Above all, Vincent viewed his parents as having never taken
“responsibility” for their actions—something he felt they expected of him despite not
being responsible themselves. He said he “never felt powerful as a kid,” and felt he had
“ruined” his mother’s life by being born. Furthermore, he felt his father’s “lust for
power” hurt others, particularly his mother, whom he felt never really had a “grip” on his
father.
Personal History
To be ordinary is to be unlovable. I wasn’t loved because I was ordinary.
Vincent, 2012
One of Vincent’s earliest memories was of something that occurred at age three:
He was sitting on his mother’s bed watching her put her bra on. When recounting the
memory, Vincent laughed hysterically and shared that what he remembered most was his
father calling the bra an “over-the-shoulder-boulder-holder.” Vincent said, “Looking
back it felt as though I was seeing something forbidden.” He further noted that he felt as
though his father “never really kept [him] from [his] mother,” stating, “Nakedness was
normal in our household.” Another of Vincent’s memories from this time period was of
his father screaming, “I’M GONNA KILL YOU!” when Vincent refused to stop teasing
their dog, and Vincent feeling convinced his father meant it because “[his] parents always
did what they said.”
Vincent remembered playing a “game” around the age of six in which he put
coins into a piggy bank. The stakes were high: If he missed getting the coin in the slot, he
had the thought that the devil would come and steal his soul. The family was not
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particularly religious, with the exception of his grandmother (who told him about the
devil), so this was not tied to any parental belief system. As previously noted, this was
also the time period when Vincent recalled cutting off his stuffed bear’s head.
Interestingly, Vincent recalled little else about his grade school years82 with the exception
of “always wanting to be part of the girls’ group”—specifically, wanting to play Pretty,
Pretty, Princess—a children’s dress-up board game. Vincent said he felt more
comfortable with girls than with boys and liked girls’ clothing, particularly women’s
shoes—a fondness that prompted his mother to say, “Oh, please don’t be a crossdresser!”
Around the time of his parents’ divorce, Vincent began experimenting with
masturbation and recalled his mother (who did not yet know he was masturbating) telling
him ways to go about “getting around an erection without masturbating.”83 For Vincent,
this was another sign of his mother’s omniscience and he was “horrified.” Vincent
recalled going to a restaurant with his mother that was owned by one of her “piggish”
male friends and asking if he could go explore the restaurant. When his mother expressed
reservations, her friend said, “Oh, come on! Let him go explore.” As he was walking
away, Vincent heard his mother say, “No…You don’t think he’s…already?” It was clear
to Vincent at that time that they were talking about masturbation. Vincent stated: “I was
so embarrassed. I vowed right then to quit masturbating, so that when my mom asked me
if I did, I could honestly say no. I thought it was wrong.” When Vincent was unable to
master his masturbation, he felt “gross” and “disgusting”—two words Vincent frequently
used to describe anything sexual.
82

This “forgetting” is typical of hysteria. Fink (1997) notes, “The forgetting of the thought, accompanied
by persistence of the affect, is especially common in hysteria” (p. 113).
83
What these “ways of getting around an erection” were never became clear in therapy.
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During high school, Vincent was the “nice kid” and well-liked, though he credited
this more to his constant adjustment of himself to others’ needs than to anything
inherently likable about himself. In high school, people assumed Vincent did not
masturbate because “nice guys don’t masturbate”—a statement Vincent said his few male
friends often made to him. He felt a certain satisfaction in knowing they were wrong,
though his chronic feelings of guilt and disgust over his masturbation remained unabated.
During his junior and senior years of high school, Vincent “dated” a string of girls, none
of whom he saw for more than a month. There was little physical contact with any of
these girls—at most, a kiss—and Vincent seemed more interested in the fantasy of the
girls than the reality. Furthermore, he often felt “ashamed” for being romantically
interested in girls. Vincent said he always befriended women because he felt more
comfortable with them and because “most guys [were] macho assholes.”
Throughout high school and into college, Vincent found himself intrigued by the
occult. He was fascinated by death, the devil, the number 666, and black magic. He said
his “fascination” with death dated back to his earliest years. The occult was associated
with something dark and forbidden and meshed with many of Vincent’s “superstitions”
(such as his fear of the devil coming to steal his soul). Vincent liked the rituals involved
in black magic and the protective spells it offered; however, Vincent was also “terrified”
of the power of black magic. This attraction to something that Vincent found terrifying
was one that played a prominent role in his life.
In college, Vincent continued his pattern of largely surrounding himself with
females, though he did have three good male friends. He pursued two quite divergent
paths—philosophy and theater—and, as mentioned, excelled at both. He enjoyed
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philosophizing and “beating others at arguments.” His intellectual prowess84 was
something Vincent was quite proud of (and identified with most), and he was disdainful
of anyone he deemed “ignorant” or “irrational.” Most people fit into this category for
Vincent, leaving him to often feel “lonely.” The theater stage was the place where
Vincent felt most comfortable, and he was often praised for his performances, which he
greatly enjoyed. He took pleasure in playing roles and in the admiration he garnered from
others. He kept himself endlessly busy, rushing from one thing to the next, and this
included an ever-revolving door of females. Vincent found himself infatuated with a
certain woman for a period of time and then, quite suddenly, would lose all interest in
her. He felt “ashamed” for “obsessing” about the woman and wondered why he ceased
liking her when she “became real.” Erotic activity with any of these women was
conspicuously absent, something that bothered Vincent greatly. Rather than feeling
sexually turned on, Vincent preferred to simply “cuddle” with women who were “warm,
nice, and dominant.” Vincent continued to view sex as “gross,” and “repulsive,” and
wondered why he did not feel more sexual toward others. It was around this time that
Vincent sought therapy.
Course of Therapy
Neurotics dream about what perverts do. This is fantasy.
(Fink, 2010, personal communication)
I don’t think I’m gay. It made who I am make sense to those around me.
Vincent, March 2011
Vincent entered therapy shortly after a brief encounter with a young woman that
left him feeling “abandoned” when she began ignoring him. He was growing frustrated
84

We could say that intellect represented the symbolic phallus for Vincent.
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with the revolving door of women in his life and the vacillation between his rapid
idealization and devaluation of them. He called himself a “miserly old man” and
wondered why he did not feel more sexual toward others. He cried when saying, “Most
people I find so disgusting and irritating that I don’t want to connect with them sexually.”
Vincent was experiencing a crisis in jouissance—a disturbance in the way he typically
obtained satisfaction—thus, he sought therapy with the hope of reclaiming his usual way
of enjoying.
Unlike Keenan, Vincent immediately situated me as the subject-supposed-toknow. He assumed I had a certain knowledge about him that he needed if he was to “get
better,” and he wanted me to provide this knowledge to him; indeed, he demanded that I
do so. This immediate positioning of the therapist as all-knowing and masterful is
characteristic of hysterical structure. Soler (1996) notes that the hysteric presents
himself85 as a question to the analyst and demands the analyst provide the answer to his
being. This is because the hysteric overcomes separation by situating lack in the Other
and then attempts to become the object that can fill that lack. We can say that the
question the hysteric has never asked himself is, “What do I want to be?” instead, always
asking, “What do you want me to be?” The hysteric is quite concerned with the Other’s
desire—he wonders what others want and attempts to become that. Stated otherwise, he
attempts to position himself as object a—as the cause of the Other’s desire. He desires the
Other’s desire and, as we will see, desires as the Other. To place his being in the Other’s
lack necessitates that there actually be a lack to fill, so the hysteric—in order to ensure
his being—also seeks to bring out lack in the Other. No lack in the Other means no being
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In her actual writing, Soler refers to the hysteric as a “she” for reasons I have already detailed. For our
purposes, I will use the masculine.
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for the hysteric. Thus, the hysteric challenges the Other—seeking out knowledge (to tell
him who he is)—while constantly poking holes in the knowledge of the person he situates
as Master (in this case, me) so as to always maintain a certain lack in which he can situate
himself as unique. Hysterics then are typically concerned with their relationships,
particularly romantic relationships, and spend the majority of their therapeutic time
discussing these relationships (Fink, 1997).
This was certainly the case with Vincent. Over the course of the three years we
worked together, I found it difficult to keep track of the multitude of women who played
roles in Vincent’s life. Vincent idealized women—he thought they had access to
something he did not because he possessed a penis. Indeed, within the first month of
therapy, Vincent’s ambivalence over his sexual identity took center stage. He wondered if
he might be gay and felt ashamed admitting this to me. Moreover, he was “terrified” that,
if he did discover he was gay, he would be beaten up by those “manly men” he so
dreaded. He rationalized his fear by talking at length about our homophobic society;
however, Vincent’s terror went beyond the rational and was, indeed, quite paranoid.
Vincent had yet to mention any type of sexual attraction to a man, and given his addition
of a new woman almost every week, I wondered why he thought he might be gay. He
said that because he was so feminine, others were constantly telling him he was gay and
he wondered if they might be right. Yet, Vincent seemed to have no erotic feelings for
men or women. When I attempted to discuss sex with Vincent, he became quite
uncomfortable and said, “Sex and kissing are taken up too glibly in modern day society.
Language uses too broad of strokes [sic] and cannot capture the beautiful moment of a
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kiss.” Vincent felt that social manners and graces were a thing of the past and he became
easily angered by how “lewdly” people talked about sex.
Vincent’s pattern during this time was to meet a new woman, put her up on a
pedestal for something he deemed other’s found desirable (e.g., she was the best singer in
the school’s choir), spend a day or two with her, and then find some reason why she was
unworthy. He would come to session and talk feverishly about each new woman, only to
arrive at the next session depressed and anxious because he was “always going to be
alone.” Vincent was attracted to women whom he perceived had power over him and was
repulsed when he realized that many of the women he found attractive resembled his
mother. He decided he was “gay” about seven months into therapy, despite his lack of
sexual contact or interest in any men. He “agonized” over telling others about his new
sexual identity, in spite of the fact that they “likely already knew.” Each coming out was
a performance of sorts for Vincent, after which he felt better for a short period of time.
Coming out to his father was accompanied by both acknowledged enjoyment and terror
(unacknowledged enjoyment); however, after talking with his father, he decided maybe
he “wasn’t fully gay” anymore.
Vincent was chronically dissatisfied, constantly in limbo, and unable to make
decisions. He felt “false”86 and worried he would never be anything more than a “being
for others.” He simultaneously worried that he was “different” and did not fit in with
others and that he was “ordinary” and “just like everyone else.” In his words, “I can’t
decide whether I am worried about being significant or insignificant.”87 He “hated”
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This is a common complaint of neurotics—particularly hysterics—and points toward the very alienation
that is constitutive of the subject. See Verhaeghe (2009).
87
In the imaginary register, “the subject cannot act because it is plagued by the idea that it may be black
[different]. In other words, it fears that there is a part of itself that does not coincide completely with the
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himself for being gay (despite his lack of sexual feelings for men), engaged in selfpunitive behaviors (such as picking his fingernails until they bled), and complained
incessantly about the “shitty state of the world.” He blamed others for almost everything,
but particularly for “not understanding” him. He was sullen, dramatic, and enjoyed
making me enemy number one. Everything I said was “stupid” and “sounded silly.”
(Didn’t I know Freud had long since been discredited?) He found me particularly
distasteful when I refused to tell him what to do and who to be—which was during every
session. He cried, cajoled, quit therapy, and pointed out how “unfair” it was that I knew
things about him but that he nothing of me. In short, Vincent was uncomfortable not
knowing what I desired him to be. How was he supposed to situate himself with regard to
me as an Other without knowing what I wanted him to be—without knowing what I
lacked? In this sense, I kept my desire enigmatic—never allowing Vincent to ascertain
what I desired—because to do so would have left him trapped in his world of “being for
others” rather than forcing him to really make himself a question. I wanted him to ask
what he wanted, not what I wanted. In other words, rather than being stuck in the demand
(the imaginary), I wanted Vincent to begin questioning his desire—a shift that would
indicate his move toward the symbolic.
Demand is always a demand for love and recognition from the Other and marks a
place of fixation, whereas desire indicates a dialectical movement that shakes up the
patient’s psychic economy freeing him from the inherent fixation of the imaginary. In
Seminar I, Lacan (1975/1988) tells us that, “This meaning [of his being] must not be

other. One of the predominant features of the neurotic subject is this division between its demand to be like
all the others and its fear that it is different” (Samuels, 1993, p. 20).
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revealed to him, it must be assumed by him” (p. 29, italics added). And as Soler (1996)
indicates,
In the case of the hysteric, a change must also be obtained from the initial
position. [...] The position of the hysteric in relation to the subjectsupposed-to-know is: “Please tell me something about myself. Please give
me an interpretation.” The subject, divided by [his] symptom, addresses
someone else, a supposed master, a master from whom the subject can
demand knowledge. “What do I have? What am I?” The hysteric has a
demanding position and you have to obtain a change. You have to make
the subject perceive that [he] is the one who has to produce the answer.
(p. 276, italics added)
Vincent sought recognition and approval from me. My refusal to give in to his demands
produced frustration in Vincent and allowed to come forward “the signifiers with which
[his] frustration [was] bound to reappear” (Lacan, 1975/1988, p. 244).
This frustration with me (or “negative transference” in common parlance)
increased the more I steered Vincent away from his complaints about “the shitty state of
the world” and toward a discussion of his sexual fantasies. In Seminar I, Lacan
(1975/1988) remarks,
Freud would say that one encounters greater and greater resistance the
closer the subject comes to a discourse which would be the ultimate one,
the right one, but one which he absolutely refuses. (p. 22)
It was far easier for Vincent to volley criticisms at me and tax me for endlessly failing
him in therapy than to reveal his sexual fantasies.88 I knew Vincent had an active fantasy
life. He said, “Fantasy is always, well, most of the time, more satisfying than real life. It’s
shiny, not gray. Like sprites and fairies.” Vincent described his fantasies as “pure” and
told me he “didn’t want [me] to touch them.” Vincent’s revulsion at even saying the
88

Unlike some therapies that see transference as the ultimate aim of therapy and as something to be
elicited, Lacan identifies how transference can, at times, be an avoidance of therapeutic work: “It is within
the movement in which the subject acknowledges himself that a phenomenon which is resistance appears.
When this resistance becomes too great, the transference emerges” (Lacan, 1975/1988, p. 41). See also
Lacan’s Seminar VIII. This was certainly the case much of the time with Vincent.
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words “sex” and “masturbation” pointed toward a fantasy life that clearly did not fit with
Vincent’s ego-ideal. This was supported by Vincent’s confession that he didn’t want his
fantasies “to be [him].”
About 16 months into therapy, an encounter with a woman occurred that began to
lessen this reticence to discuss his fantasy life. Vincent was at a party and found himself
attracted to a woman whom he knew had a boyfriend. This was not a desire to
“cuddle”—this was wholly new to Vincent. He found himself wanting to “steal” her from
her boyfriend and said he felt “masculine” for the first time. In his words,
I felt powerful. I had this primal desire, like a hunt. I wanted to take her. I
[felt] like I could do something. I had the thought, she’d be better off with
me.
Vincent described the pain of the situation (not being able to have her) as “like having
someone bite [his] lips”—a pleasure in pain. Vincent said, “I could approach her because
she would have to reject me. There’s excitement in disaster and pain.” In other words,
there was satisfaction in remaining unsatisfied. To maintain an unsatisfied desire allowed
Vincent to keep desiring—a hallmark of hysterical structure. Vincent’s enjoyment—his
jouissance—came from sustaining dissatisfaction through deprivation. Thus, his
statements, “I always feel so dissatisfied” and “I desire desires” began to take on different
meanings, opening up previously unexplored avenues.
This encounter shifted something for Vincent. He identified his feelings of
masculinity and power with his father’s degradation of women; however, rather than
exclusively rejecting such feelings, he instead began exploring this “masculinity.” He
wondered about the origin of his idea of masculinity and whether there were other ways
to be masculine. New signifiers began to pepper Vincent’s language. He spoke of “carnal
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desire,” “lust,” “Machiavellian power,” and “aggression.” He would frequently refer to
himself as “we” rather than “I,” stating, “We are wicked and enjoying it.” He also shared
his first masturbation fantasy which entailed him and other men (that was all he would
initially say). He was quick to add that, “There was no S&M shit” as that stuff “freak[ed]
the shit out of [him].”
It was at this time that Vincent, with great shame and anxiety, revealed his
obsessive symptoms to me. He described his symptoms as “that crazy place [he] could
go,” and worried what I would think of him if he shared them. Vincent described his
overwhelming fear that the FBI were going to show up at his apartment because he had
been looking at a pornography website for the past few years, but had only recently read
the fine print on the screen that said it was a crime to do so from his particular area code.
He spontaneously showed up at the clinic where I worked in the middle of a panic attack,
his feeling of terror was so great. He carried around beads as a way of “protecting”
himself and would often sprinkle salt around his room as a protective barrier—a way of
keeping evil out. On another occasion, Vincent snuck a bottle of whiskey into a university
function and “accidentally” left it in a bag that also contained materials for the function.
Rather than go retrieve the illicit bottle of whiskey, he instead suffered another panic
attack and spent the rest of the evening worrying about what would happen to him if he
was caught. Similarly, he smoked marijuana about a month before taking a drug test and
became convinced he would be caught, resulting in a compulsive need to knock on wood.
The most predominant of Vincent’s obsessions during our work together was his fear that
he was a pedophile. He was “terrified of getting near children” because he worried what
he might do. This particular obsession bothered Vincent the most and was the most
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difficult for him to admit. Finally, Vincent recalled that, as a child, he would set up
propositions around masturbation, such as “If x happens, then I can masturbate.”89
A loosening of Vincent’s rigid ego identifications90 and an increased capacity to
talk about sex resulted in Vincent’s admission of his love for cross-dressing—something
he only did in private at the time. He loved the feel of women’s clothing, particularly
women’s hosiery, and said he felt “most comfortable” when dressed as a woman. Vincent
longed to dress as a woman publicly and felt he had been born the wrong sex. His fear of
being “beaten” by “manly men” kept him from satisfying his desire, which provided him
ample reason to feel dissatisfied. When an opportunity arose that made it socially
acceptable to cross-dress publicly, Vincent described how much he enjoyed the
compliments he received for his “costume,” and how “comfortable [he] felt in his own
body.” He longed to make it a more regular occurrence; however, he feared someone
“grabbing [his] junk” if he wore a skirt around others. When I said, “Or maybe you’d like
it...” he responded, “I’m scared of that feeling.”
Vincent gradually grew more comfortable wearing women’s clothing in public;
however, he always did it in the context of a “joke” or in a performative manner that
canceled out how serious he actually felt about it. He discussed the possibility of
undergoing a sex change operation because of his belief that he was meant to be a
woman. Vincent said women were “sacred” and were the ones who “got to be taken care
of.” Furthermore, he said, “Girls can manipulate themselves into being lovable. They can
manipulate love out of people by being feminine. By being pretty. They can dress
themselves up.” Vincent felt women had the luxury of “expressing themselves with their
89

This is only a handful of Vincent’s many obsessions; however, it provides a representative sample.
Vincent said: “There’s a shell I have to keep up for this world. It breaks down when I come in here. I
need it. I have many fronts.”
90

174

bodies” in a way that men did not, and consequently, that they had a special power or
freedom available to them. Vincent said there was a feeling of “correctness” for him
about being a woman, though he also expressed how much he “like[d] [his] penis.”
During this time, Vincent began visiting gay nightclubs; however, he found
flagrantly gay men distasteful: He didn’t understand why they needed to flaunt
themselves that way. He began to actively desire oral sex from women—a desire he
found “disgusting.” His admission that he longed to have intercourse with a woman one
day led to further feelings of repulsion and guilt. In a particularly poignant session,
Vincent discussed how troubled he was by his desire for girls and how he “replace[d]
people in fantasy.” Vincent preferred his fantasy life to any actual engagement with real
people in his daily life. He said, “What if I’m like my father? OH MY GOD! I AM MY
FATHER!” Even wanting a woman was linked in Vincent’s mind to his “ignorant,
macho, objectifying” father.
Two years into therapy, Vincent was finally able to begin putting words to his
sexual fantasies, as well as his masturbatory activities. Vincent’s fantasies revolved
around torture and punishment in which he almost exclusively played the submissive
role. They involved being tied up by women and “beautiful women forcing [him] to do
things [he] really wanted to do anyway.” In some, men were giving him “blow jobs”—
something Vincent found quite erotic. In another fantasy, he was having sex with the
devil and the devil was male. As he grew more comfortable talking about his fantasies,
they grew more graphic. He fantasized about being raped, bound, and “dominated by a
man,” and confessed that his favorite way of masturbating was to dress in women’s
clothing and “cum on [his] own face.” He detailed fantasies of being cooked alive,
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thrown on spikes, and stabbed. He grew simultaneously frightened and fascinated with
movies where people were being tortured, mutilated, and dismembered, stating they made
him feel “terrified of being helpless where [he couldn’t] fight back.” Vincent would
visibly tremble when discussing such “horror” films; however, he said there was a “safety
in pain.” In all of Vincent’s fantasies, he was being humiliated in some way, and he
almost exclusively occupied the role of the woman. In his words, “My fantasies are about
me being utter object. The feeling of shame is arousing. The pain is intoxicating. Being
degraded is intoxicating.” Vincent further shared that he felt “all of [his] fantasies [were]
about wanting to be taken care of,” and that he felt everyone always expected him to be
the “dominant” one in real life.
As we worked through these fantasies, Vincent often longed to run out of the
session room or hide from me. He wondered whether I thought about him outside of
therapy and whether he was “special” to me. He asked whether I thought he could be
“blamed” for this Other that existed within him, and how he could “possibly be
responsible for it, as it didn’t seem to be a choice.” When I asked what “it” was, he said
the “grotesque, dark” part of himself of which I now knew. He felt “constant horror” over
someone having power over him and said “[he] did all kinds of things to keep [himself]
safe from death.”91 This statement led us back to his fear at age six that the devil was
going to steal his soul. When I asked what came to mind around the devil, he said,
“alluring, aloofness, suave, control, clean lines, no worry, security, mischief, and con
artist.”
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Sexuality, jouissance, power, and death are intimately related; however, such an exploration would take
us away from the main point of this dissertation. I will confine my comments to saying that Vincent’s lifelong fascination with death and his abject fear/wish to be “dominated” point to this connection. For a more
thorough exploration, see Verhaege (1999, 2009).
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As we entered the last six months of therapy, Vincent’s demand of me lessened in
some regards. He had moved to lying on the couch—a move that only occurred with
great anxiety for Vincent, as he feared “not being able to see [my] face.” The move
allowed Vincent the freedom to just wonder without the need to scan my face for
approval. Consequently, he began questioning more and demanding a little less. He
continued to long to be a woman, while also saying he felt he would “lose meaning” if a
girl he was romantically interested in did not like him. The ambiguity around his sexual
identity greatly distressed him, and he sought to find a label for himself that “fit.” He also
wondered why he “couldn’t allow [him]self to have fun.” He described “feeling bad for
being happy, like [he was] supposed to always be sad,” and said he feared that if he “let
[him]self out, it would be too much.” He would have “too many needs.”
In our last four months of therapy, Vincent met a woman and, at long last, had sex
with her. He described it as “less impressive than [he] thought” and said, “Mom wouldn’t
be okay with me having sex. Dad would be happy I was getting one over on her [mom].”
He complained that his new girlfriend did not dress properly and didn’t seem to care what
others thought about her appearance. He described her as “blobbish, frumpy, soft,
repulsive, and disgusting,” though he said he enjoyed that, “She look[ed] like a woman.”
He liked that she was curvy and not too thin. He vacillated between his “pure love” for
her and his denigration of her. He began exploring a more sadistic side of himself with
this new woman, enjoying handcuffing her to the bed and playing a more dominant role.
He dreamed of raping her with a knife—a dream he found pleasurable.
In therapy, Vincent’s paranoia and obsessive symptoms lessened. He said he
could not remember the last time he had worried he was a pedophile and pondered that
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this symptom had “just disappeared.” Rather than disowning the “Other within,” he now
said he felt his fears and compulsions were just “distorted desires” and that they were “all
[him].” He punctuated this himself, saying, “Maybe I wanted the devil to come take me
as a child.” Finally, Vincent said, “I’m trying to leave behind performance and embrace
passion. I want to be rid of demands because when you’re too busy saying, ‘give me
this,’ you can’t see all the different parts available.” His demand was ever-so-slowly
giving way to desire; however, “the idea of having a desire that [couldn’t] be completed”
terrified him.92
The final two months were a combination of great insight and regression for
Vincent. With our impending termination came a return of his hyperfocus on me at the
expense of his therapy. He demanded to know (again) why he could not know more about
me personally, saying, “I find it hard to know what your perspective is on things. You
don’t make me feel comfortable and you seem to make no attempt to do so.” His desire to
be the object of my desire was patent: He hoped we could be friends after termination and
assumed this would be the case. He longed to be the center of my world and frequently
left sessions telling me how “dissatisfied” he was: “I FEEL DISSATISIFED!
UNSATISIFIED! THERE IS NO SATISFACTION!”93
Transformative moments came when Vincent acknowledged that dressing as a
woman felt like “real enjoyment” and really began questioning why he did not allow
himself to enjoy. He was just beginning to explore how he “avoided pain by creating
92

Fink (1997) notes, “Demand is, of its very nature, repetitive. The patient’s insistent, repetitive demand
for an instantaneous cure gives way to something that moves, that is intrigued with each new manifestation
of the unconscious, that attaches itself to each new slip and explores it; in a word, the patient’s demand
gives way to desire” (p. 26).
93
Miller (2011) writes, “In articulating the loss, in symbolizing the lost phallus, we are symbolizing the fact
that part of us is alienated, not desired. It is our instinct perhaps to remedy this situation by regaining the
desire of the m/Other” (p. 101). This was clearly the case with Vincent and the return of his transference to
me toward the end of therapy.
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pain”—in a word, how he orchestrated his own jouissance, particularly in his fantasy life.
He was also growing bored with his fantasies, saying, “I don’t want to move toward
fantasy. I think I’ve had my fill.” Vincent felt he was less controlled by others’ opinions
and was growing more comfortable with disappointing people when he “didn’t perform.”
He was also becoming genuinely curious about the symbolic Other (rather than the
imaginary other) and wondered how communication was possible given the polyvalence
of language. He also wondered whether his goals were his own or someone else’s. In one
of our final sessions, Vincent said, “I am distinct from some. I am not all humans. We are
not all unified. There’s great value in not being understood.” He was beginning to
recognize difference and slowly needing the reflection of the Other less.
These are the things Vincent was pondering when our work together ended. I
transferred him to a different therapist who was also of a Lacanian persuasion. Though he
had made great strides in therapy, he continued to struggle with the question of whether
he was a man or a woman, and he continued to blame others for much of his suffering. I
saw Vincent once more when I obtained his signature for IRB purposes. It was only for
15 minutes, but I found what he said to be noteworthy:
I realized [after our last session] if I could live through the end of
something so big, I could live through anything. It made me more
comfortable with my own death.
Case Formulation
For the male hysteric, woman constitutes the object par excellence that
allows him to get his bearings with regard to possession of the phallus.
(Dor, 1999, p. 63)
Vincent clearly desired to be the cause of desire—object a—for those around him.
To be the unique, special object that could both evoke and fill the Other’s lack guaranteed
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his being, and his symptoms functioned in a variety of ways to ensure this. Vincent was a
chameleon of sorts—becoming what others wanted him to be—performing and changing
at the drop of the Other’s hat. His feeling of always being “an actor” illustrated not only
that he longed to be object a, but also that he came to desire what the Other desired—in
other words, that he desired as the Other. At times, Vincent desired as his father and, at
others, as his mother. Furthermore, he maintained his desire as unsatisfied as a defense
against jouissance—both his own and the Other’s.
Freud posited that the hysterical subject feels an aversion—a repulsion—toward
early sexual experiences that results from a fear (whether real or fantasized) of having
been the intended sexual object of an early seduction. The hysteric therefore accuses the
Other and attempts to resist or reject jouissance. Soler (1996) writes,
There is an aversion to pleasure in hysteria [...] Aversion does not mean
that the hysteric cuts off every relationship involving jouissance. There is
a defense against jouissance in hysteria, but there is also a failure. [...] This
failure gives rise to symptoms. Logically, therefore, jouissance is present
in the symptoms. The hysterical subject defends against this jouissance.
(p. 253, italics added)
Vincent was clearly “disgusted” by his “needs” which he thought were always “too
much.” He escaped into intellectualization to avoid this encounter with his jouissance,
and instead maintained his desire and jouissance via his active fantasy life. Consequently,
Vincent’s own enjoyment was hardly in the picture. His question toward the end of
therapy of why he felt so averse to pleasure was a pertinent one.
Similarly, Vincent’s obsessional symptoms served the purpose of placing limits
on his jouissance and his sexuality (which are, of course, intimately connected) by
attempting to invoke the law. Fink (1997), following Freud, notes that hysteria is
characterized by a propping up of the weak father—as a propping up of the law. Recall
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that the No! of the symbolic father is what places limits on the child’s jouissance, and
while this occurs in hysteria, it is not firmly pronounced. Symptoms arise then to further
limit what is experienced as overwhelming need. Short of a father that attended to him
and firmly separated him from his mother, Vincent developed obsessional symptoms.
Schneiderman (1986) notes that, “Obsessions signify the effort to bring his desire [...]
under his control” (p. 40). Examining Vincent’s symptoms closely, we see that they all
entail a restriction of jouissance by invocation of the law. Vincent’s fear of the FBI after
looking at pornography, his panic attack after sneaking whiskey into a school function,
his need to knock on wood after smoking marijuana, and his fear of being a pedophile all
revolved around his fear of being caught, or rather, his wish to be caught. They also all
involved some form of sexuality or pleasure. Likewise, his proposition that “If x happens,
then I can masturbate...” was a way of setting limits around when it was okay to
experience pleasure. If there were limits, then perhaps he could enjoy. To “protect”
himself, he carried around beads, and he sprinkled salt around his room to “keep evil
out.” The “evil” here from which he needed to be “protected” was his own jouissance—
his own drives.94 His symptoms functioned as a defense against jouissance. In this vein,
Vincent talked about feeling as though he had committed a crime—one for which he
obviously felt the need to be punished.
The crimes for which Vincent felt responsible were (at least) three-fold: his sexual
being, his male sex, and his belief that he had “ruined” his mother’s life by being born.
Vincent never felt loved enough by his mother and longed to be the object she desired;
however, Vincent was male. The combination of his “disgusting, ignorant” playboy
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Lacan speaks at length about jouissance as a real bodily substance with materiality. It is something
experienced in the real of the body. See Soler (1996) and Verhaege (2009).
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father and his mother and aunt’s pervasive anti-male discourse combined to create an
environment in which having a penis was equated with ignorance, dominance, and
unrestrained lust. Men were nothing more than objectifying “pigs” who ogled women’s
bodies and degraded them. For Vincent, to be masculine thus meant identifying with his
father as a “macho, manly man” who philandered and denigrated women. Vincent found
his father to be both someone who seemed to be unable to limit his mother’s interference
in his life, as well as a terrifying figure that his mother “couldn’t get a grip on.” Thus, any
identification with his father was consciously shameful for Vincent and represented a
betrayal of his mother; indeed, to be masculine created extraordinary conflict for Vincent.
Vincent’s belief that his mother was omniscient—and therefore “knew” when he
masturbated—reflected an incomplete separation from her that prohibited recognition of
Otherness and sexual difference. Schneiderman (1986) writes, “Otherness is introduced at
the moment the child realizes that his parents do not know all his thoughts. The Other is
introduced as having a defect, a blind spot, where something escapes his knowledge” (p.
26). Vincent did not perceive this defect in his mother; in fact, he did not perceive it in
women generally. He idealized them and believed they had something “special.” Women
were placed on a pedestal as the ones who were “lovable” and “pure” and who did not
want their bodies looked at. The idea that there was something wrong with his
masculinity and sexuality was further reinforced by his mother’s admonitions of his early
masturbation and her belittling of Vincent when he began expressing romantic interest in
girls in high school.
Vincent was caught in a trap: To identify with his father was to betray his mother
and to be seen as a sexual brute; however, to identify with his mother was to give up
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sexuality. Given his father’s early departure from the family for another woman and
Vincent’s subsequent rejection of him at an early age, he sought to become the ideal
object for his mother—someone she could see as “lovable.” Recall Vincent’s statement
that if he had “just been born a girl” he could have been loved. Given this context—this
symbolic matrix—Vincent identified as a woman and rejected his sexuality, feeling
repulsed by it. However, it was impossible for Vincent to completely identify as a
woman—he had a penis, one he liked—and this created great ambivalence for Vincent.
Thus, his question: Am I a man or a woman?
Vincent identified women as having the phallus—as being the signifier of the
Other’s desire (Lacan 1958/2002, p. 279). Vincent’s identification with and idealization
of women can be viewed as his attempt to enhance his own prestige via a woman:
Because Vincent did not experience himself as having the phallus (recall his statement
that he never had any power as a child), he aligned himself with those he perceived did.
Dor (1999) notes that hysterics are “militantly engaged in having the phallus” (p. 74)
because they perceive they have been unjustly deprived of it. Vincent was adrift in a sea
of ambivalence over just who had the phallus in his family: On the one hand, he felt his
philandering father had deprived his mother of it (Mom couldn’t get a grip on Dad—he
had the power); while on the other, he identified woman as possessing the phallus insofar
as she was the object of man’s desire and was the one who “got to be taken care of.”
Furthermore, his mother and aunt’s discourse portrayed women as special and “above”
men. Dor writes, “It is easy to see how, on this level of the oedipal dialectic, every
ambiguity, every ambivalence on the part of the mother and father concerning exactly
where the phallic attribution is to be situated can be conducive to the organization of the
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hysterical process” (pp. 73-74). Vincent wasn’t quite sure who had the phallus; he only
knew that he did not.
Consequently, he sought it out in any number of women he idealized as perfect
and desirable. Though Vincent felt deprived of the phallus, he believed it was still
available to him through a woman—that “brightly shining object in the gaze of others”
(p. 64). Such idealization was quickly replaced by rapid devaluation when the chosen
woman displayed any form of lack or desire—an indicator to Vincent that if she could
want, she must not possess the phallus. Vincent’s relationship to the feminine other was
alienated from the outset in his representation of the feminine as inaccessible, placed
upon a pedestal. Such idealization functioned as a way of keeping feminine objects at a
distance—Vincent could avoid a confrontation with sex precisely because it would ruin
that “specialness” only available to women. This was evinced by Vincent’s Victorian
speech about how “lewdly” sex was taken up and how no words could capture “the
moment of a kiss.”
Vincent’s cross-dressing, as well as his fantasies, signified his desire to enjoy as a
woman, to be the “shiny object of the gaze”—in other words, to be the center of
attention, the object cause of desire. By cross-dressing, he could perform and offer
himself to the other’s gaze, embodying the ideal object of desire. This, of course, was
fraught with anxiety for Vincent: He simultaneously enjoyed it while also worrying about
the judgment of the Other.95 This Other for Vincent encompassed both of his parents.
Recall that at the age of 11, Vincent’s mother said, “Please don’t be a cross-dresser!”
Vincent’s cross-dressing thus functioned as way of separating from his mother by
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This fear of judgment by the Other is what situated Vincent as an hysteric rather than a pervert. Vincent
said, “There’s always an unseen panel judging my actions.”
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refusing her demand. Lacan (1961/2002) writes, “Ultimately, by refusing to satisfy the
mother’s demand, isn’t the child requiring the mother to have a desire outside of him,
because that is the pathway toward desire that he lacks” (p. 252)? Likewise, Vincent’s
cross-dressing served as a refusal of his father’s request that “if [he] was going to be gay”
to “please not act like a girl!” While Vincent presented his cross-dressing as a symptom
that was distressing, he obtained great jouissance from it precisely because of the
disapproving opinion from others it garnered. Dor (1999) notes, “Since make-believe is
always sustained by the gaze of the other, it enables the subject to enjoy, in fantasy, the
supposedly disapproving or hostile opinion the other has of him” (p. 102). Cross-dressing
provided the opportunity to present his body as a show—as an object—perhaps the object
that would capture his father’s attention the way those women in Playboy did. Perhaps
Vincent could be the woman who stole his father’s attention—attention he felt he never
received as a boy. Perhaps he could be the object cause of his father’s desire?
Vincent’s fantasies of punishment, torture, and humiliation support such a
formulation. The discourse that shaped Vincent’s ideas of masculinity and femininity
suggested that men dominated and humiliated women, making them nothing more than
objects. Almost exclusively, Vincent played the role of the woman in his fantasy life—
often being beaten, bound, tied, raped, and dominated. He was powerless in his fantasies,
something he felt “horrified” by. Such horror points toward the jouissance of the real—
that pleasure in pain Vincent so loved. Vincent noted that in all of his fantasies he was
“utter object.” Again, we can surmise that this was the object he perceived his father
desired. Vincent had described his early play with his father as “violent” at times—
something that reappeared in his fantasy life. Furthermore, in situating himself in the
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submissive role, Vincent was able to give up his “feelings of responsibility” and succumb
to power—something he had always felt unable to do in his daily life. Recall that Vincent
felt he “always had to be dominant” to make up for his parents’ careless “mistake” on
their first date. Fink (1995) writes, “Fantasy stages the position in which the child would
like to see itself with respect to the object that causes, elicits, and incites its desires” (p.
xiii). Vincent was the degraded object in his fantasy life, deserving and receiving
punishment. He was powerless in fantasy, despite his conscious “horror over someone
having power over [him].” Such horror suggested his terror of his own drives and his fear
that they would be “too much” and “overwhelm” him. In his daily life, he projected such
fears outward—making everyone a “predator” or fearing being beaten up by “manly
men”; however, in his fantasy life, he allowed himself to be powerless and submissive to
his drives. There was no need for obsessive symptoms to limit his jouissance.
Vincent’s horror and fascination with torture films that involved mutilation and
dismemberment, as well as dreams he had of this nature, signified his desire to escape the
rigid confines of his ego. Boothby (1991) suggests that fantasies and dreams of mutilation
point toward the fragmentation of the real—the body before the mirror stage and a drive
toward difference over unification.96 (Note that these fantasies and dreams did not come
until the end of Vincent’s therapy—around the time he began to really explore and
articulate his sexuality.) Furthermore, in “Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis,” Lacan
(1948/2002) notes that “[i]mages of castration, emasculation, mutilation,
dismemberment, dislocation, evisceration, devouring, and bursting open of the body—in
short, the imagos that I personally have grouped together under the heading ‘imagos of
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the fragmented body,’” represent “aggressive intentions” (p. 13). Such fragmentation and
aggressiveness was a source of jouissance for Vincent, increasingly one he was able to
discuss in therapy rather than simply entertain in his fantasy or dream life. His fascination
with dismemberment signified to me a change in his stance with regard to his desire and
his jouissance—a willingness on his part to explore the “grotesque” parts of himself
rather than repress them.
Conclusions
Nothing other than this is at stake in analysis—recognising what function
the subject takes on in the order of the symbolic relations which covers the
entire field of human relations, and whose initial cell is the Oedipus
complex, where the assumption of sex is decided.
(Lacan, 1975/1988, p. 67)
Vincent’s burgeoning interest in what it meant to be “masculine,” as well as the
awakening of a longing for oral sex and sexual intercourse with women, represented a
shift in his psychic economy. It indicated a move from his exclusive identification with
women and his enjoying as a woman to a tentative exploration of all of those features of
his father he believed would make him undesirable. To lust—to sexually want a
woman—was inscribed in his very being as wrong; thus, he rejected it and played object
a for his mother at the expense of his sexuality. We can see then that Vincent played both
parts: object a for his father by being the degraded object in his fantasy life and object a
for his mother by being the little girl she had so badly wanted when she was pregnant.
We can also read the inverse, something Freud repeatedly reminded us to do: Vincent
identified with his father by cutting women down in his fantasy life. Initially, this was
something he could not openly wish for, so he instead positioned women as humiliated
and denigrated in fantasy. Vincent wanted to do to women what he perceived his father
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did to his mother. His mother’s discourse taught him that all men were users, and this is
what he sought to become. Later, when Vincent was better able to symbolize this, he
began playing it out consciously with his new girlfriend—cutting her down to size by
calling her “blobbish and dumb,” and enacting sadistic sexual play with her in “real” life.
This movement was only able to occur once Vincent had begun to explore his lust,
dominance, and all of those other signifiers he associated with “masculinity.” As a result,
he began to feel that he had had his “fill of fantasy”—he was exploring things with
another person now.
Vincent also identified with his mother and the other women in his father’s life by
playing the role of the degraded object in his fantasies. He wished to be used by Dad like
Mom was. He wanted to be the object that would cause a man’s desire. This was present
in Vincent’s cross-dressing, as well. He longed to be the object of the Other’s gaze, while
also feeling great anxiety about it—a feeling that implied considerable jouissance for
Vincent. While Vincent’s situating of himself in both the male and female roles was
certainly complex, what is clear is that, in both scenarios, he desired as the Other desired,
his own desire always being mediated by someone else’s desire. While, on one level,
Vincent’s identification as a woman functioned to please both of his parents (recall his
statement that, had he been born a girl, they wouldn’t have gotten divorced), it also
served as a refusal of their jouissance. As a teenager, both of Vincent’s parents implored
him to “please not be a cross-dresser” and to “please not act like a girl!” By refusing
these demands, particularly through his cross-dressing, Vincent created a space for
himself outside of his parents’ desires. This was the crux of many of Vincent’s issues: He
could not decide whether to please the Other or just say, “Fuck you.” For three years he
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vacillated between his need to be the pleasing object for all and his desire to leave the
“people pleasing” behind. Vincent could never be sure that he had the phallus—indeed,
he wasn’t quite sure whether it was his mother or father who had it—and this kept him
trapped in a loop of indecision and terror.
Vincent’s complex uncertainty as to his sexual identity was perhaps best
exemplified by his favored masturbatory act of dressing in women’s clothing and then
ejaculating on his own face. We can see in this act his embodiment of both the masculine
and the feminine: He’s the male ejaculating on the woman’s face (perhaps on Mom’s
face?). Whether identified as male or female, Vincent’s desire was to be the object that
could fulfill the Other. Though his own jouissance came to the foreground later, it was
barely in the picture at the beginning of therapy. His concern was always with the Other.
Vincent’s case was particularly complex because he simultaneously idealized women and
degraded them, identified with/hated his mother and his father, and routinely played both
roles; however, if we return to his presenting complaint and the early discourse that
shaped him, we can perhaps more readily disentangle this complexity.
Vincent sought therapy because he was “having problems with the opposite
gender.” In light of Vincent’s history, we can now understand the wording of his
presenting problem in an entirely different manner. Vincent, indeed, had problems with
the opposite gender—he could not figure out which he was and all of his symptoms led
back to this confusion and to the hysteric’s question: Am I a man or a woman?
Unbeknownst to Vincent, the preconditions for his desire were established by the
signifying chain that commenced in the discourse of his parents and conditions that
existed before his birth (his very own conception, for example)—in other words, in his
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symbolic matrix. Vincent’s signifiers, his very language, contained the keys to his
symptoms.97 To be masculine was associated with being a user, lust, power, domination,
degradation, objectification, ignorance, and sexuality. Because Vincent blamed his father
for hurting his mother (and him) through his philandering, he rejected these things;
however, as we have seen, they continued to operate for him unconsciously. Given his
mother and aunt’s anti-male discourse, to have embraced the only notion Vincent had of
masculinity was to betray his mother by identifying with his father. What resulted were
paranoid fears of being “beaten up” by “manly men” and a turn to intellectual pursuits in
contradistinction to his father’s blue collar work. We can recollect Vincent’s father’s
warning that he would one day be “beaten up for being smart,” and see how this
discourse structured Vincent at the level of the real. He was “terrified” and “horrified” at
the idea of being “beaten” by such “manly men.” In such fears was a wish to inhabit this
place that he could not consciously claim without identifying with his “disgusting” father.
Women were sacred, lovable, special, unique, and above all, desirable. They
“didn’t want their bodies stared at” and were placed on a Victorian pedestal of purity by
Vincent. By idealizing women, Vincent could remain safe from any encounter with his
own sexuality or jouissance. His idealization served to keep the feminine object at a safe
distance where he could imagine she had the phallus, therefore, providing him the vehicle
by which he could enhance his own prestige through identification with her. He desired
via her, and as has been shown, longed to be her. His mother’s discourse about men did
not provide Vincent with any idea of a way a man could have a sexual relationship with a
woman that was not objectifying or dominating, and he certainly did not see it modeled in
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his parents’ relationship. Similarly, his father’s discourse about masculinity and what it
meant to “be a man” was so restrictive that Vincent felt he must not be a man.
These conflicting desires manifested themselves in Vincent’s symptoms, dreams,
and fantasy life. More importantly, they were present in his language—in his very choice
of signifiers. It was not surprising that the words Vincent used in the beginning of therapy
to describe his father (such as “lust” or “dominate”) were the words he used later in
fantasy when the repression of his own sexuality and masculinity began to lift. Though
the question of his sexual identity still loomed large for Vincent upon termination, he had
made some progress toward demanding less and desiring more—a shift from the
imaginary to the symbolic. This was due, in large part, to his increasing ability to accept
the inherent unfulfillability of desire—in other words, his budding acceptance of his own
castration and subsequent structural dissatisfaction. He was also able to symbolize his
fantasies rather than manifesting them in obsessive symptoms. He had also begun to
wonder about his own pleasure rather than exclusively focusing on the Other’s. Finally,
he had allowed himself to desire a woman—the very verboten thing his mother found so
devastating and that he knew would give his father pleasure. Vincent, who had remained
mobilized by desire for his mother, was separating from her, thus allowing for the
emergence of his sexual desire.
Therapeutic Aims
As with Keenan, my aim with Vincent was to invite him to become a question for
himself and to assist him in separating from the Other’s desire. I punctuated signifiers
and made interpretations that pointed toward unrecognized desire and jouissance and
asked Vincent to wonder about who it was that desired within him. I will not repeat all of
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the therapeutic aims I detailed in the previous chapter here; however, I want to emphasize
a few things I did differently with Vincent because of his hysterical structure. Firstly, I
invited Vincent to lie on the couch so that he could not see my face. He was excellent at
scanning my face and situating himself in response to what he believed he read in my
facial expressions. He was terrified of not being able to see me, though once he overcame
his fear, he enjoyed having the space the couch afforded him to not always be attending
to someone else (me). Secondly, I frustrated Vincent’s demands much more readily, so as
to foster his separation from my desire as Other. With Keenan, I was lucky if I could get
him to ask for anything, much less demand. The hysteric demands an answer—tell me
what is wrong with me!—to avoid doing the work himself. (The obsessive refuses to do
the work himself but in a different way—by playing dead—or he works hard through
conscious thinking, but resists remembering his dreams and fantasies.) This also
functions to induce a lack in the knowledge of the therapist (as Master), something at
which Vincent excelled. By refusing his demands, I invited him go past his demand to his
desire. Thirdly, in conjunction with this, I kept my desire enigmatic, never allowing
Vincent to quite nail down what it was I wanted from him. In so doing, he could not
situate himself as object a for me (though he tried repeatedly). This proved highly
frustrating to Vincent, often resulting in his quitting therapy or yelling at me about how
“unfair” everything was (the accusation of the Other so familiar in hysteria).
He particularly found my scanding of sessions to be troubling, often telling me he
felt “obliterated” when I would not speak or interpret, instead scanding a session. Finally,
I strictly limited any knowledge Vincent had of me as a subject in the room. Indeed, I
attempted to be as much of a placeholder as possible. With Keenan, I had to constantly

192

remind him I was in the room; consequently, I interrupted him more and spoke more
often. This does not mean I shared personal details, only that I made my presence known
much more often. The opposite was the case with Vincent. Because he frequently focused
on me as a way of avoiding his own work, the transference—more often than not—
served as a hindrance to the therapy rather than as something that facilitated it. Thus, I
gave Vincent my lack—my love—my pure desirousness that he come into being as a
subject on his terms rather than as the object everyone else wanted or needed him to be.
This is where our work together ended—with Vincent wondering about his enjoyment
and desire and the question of his sexuality.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Clinical Implications and Concluding Discussion
The challenge Lacanians accept is that of inventing ways in which to hit
the real, upset the repetition it engenders, dialectize the isolated Thing,98
and shake up the fundamental fantasy in which the subject constitutes
herself in relation to the cause.
(Fink, 1995, p. 92)
The point to which analysis leads, the end point of the dialectic of
existential recognition, is—You are this. In practice this ideal is never
reached. The ideal of analysis is not complete self mastery, the absence of
passion.
(Lacan, 1975/1988, p. 3, original italics)
In this concluding chapter, I detail the project’s findings, specifically focusing on
the clinical presentation and treatment of obsessive structure, as well as articulating how
Lacan’s diagnostic approach goes beyond the apparent symptoms to the underlying
structure of the subject. I highlight how such an approach guided my case formulation
and therapeutic work with two patients who presented with similar symptomatology, thus
allowing for shifts in each patient’s psychic economy rather than superficial symptom
reduction. In this context, I discuss my historical experiences with various therapeutic
modalities for the treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder and how these experiences
contributed to my eventual embracing of Lacan. Next, I discuss the case study and
psychoanalytic interview methodologies I utilized and how these methods proved
particularly useful in articulating the how of a Lacanian-oriented psychotherapy. Within
this context, I discuss the inevitable limitations of this work and some of the issues I
struggled with while writing. Finally, I discuss implications for future practice and
research, including a brief discussion of the impending publication of the DSM-V.
98

Object a.
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Clinical Findings
For in the work he does to reconstruct it for another, he encounters anew
the fundamental alienation that made him construct it like another, and
that has always destined it to be taken away from him by another.
(Lacan, 1953/2002, p. 42, original italics)
The aims of this dissertation have been to detail a Lacanian-oriented approach to
working with obsession and to illustrate how a Lacanian approach looks beyond apparent
symptoms. By examining a variety of theoretical treatment approaches, we have seen that
“obsession” takes on very different meanings depending on one’s theoretical position.
Our theoretical models deeply influence us; indeed, they prescribe the very way we view
the patient and how we formulate treatment. “Obsessive-compulsive disorder”—as
described by those of a CBT or neurobiological orientation—is something quite different
from the “obsessive personality” as described by dynamically-oriented therapists such as
Nancy McWilliams or Glen Gabbard. Then we have the work of David Shapiro, who
speaks of “obsessional styles,” where “style” is a product of drives and stimuli plus the
“mental organizing capacities” of the individual” (1965, p. 5). In this view, rather than
focusing on superficial traits, styles are linked to underlying psychological structure—
what Shapiro terms a “matrix.” Shapiro thus identifies symptoms as “problems of
character” that are more general than any specific mechanisms that can be inferred from
them. Symptoms are viewed as a result of a style of functioning. We see a progression
from the symptom taken at face value—defined as a type of medical illness—to a
personality organization largely based around the defensive structure of the patient, to a
first step toward a structural approach, one that attempts to locate a symptom within the
person’s underlying “matrix.”
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Lacan takes us even further—suggesting that it is the very symbolic matrix of the
patient that must be articulated and brought to light in order for movement to occur.
Lacan brings to the table the very question of human desire and how this desire structures
the patient at the deepest levels of her being. Obsession is not a set of symptoms—anyone
can have obsessive symptoms—it is a structural position with regard to the Other. It is the
stance the patient takes with regard to desire and jouissance. To “treat” the neurotic is,
therefore, not to treat a set of symptoms, but to bring her to a point of confrontation with
the symbolic Other so that the very constellation of signifiers that have conditioned her
desire may be articulated—the gaps and holes in her signifying chain reorganized,
reconstituted, filled in. In so doing, the therapist attempts to bring about a shift in the
patient’s subjective position, which is based on desire. The therapist assists the patient in
her movement toward subjectification, “whereby the [patient] moves from being the
subject who demands (as well as being subject to the Other’s demand) to being the
subject who desires (as well as being subject to the Other’s desire), and then to being the
subject who enjoys (who is no longer subject to the Other)” (Fink, 1997, p. 65).
What Lacan offers that is truly unique is his emphasis on the linguistic structure
of symptoms and the unconscious. The patient’s desire is evident in the words she uses—
her desire is displayed in the signifying chain. Thus, the work involves fleshing out the
symbolic matrix, drawing into awareness the “symbolic constellation dwelling in the
subject’s unconscious” (Lacan, 1975/1988, p. 65). Signifiers repeat and point to where
the patient is fixated—to the real and the trauma of repetition it engenders. That which
has never been symbolized repeats.
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Keenan’s life was on “repeat.” Nothing ever moved. His presenting problems
were that he was bored, dissatisfied, and unmotivated. He “feared” social interactions and
longed for friends and love, so long as he did not have to lose his own independence.
Keenan did not want to have to give up anything. He wanted companions, yet he also
wanted to maintain his position of superiority over the “conformist sheep” of society.
Lacan’s formulation of the obsessive’s question as “Am I dead or alive,” allowed me to
situate Keenan’s symptoms within the larger symbolic matrix that constituted his desire.
In other words, I was able to ascertain from Keenan’s words his position in the symbolic
order. Guided by the question, “What is at stake in desiring for Keenan?” I was led to a
greater understanding of how Keenan’s symptoms functioned as a response to his
existential question. For Keenan, what was at stake in desiring was the very giving up of
his being in the face of the Other’s desire. This traced back to his mOther’s early
engulfing desire, and Keenan’s subsequent withdrawal. Faced with his mother’s
overwhelming lack, Keenan chose to play dead—to deny his own lack and desire, as well
as the Other’s. Thus, the wording of Keenan’s symptoms—that he was “taking up space,”
“non-existent,” “empty,” and “excluded”—were directly tied to his mother’s discourse
and early experiences. Indeed, we saw that Keenan’s emphasis on rational understanding
over expression of his feelings for fear that the latter would swallow him structured him
at the level of both his desire and jouissance. We saw how Keenan “never developed an
appetite” in response to his mother’s voracious appetite—her overwhelming jouissance—
and how his feeling that he was “taking up space” signaled the lack of symbolic space he
was provided as a child to come into being as a separate subject. We were thus able to tie
Keenan’s symptom of withholding to this larger constellation—identifying in it his desire
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to retain a position for himself by giving up nothing. Indeed, Keenan felt he was
“nothing.” By being “nothing,” he could, paradoxically, maintain a place for himself. By
enjoying “nothing,” he distanced himself from the jouissance he associated with his
mother that felt overpowering. This was particularly illustrated by Keenan’s guilt the day
after he “successfully” masturbated—he felt pleasure initially, but had to run from it
afterwards.
Keeping in mind Lacan’s formulation of the obsessive’s question, we were able to
situate Keenan’s obsessive symptoms and childhood nightmares of being kidnapped as
responses to this question. His symptoms served two functions: to deny lack and to
express his repressed hostility toward his mother. Keenan’s need for symmetry and his
“canceling out” behaviors pointed toward his inability to tolerate any form of lack. His
frustration with me when I did not repeat his exact words back to him likewise pointed
toward his inability to tolerate lack—the very lack intrinsic to language and subjectivity.
His dreams of being kidnapped, fears of stepping on a crack lest he break his mother’s
back, his need to walk a certain number of steps to the kitchen for fear that something
“bad” occur (death), and his sneezing and belching compulsions all displayed his
unconscious hatred toward a castrating mother who “stabbed sausages,” yelled “PENIS!”
in restaurants, and humiliated Keenan time and again. His obsessive symptoms
manifested his question of being: To be or not to be when faced with a woman who took
great pleasure in mutilation and humiliation and a father who did nothing to limit her.
Keenan chose death. This was best exemplified in Keenan’s dream of his dead
grandmother who died waiting.
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As a therapist, I was better able to understand Keenan’s deferral of action,
superiority complex, withholding, and his obsession with time and subsequent waiting for
something to happen within the context of Lacan’s theory of the role death plays for the
obsessive. By playing dead, Keenan felt he could perhaps escape death. By waiting for
the master to die, he was able to escape any responsibility to the Other—to escape having
to make a choice. To say what he wanted would have made Keenan vulnerable: It would
have implicated him as an engaged participant in his life. To risk such a move was to risk
an encounter with the Other. This was at the crux of Keenan’s presenting problems: his
fear of social interactions, his dissatisfaction, his lack of motivation, his feelings of
boredom and repetition. They all served as defenses against desire and jouissance—both
his own and the Other’s. His symptoms were plugs, as it were—satisfactions that
sustained him in his position with regard to the Other. And, as Keenan said in our initial
interview, he would rather maintain the status quo than lose himself by conforming to
Others.
The work with Keenan, therefore, required a hystericizing of him—opening him
up to the Other whom he feared would eclipse him as a subject. By my punctuating his
unacknowledged desire and enjoyment, Keenan was able to see how playing dead
functioned for him and was able to tie it to his past discourse. In so doing, he began to fill
in the gaps and holes in his signifying chain, shaking up his psychic economy, resulting
in a dialectization of his desire. We saw that, toward the end of therapy, Keenan had
slowly begun to ask for things, to make “long-term” plans, and to question what he
wanted—something that before had remained impossible for him. Keenan maintained his
desire as impossible so that nothing would ever move, the very thing he “feared” the
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most. We have seen just how complex this “fear” was for Keenan, and how his symptoms
served as an answer to his question: To be or not to be? Am I dead or alive?
Differential Diagnosis
I chose the case of Vincent as a counterpart to that of Keenan to specifically detail
how symptom-based approaches leave out the very question of desire and jouissance.
Had we only paid attention to the obsessive symptoms present in both Keenan and
Vincent, we would have altogether missed another register—the symbolic register,
including the unconscious, language, the law, and desire. We would perhaps also have
missed that, though alike on the surface, Vincent’s obsessive symptoms served a different
purpose than Keenan’s. Part of the problem with CBT and neurobiological approaches to
obsessive-compulsive disorder is their failure to view symptoms in their singularity—to
identify how the symptom functions as a source of jouissance and as a response to the
neurotic’s question. Keenan’s obsessive symptoms, as I have just discussed, were tied to
his existential being: They covered over lack and expressed repressed hostility toward his
mother. Indeed, his dreams and his compulsive symptoms were death wishes toward his
mother. Vincent’s obsessive symptoms, too, were tied to his question; however, the
hysteric’s question is different than the obsessive’s: Am I a man or a woman? What we
learned from careful examination of Vincent’s symptoms was that they all involved an
attempt to limit his jouissance and his sexuality. They served as a defense against
jouissance (Soler, 1996). Vincent feared (wished) being caught. The FBI was coming to
get him for looking at pornography. He was going to be caught for the illicit bottle of
whiskey he smuggled into the school function and the weed he smoked a month before
his drug test. Vincent needed to protect himself from “evil” (his own drives and
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enjoyment). Vincent’s obsessive symptoms signified his struggle with his sexual being,
while Keenan’s signified his struggle with his existential being.
Furthermore, at the level of desire, Vincent situated himself on the side of the
object—becoming object a—the cause of desire. He was a chameleon, an actor, situating
himself to fill the Other’s lack. He maintained his being by being the desired object.
Vincent’s symbolic matrix—his early parental discourse, as well as the conditions that
pre-existed him—turned his sexual being into a source of immense complexity and
confusion. His questions all revolved around his relationships with Others and whether he
was approved of and desired by them. Despite similarities in symptomatology, we thus
can identify radical differences in Vincent and Keenan. Keenan dealt with his alienation
and separation by nullifying the Other and denying lack. He plugged up his own division
with any number of objects that were not connected to any human person per se (recall
the disembodied penis). Cut off from his own desire, he felt bored, monotonous, dead.
Vincent avoided full separation by eliciting lack in the Other so that he could then be the
object that filled that lack. He therefore complained of feeling “false” and “like an actor.”
Both men had somewhat similar early experiences: fathers who were largely ineffective
and mothers who dominated their lives; however, their “choice of neurosis” to use
Freud’s term, differed. To neutralize the (m)Other, Keenan played dead and Vincent
became what she wanted—her little girl.
Without Lacan’s formulation of the signifying chain, I could never have
understood the role each patient’s symptoms played, nor would I have known how to
position myself in the therapy. This is one of the things that draws me to Lacan: His
diagnostic structures imply a corresponding therapeutic stance. I made myself irritatingly
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present in Keenan’s case. (He so longed for me to just disappear.) In so doing, he could
not evade the Other as he had done his whole life. With Vincent, I did the opposite. I
more readily refused his demands, forcing him to make himself a question rather than
simply demanding I provide it for him. My therapy revolved much more around
questions of time, death, and inaction with Keenan; whereas, with Vincent, we almost
exclusively focused on his sexuality. This is not to say that sexuality was not a focus with
Keenan (we saw that it was) or vice versa; however, the questions they brought with them
to therapy remained largely consistent with Lacan’s formulations.
With both, I listened for the beyond of discourse, punctuating signifiers that
repeated and polyvalent language in an effort to assist them in articulating and
reconstituting their histories. I attempted to intervene at the level of the real—to shake up
that which had never been symbolized—by making interpretations that were meant to be
surprising and evocative. I attempted to place myself in the role of the symbolic Other so
that each patient’s subjective position with respect to the Other could be brought to light
and explored. To further enable this, I kept my own desire enigmatic—never allowing
them to know what I wanted so that, instead, they could have the space to confront desire
and perhaps find a place for their own to manifest. Fink (1997) writes,
The ultimate struggle in analysis—that of getting the analysand to assume
responsibility for his or her castration instead of demanding compensation
for it from the Other—is played out between the analysand and the
analyst, who stands in for the Other (and the lost object [object a] at the
same time. (p. 70)
I saw my role as directing the treatment, not directing the patient. It was neither my desire
nor my place to tell either Vincent or Keenan (or any other patient, for that matter) how
to live their lives, how to be “more productive,” or to impose a value system upon them.
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My genuine desire was for each of them to come into being as they saw fit. This was also
my initial draw to Lacan: Rather than seeing therapy as an adaptive process—one that
seeks to adjust the patient to society—Lacan emphasizes the singularity of each person
and views the role of the therapist as assisting the subject in separating from the Other’s
desire.
I am a long way from the days of forcing someone to sit on a public toilet seat in
order to overcome her “contamination fears.” I have arrived at a place—a human place—
where symptoms reflect positions with regard to desire and enjoyment. This is a complex
place, not readily reducible to a serotonin hypothesis or a “negative automatic thought.” I
have utilized those modalities. I would even say they work sometimes; however, they
leave the patient further alienated from herself and her desire. They require that she
objectify parts of herself and “manage” them, rather than integrating and accepting them
all—even the most “grotesque,” to use Vincent’s word. My experience working with
“obsessive-compulsive disorder” was always that, as soon as one symptom was relieved,
it would manifest elsewhere (driving therapists nuts). I have heard many therapists say
they do not like working with people with obsessions because of their refractory nature.
Let me make it clear that I did not explore Vincent or Keenan’s symptoms with
them with the intention of either of them “gaining insight” or “understanding” them.
Instead, I punctuated the wording of their symptoms. When Vincent discussed his fear of
being a pedophile, I simply asked what he associated with “pedophile.” When he said,
“wrong, disgusting, perverse,” and so on, I punctuated “disgusting.” This led to his
discussion of how “disgusting and repulsive” he felt when he masturbated as a child, and
how he tried to “master” it so that his mother would not find out. We can recall Vincent’s
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comment toward the end of therapy that he “could not remember the last time [he]
worried about being a pedophile.” Stated otherwise, I aimed at what was driving the
symptom—the repressed sexuality and the signifiers that fixated the symptom and held it
in place—rather than saying, “Well, I think you fear you’re a pedophile because it
represents your belief in your own badness and your unconscious desire to be punished
for it.” What would that have offered Vincent other than some heady Freudian abstract
theorizing that he would undoubtedly have found fault with and then challenged me on?
By simply allowing Keenan and Vincent the space to verbalize that which had never been
spoken, a reordering occurred that shifted their symptoms and desire without their
conscious knowledge or insight. By listening at the level of the symbolic and aiming at
the real, I was able to facilitate this via my punctuations and interpretations. The other
therapies I have utilized in the past—even psychodynamic ones that focused on the
relationship or the patient’s affect—never escaped the register of the imaginary, which, as
we have learned, is structured by ego-to-ego relations. In such therapies, the patient is
hopelessly linked to the reflection of the therapist, thus preventing the very separation a
Lacanian-oriented approach seeks to engender.99
Case Study Methodology and the Psychoanalytic Interview: Benefits and
Limitations
My decision to utilize a case study methodology, with particular focus on the
psychoanalytic interview, provided me the opportunity to 1) articulate the role Lacan’s
theory played in my clinical practice, 2) explicate Lacan’s theory via concrete case
examples, 3) illustrate the how of psychotherapy—what actually occurs in the session
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room—with specific attention paid to the patient’s words and the interpretations and
punctuations I articulated as the therapist, and 4) to highlight manifestations of the
unconscious as a valid form of knowledge in itself. Employing this methodology
provided both benefits and a few drawbacks.
Firstly, by utilizing a case study methodology, I was able to tell a story in a way
that I hope was reader-friendly. I was able to share parts of the patient’s speech verbatim,
thus highlighting the importance of signifiers and their place in each patient’s signifying
chain. Furthermore, I was able to offer a view of what occurred in the actual session
room—something that is of great help to clinicians and that is sorely lacking in the
literature. By necessity, I was forced to pick and choose what material to share. I saw
each of these men twice weekly for over two years. This produced a wealth of
information, and most certainly, what I chose to share was, in part, guided by the
particular Lacanian concepts I was attempting to articulate. This is to say that, had I been
focusing on other concepts, different parts of the story would have been highlighted. As I
hope to have shown throughout this work, there is no way to fully encompass everything;
there is, indeed, always a lack. I did my best to present the material I believed was
relevant to the ideas I was attempting to communicate; however, it is inevitable that there
were things left out that could have proven beneficial.
Secondly, the material I chose to share reflected, in many ways, the material I felt
most comfortable working with. Lacan is difficult, and as mentioned in my initial
chapter, there is much I still have to learn. My case presentations thus reflect my current
knowledge of Lacan, and I chose to work with concepts on which I felt I had a fairly
good grasp. Were I to reformulate these cases a year from now, they would likely be
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more nuanced, reflecting my own further understanding of Lacan. Nevertheless, I believe
what I present here offers the clinician who has an interest in incorporating Lacan into his
or her practice a nice starting point, particularly with obsessive patients.
Thirdly, I struggled with many concepts and formulations as I wrote—learning all
the way through—and I believe this shows in the cases. It is difficult to formulate such
complex cases, and I found myself wondering at times, for example, what the difference
was between object a and the phallus. Consequently, my articulation of them is
somewhat sketchy. I do not believe this confusion about the phallus and object a is
exclusive to the novice Lacanian—it is likely a conversation had amongst the most
sophisticated Lacanians. I found myself wishing I could be more clear and concise in
these areas; however, I also wanted to remain true to the aim of this dissertation, which is
clinical in nature. I love a good theoretical exposition, and I had to continuously remind
myself that this was not the purpose of this particular piece of work. I did attempt to point
the reader in the direction of written works that were theoretically denser for those (like
myself) who enjoy the theoretical part. I found myself somewhat limited in this respect;
however, Lacan’s corpus is so extensive, there is no possible way I could have provided
detailed analyses of all of his major concepts.
Despite hundreds of pages of notes, I sometimes worried that I was not presenting
either Vincent or Keenan in the way they presented in certain sessions. There is, of
course, an inherent fallacy even in this thought, for the way Keenan and Vincent
presented in sessions was already mediated through my own perceptions and hearing.
Both as a therapist and as a writer, I try to really listen to the patient to the letter and to
re-present them to the letter. This is why much of the case presentations detailed actual
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conversations. Rather than simply formulate the cases in Lacanian terms, I wanted to
share the actual conversations that occurred. This served the purpose of not only
attending to the patient’s signifiers and transference, but also of allowing the reader to see
how I sometimes responded as well as the mistakes I made. There is something to be
learned in the mistakes therapists make, and I believe sharing them is an important part of
this work. It was largely because of my early failings with both Keenan and Vincent
(when I was making suggestions and functioning as an imaginary other) that Lacan
entered the picture for me. What I was doing was not working, and I wondered why. I
was following affect, interpreting transference, creating rapport—why was I being met
with such resistance? As much as patients demand that we tell them what to do, they
really do not like it much. Even the obsessive, who lives by the Other’s rules, secretly
enacts his opposition to such rules. I learned this through experience, and it is this
experience—mistakes and all—that I seek to share.
Finally, my interpretations are just that—mine. They are informed by Lacan’s
formulations, but they are still my own. For example, there were most certainly multiple
layers to Keenan’s dream of the dead grandma; however, I focused on the interpretations
I felt were most relevant to the case. The wonderful thing about dreams is how complex
they are and the rich material they provide. I, in no way, completely analyzed any of the
dreams presented. Even today, I find new meanings in Keenan’s dreams. Such is the
nature of the unconscious. It provides us with something beyond conscious insight—
something that, just because we cannot quantify it or fully “understand” it—shouldn’t
preclude it from our discourse. The unconscious needs to be taken seriously, and the
psychoanalytic interview does so. It places importance on the pauses and stumblings in

207

the patient’s speech, the negations, the sentences that trail off, the slips of the tongue, and
the bungled actions. All of it points to something—something beyond—something that is
often difficult to articulate in words. Language is limiting in this way: It never fully
expresses what we long to express, for this is structurally impossible. In my writing, I
have been forced to (once again) accept my castration here, my lack. Like Keenan and
Vincent, I have had to struggle with the incompleteness of language, the lack in the
Other.
I believe the case study methodology and the psychoanalytic interview invite
clinicians to share their stories—successes and failures—in a way that allows us to
consider alternate ways of treatment. Rather than presenting patients as numbers on a
graph or detailing “outcome measures,” the case study provides a glimpse of the immense
human complexity that is inevitably part of every patient we see. I hope this is something
that every mental health care professional, regardless of theoretical orientation, can agree
upon: the sheer intricacy of the human species.
Implications and a Call to Ethics
This is the saddest moment in my 45 year career of studying, practicing,
and teaching psychiatry. The Board of Trustees of the American
Psychiatric Association has given its final approval to a deeply flawed
DSM 5 containing many changes that seem clearly unsafe and
scientifically unsound. My best advice to clinicians, to the press, and to
the general public - be skeptical and don't follow DSM 5 blindly down a
road likely to lead to massive over-diagnosis and harmful overmedication.
Allen Frances, Chair DSM-IV Task Force, December 2012
My primary goal throughout this work has been to articulate Lacan’s clinical
approach to obsessive structure. Implicit in such an aim is an exposition of the difference
between a descriptive or symptom-based approach and a structural approach. The latter
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has been my secondary aim because of its ethical implications. I worry when I hear
people reduce their everyday human experiences to biological malfunctions and chemical
imbalances. I worry when I see children taking psychiatric medications for throwing
temper tantrums or exhibiting what used to be considered typical kid behavior. In short, I
worry about the medicalization of human distress that is occurring. As mentioned in the
introduction, political and economic motives have contributed almost exclusively to the
shift toward the biological perspective in psychology with its concomitant proliferation of
psychopharmacology. People are no longer “sad,” they have depression. They no longer
“feel moody,” they have bipolar disorder. People are no longer “exuberant,” they have
manic episodes. We have become objects—further alienated from our human experiences
by this medicalization of distress. There is no longer an I, there is a “me.” Everyone is
outside of themselves looking down—never in the moment experiencing—always
observing. Our culture is an obsessive one. We are spectators rigidly defined by labels
that the Other affixes to us. The Other in this case is often the world of psychologists,
therapists, social workers, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals—in a word,
clinicians.
Allen Frances, the chairman of the DSM-IV has been among the most vocal of the
critics of the impending DSM-V, due to be published in May 2013, precisely because of
its biological ideology. Frances (2012) notes that over fifty mental health professional
organizations petitioned for an outside review to provide an independent assessment of its
supporting evidence. He further notes that professional journals, the press, and the public
have “express[ed] widespread astonishment about decisions that sometimes seemed not
only to lack scientific support but also to defy common sense.” The APA refused to
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conduct any independent review, and final approval was given to publish the DSM-V.
Psychiatric diagnosis has far-reaching implications: It determines whether an insurance
company will pay for patient treatment. It decides what drugs a person will be placed on.
It determines eligibility for benefits and services, and it stigmatizes—branding people
with labels that often carry great weight. These are but a few of the powers psychiatry
wields. I note them to highlight that, as clinicians, we are ethically implicated not only in
our patient’s lives and what happens in the session room, but also in the larger social
repercussions that occur when we fall into line with this ideology. Let me be clear: My
intention here is not to demonize psychotropic medications. They have their place. The
problem is, they are currently all over the place. Their place is everywhere. So it goes
when everything is considered to be a biological disorder. And when you can medicate it,
everything somehow ends up being a biological disorder. For example, in the new DSMV, temper tantrums in children will be called “Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder.”
“Excessive” eating twelve times in three months will now constitute “Binge Eating
Disorder.” (What will we all do from Halloween through Christmas?!) Normal grief (e.g.,
over the death of a loved one) will become “Major Depressive Disorder.” I could go on,
but it’s more of the same. Behaviors are being regulated down to the tiniest degree.
“Disorders” are rapidly proliferating, and the medications to treat them are growing even
faster (even if the majority of disorders are still treated with the same handful of
psychotropic medications).
Perhaps what is most troublesome is that people believe in these fantastical
diagnoses and fear they are irreparably damaged—doomed and determined by biology.
Why bother trying if you are already determined by biology? Such a view leaves little
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place for talk therapy, no matter what your theoretical persuasion. Furthermore, it
prevents precisely what a Lacanian-oriented therapy aims for: subjectification and
assumption of one’s history and a responsibility to the Other. When Vincent pondered
why he should be responsible for the “Other within” because it seemed like he had “no
choice,” imagine if my response had been, “You’re not responsible. It’s just bad genes.
Sorry kid.” We need a counter discourse. We need a dialectization of thought because we
are currently fixated—stuck on repeat to the tune of, “Everyday I wake up and I take my
medication and I spend the rest of the day waiting for it to wear off...”100 I can think of no
better counter discourse within the therapeutic community than that of Lacan, not only
because he offers a diagnostic schema that focuses on human desire and the relation to
the Other (i.e., human experience), but because his is a therapy that aims at something
greater than social adaptation and conformity: It aims at the very realization of the subject
as difference. Isn’t this fundamentally what has been detailed in this work? A move from
the necessary submission to the Other of language, to the necessary objectification and
alienation of the self in the mirror stage, to the anxieties of separation and the demand for
love and recognition characterized by the imaginary, to an acceptance of lack and the
structural unfulfillability of desire characterized by the symbolic, and finally—
hopefully—to a subjectification of one’s own particular jouissance and one’s place in the
symbolic order: an identification and acceptance of the very impossibility of perfect unity
and wholeness, perhaps even an embracing of the difference that constitutes us all. Recall
Vincent’s comment that “There’s great value in not being understood.”
Indeed, there is. I am reminded here of Lacan’s (1957/2006) well-known
reformulation of Freud’s “Wo Es war, soll Ich werden”—usually translated as “Where
100
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the id was there the ego will be”—as “Where It was, there I shall come into being.” The
subject must come into being “in that place where the Other’s desire—a foreign, alien
desire—had been” (Fink, 1995, p. 62). The neurotic must thus be brought to a place in
therapy where s/he accepts the Other within and establishes a new relationship to the
drives and the satisfaction they seek. This is not a socially adaptive agenda. This is a
creative embracing of the very lack that constitutes our existence. It is a joyful acceptance
of that which cannot structurally be changed. It is, in the end, a radical envelopment in
difference, singularity, and the sheer beauty of human complexity.
Concluding Thoughts
I have completed my dissertation. I have formulated my cases. I now have the
luxury of hindsight. I find myself asking different questions now than at the beginning. I
wondered then why I felt capable of writing a Lacanian clinical dissertation given my
limited understanding of Lacan and my status as a simple Lacanian-oriented therapist
rather than an analyst. These are no longer questions for me. I have realized that the
answers to these questions lay in my patients’ speech. If I just followed the signifiers and
paid close attention to the signifying chain, the gaps—the lack—in their histories were
there in plain sight, waiting to be discovered. Perhaps even more so than when I began
this project, I believe Lacan is desperately needed in our current biologically-minded
cultural climate. Our culture is one that suggests that “normalcy” or “maturity” is a
developmental stage that is somehow attained and never again lost. It is reminiscent of
the idea of a “genital stage”—that if one could just reach it, it would mean the world
would be glorious and one would finally have arrived “there.” Wherever “there” is. The
truth is, for Lacan, there is no “there,” no final resting place where all is right in the world
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and blissful satisfaction reigns. It is structurally impossible. There is no magical place of
“normalcy,” no firmly instated line between “normal” and “pathological.” Development
does not follow a linear progression but is always a back and forth, an exquisite
dialectical movement that characterizes life and illuminates the beauty of the human
condition with all of its commensurate flaws, dissatisfaction, and imperfections. Beauty
does not lie in attaining some form of socially-defined “normalcy,” it lies in finding and
subjectifying one’s own particular kind of jouissance. People are not “normal” or
“abnormal,” they just are.
Looking back at the case presentations, I am reminded of the many ups and
downs that both Keenan and Vincent experienced during our work together. There was
no movement from “childishness” to “maturity.” There were strengths that were present
from the beginning and regressions that happened until the very end. Such is the nature of
being human. Lacan recognized this. It is not always easy to present a case in its full
circuitous complexity: It can make it quite difficult for the reader to follow. I realize,
reading the cases now, that in some ways, they do not quite capture the often rapid
vacillations that occurred during the therapeutic process. Rest assured, both Keenan and
Vincent’s therapies were anything but a straight trajectory from “unhealthy” to “healthy.”
My role throughout our work together was not to gage what “stage” either was in,
but to listen—actively listen—punctuating signifiers and polyvalent phrases, helping each
rewrite and reconstruct the rejected, lost parts of their histories. I offered evocative
interpretations when they were just on the brink of a new discovery, circling around it,
not quite able to find the word. I offered them my lack—my pure desirousness—in order
that they might lay claim to previously unavowed desires, and in so doing, find
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themselves a little less alienated from those desires. I did not draw socially normative
comparisons in an attempt to reassure them of their similarity to others, but instead
offered them the space to glimpse how their differences could be liberating and even lifeenhancing. I invited them to become questions for themselves and to explore freely the
various answers to those questions. Answers they provided, not ones enforced upon them
by socially-driven norms. Their therapies were not aimed at adapting them to society or
helping them become more “productive” members of society, but at freeing them to
ascertain for themselves their desires and enjoyment.
The end of this dissertation is a bit like the end of a Lacanian analysis: It is over
when a patient decides he or she is ready to move on, that he or she no longer needs the
therapist. The therapist falls away as the subject-supposed-to-know, and the patient
acknowledges the Other within. There is no grand culmination where the patient is
“cured,” only a place arrived at where the patient feels life is worth living. There are
always more questions and more work to be done. The questions are what keep us
moving forward, igniting our desire so that we do not become fixated and stagnant.
In preparing this dissertation, I have probably failed to answer certain questions
the reader may have hoped would be answered. I have come to terms with the fact that I
cannot cover everything, cannot speak masterfully about all of Lacan. Many of the
questions I began with have been answered for me through this writing. New questions
have been engendered that concern how to practically disseminate Lacan’s work to an
audience that has been so thoroughly indoctrinated into the medical model approach. I
hope that this dissertation provides a first step. I am left to wonder what the next step will
be. And it is in the very posing of that question that I continue to move forward.
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